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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents results from studies that empirically examine incentives,
values and provision of ecosystem services and restoration employing both realmoney field experiments and hypothetical stated preference mail surveys.
Manuscript I reports on a real-money discrete choice experiment (DCE) to
assess values for ecosystem restoration efforts focused on non-native plants
management in a nature reserve in southern California, USA. Employing a split
sample design, participants’ values and preferences for ecosystem restoration projects
are compared under a theoretically incentive compatible provision rule, i.e., a single
decision-maker’s choice, against a non-incentive compatible provision rule, i.e., a
plurality vote using three-option choices for restoring native habitats and birds. A
provision rule is a rule or process by which an environmental good is provided and
provides an explicit nexus between participants’ choices and actual policy outcomes.
In the field experimental settings, participants contributed actual dollars to deliver
actual ecosystem restoration projects on the ground. Results from these field
experiments suggest that the two provision rules produce statistically equivalent
preference functions irrespective of theoretical prediction of incentive compatibility
properties of such provision rules. These results may imply that participants in
consequential DCE surveys may respond truthfully to the choices despite the absence
of a provision rule that is theoretically incentive compatible.
Manuscript II reports on a hypothetical DCE survey, which asks survey
participants about their values and preferences for attributes of forested wetland
parcels. A split sample approach is employed to examine survey participants’ values

and preferences for attributes of protecting wooded wetlands using two survey
formats. The first survey format asks a group of survey participants two choice tasks
and the second survey format asks a different group of participants a series of twelve
choice tasks. This manuscript empirically examines whether the alternative choice
formats produce consistent responses and thus similar value estimates using
trichotomous choices (or three alternatives in each choice task) of wetland parcels
protection. Our results suggest that the alternative choice formats produce statistically
different underlying preference functions as well as significantly different estimates of
scale parameters related to error terms. Further explorations of the participants’
choices from the repeated survey format (or the responses from twelve choice tasks)
suggest evidence of precedent-dependent effects relating to a potential to retain higher
net surplus from the most-valued alternative in the current task relative to the mostvalued alternative in the preceding task may induce participants to be less cost
sensitive and thus have a higher WTP across the sequence.
Manuscript III reports on a real-money field experiment designed to generate
revenues through experiment participants’ offers to implement manure management
projects that improve water quality in local watershed system. The field experiments
employ a voluntary donation elicitation as well as a newly established public good
institution called individualized price auction (IPA). Participants offers are empirically
compared between the two public good institutions both incorporating the incentive
mechanisms from experimental economics literature including provision point (PP)
with a money back guarantee (MBG) and proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds
beyond the PP. Using a split sample design in a field experimental setting, we ask

participants to contribute real dollars towards ecosystem-service public good projects
focused on water quality improvements from implementing best manure management
practices in local livestock farms in the local watershed system. Our results suggest
that voluntary donation elicitation generated higher offers, on average, than those
under an IPA approach for all available range of water quality improvements (or
quantities of the ecosystem-service public good). Even though participants under both
public good institutions made approximately constant offers across the available range
of quantities of the good, they showed a statistically different pattern of contribution
across the public good treatments. A two-limit tobit model results suggest a
statistically significant heterogeneity in offers generated across the public good
treatments based on socio-demographic profiles of participants.
.
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PREFACE
This dissertation uses Manuscript Format to report the results of three research
projects with interconnected themes to assess values of ecosystem services and
restoration. All the procedures for the field experiments and surveys reported in this
dissertation were approved by Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of
Rhode Island.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmental economists have used stated preference or survey-based methods to
learn about the values of environmental goods and services. Under stated-preference
methods, researchers develop choice scenarios regarding the goods under
consideration and ask individuals to “state” their values for the goods. Because these
environmental goods and services cannot be traded in common commodity markets,
environmental economists have relied on these methods to create market-like
scenarios to learn about values of these goods. Also, many environmental goods and
services possess non-use values and these methods may be the only way to learn about
those values. Learning about the values of non-market goods is important because
these values are an integral part of many government-mandated benefit-cost analysis.
These values have also been used as evidence in legal proceedings over environmental
damages, e.g., after an oil-spill event. Overall, these values can be crucial to evaluate
public policies affecting the use and management of natural resources that produce
these goods and services for better environmental decision-making. Therefore,
creating an incentive compatible scenario, i.e., developing the scenario such that
individuals state their utility-maximizing choices, may be crucial in order to interpret
those values based on standard economic theory.
One of the popular stated-preference valuation methods is a discrete choice
experiment (DCE) method in which environmental goods are described by a bundle of
attributes or characteristics and individuals are asked to choose their preferred
alternative or option from a set of alternatives. There exist divergent views among
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economists regarding interpreting the results of DCE studies due to “stated” nature of
the choices rather than “revealed” market transactions. However, there is also a
consensus among economists that if the choices are obtained from incentive
compatible scenarios, where individuals are stating their utility-maximizing choices,
the responses from DCE studies can be interpreted in terms of the standard economic
theory.
There are various elements or dimensions that may affect incentive structures
of choice scenarios in a DCE study. One important dimension often ignored in most
previous studies is an explicit description of a provision rule by which an
environmental good under consideration is provided based on participants’ choices.
Manuscript 1 of this dissertation empirically examines this aspect of incentive
compatibility of DCE studies. Employing real-money in-person field experiments, I
empirically examined whether the type of provision rule affects value estimates for
ecosystem restoration attributes. That is I compared estimated values produced by a
DCE employing a single decision-maker’s choice rule, an incentive compatible
provision rule, and the corresponding estimates from a DCE using a plurality vote, a
non-incentive compatible provision rule under trichotomous elicitation format. Our
results suggest that value estimates are statistically equivalent across the provision
rules, implying that consequential DCE studies may produce value estimates that are
robust to the weaknesses in incentives of the DCE (particularly the absence of
incentive compatibility).
A DCE study elicits values for multi-attribute environmental goods and
services by asking survey participants a repeated series of choice scenarios consisting
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of two or more alternatives. This repeated response format in DCE studies has been
questioned in terms of truthfulness of responses across the sequence based on both
theoretical prediction as well as empirical evidence of a systematic change in stated
preferences across the sequence. Manuscript 2 of this dissertation examines this issue
in DCE by empirically comparing value estimates produced by a DCE study using two
choice scenarios and a DCE with a repeated series of twelve choice scenarios.
Employing a split-sample design, participants were asked about their preferred
wetland preservation parcels in local towns of Rhode Island, USA. Our results suggest
evidence of precedent-dependent effects relating to a potential to retain higher net
surplus from the most-valued alternative in the current task relative to the most-valued
alternative in the preceding task may induce participants to be less sensitive to cost
and thus appear to have a higher WTP across the sequence.
Valuing public goods and their efficient provision have posed a fundamental
challenge to both economists and fundraisers because the providers of the public
goods can not exclude potential beneficiaries who do not contribute toward the cost of
provision. This non-excludability nature creates a natural incentive for individuals to
“free-ride” on others’ contribution. Thus, public goods institutions often result in
under-provision of the good. Economists have been using modifications in public
goods institutions through experiments to mitigate the “free-riding” behavior. One
such pragmatic institution is a public good institution motivated by Lindahl’s
framework, called the Individualized Price Auction (IPA) implemented with incentive
mechanisms from experimental economics literature. In Manuscript 3 of this
dissertation, I empirically examined participants’ offers in terms of willingness-to-

3

contribute for ecosystem-service publics goods under the IPA approach against the
corresponding offers under a standard voluntary donation mechanism both
implemented using incentive mechanisms including a provision point (PP) with a
money-back guarantee (MBG) and a proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds
beyond the PP. Our results from real-money in-person field experiments suggest that a
less-structured voluntary donation elicitation generated higher offers compared to a
more-structured IPA approach.
The major goal of this dissertation research is to contribute to both DCE
literature as well as the public good experiments literature to further our understanding
in terms of examining ways to assess better estimates of values for the goods and
services that cannot be traded in common commodity markets and important insights
towards creating novel markets for the ecosystem services. This dissertation is
composed in Manuscript Format and I present results of three research projects with
interconnected themes as individual manuscripts. Finally, I complete the dissertation
with concluding remarks.
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MANUSCRIPT 1

CONSEQUENTIAL CASH CHOICE EXPERIMENTS AND RESTORATION OF
NROC’S ECOSYSTEM: DO THE PROVISION RULES MATTER?

Prepared for submission to mainstream journal in environmental and natural
resource economics
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1.1 Abstract
Although investigating incentive properties of stated preference surveys has been
a central topic in the non-market valuation literature, economic incentives defined by
the inclusion of a provision rule in the discrete choice experiments (DCE) framework
have not been adequately examined. We examine whether incentive compatibility of
provision rules likely affects responses from DCE surveys. We compare participants’
marginal values, and marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) estimates from DCE
surveys under a theoretically incentive compatible provision rule, i.e., a single
decision-maker’s choice, against a non-incentive compatible provision rule, i.e., a
plurality vote. We compared estimated preference functions that may be derived from
modeling trichotomous choices under the assumption of utility maximization. The
choices included ecosystem restoration projects focused on non-native plants
management in the Nature Reserve of Orange County (NROC), California. We
employed a split sample design in a consequential DCE framework, which involved
choices that require both actual cash payment and resulted in the actual
implementation of ecosystem restoration projects. We also compare those choices to
responses to a set of hypothetical choices. Results from a panel mixed logit model
suggest that the two provision rules produce statistically similar preference functions
in terms of marginal values as well as statistically equivalent marginal willingness to
pay (mWTP) for ecosystem restoration attributes, irrespective of the theoretical
prediction regarding incentive compatibility properties of the provision rules. These
results suggest that participants in consequential DCE surveys may respond truthfully
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to the choices despite the absence of a provision rule that is theoretically incentive
compatible.
Key words Consequentiality, discrete choice experiment, ecosystem restoration,
mixed logit model, provision rule, public goods
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1.2 Introduction
Participants’ responses from survey-based methods of eliciting preferences for the
valuation of non-market public goods are often questioned on the grounds of
truthfulness, although the stated preference methods have been widely used by many
government and private institutions for benefit cost analysis. Among economists, there
are divergent beliefs when it comes to interpreting the responses from such surveybased methods because the economic incentives that define these responses remain
poorly understood (Vossler, Doyon, & Rondeau, 2012). Many previous empirical
studies have tended to focus on examining the incentive properties of responses from
stated preference surveys compared to responses from such surveys which have direct
financial consequences (e.g., Mozumder & Berrens, 2007; Johnston, 2006; Brown,
Ajzen, & Hrubes, 2003; Taylor, McKee, Laury, & Cummings, 2001; Cummings &
Taylor, 1999). This comparison suggests that stated preference surveys that have
hypothetical choices frequently have higher willingness to pay (WTP) than from the
surveys that have choices requiring actual payment and bearing direct financial
consequences.1 However, Carson & Groves (2007) argue that responses from
consequential surveys2 can be interpreted in terms of standard economic theory such
as a mechanism design theory concerning incentive structures.

1

We also recognize literature on the convergent validity of stated preferences, such as

Carson, Flores, Martin, & Wright (1996), Murphy, Stevens, & Yadav (2010), Murphy,
2

Carson & Groves (2007) define surveys as being consequential if the results are seen

by survey participants as potentially influencing the surveying agency’s actions and
participants care about the outcomes of those actions. Carson, Groves, & List (2006)
8

An important aspect of consequentiality in DCE surveys relates to an explicit
description of a provision rule, a mechanism or process by which participants’
responses determine a collective policy outcome. The provision rule is therefore
considered important information bearing on incentive structures. When a provision
rule is not explicitly described, survey participants may be uncertain about how their
choices determine actual outcomes and this uncertainty may affect the incentives to
truthfully reveal their values. An explicit description of a provision rule may present
survey participants with specific incentives to respond to valuation questions.
Relatively little is known about how survey participants respond to the incentives
presented through including a provision rule in discrete choice experiments and how
these incentives shape the responses to the valuation questions. Using a split-sample
approach, this study empirically compares marginal values and marginal willingness
to pay (mWTP) estimates for ecosystem restoration attributes focused on invasive
plants management under a theoretically incentive-compatible provision rule, i.e., a
single decision-maker’s choice, against a non-incentive compatible provision rule, i.e.,
a plurality vote. In mechanism design theory, a single decision-maker’s choice rule is
called a dictatorship rule and is an incentive compatible mechanism for choice
situations with three or more alternatives as in our study. We referred to this rule in
our field experiment as “Single decision-maker’s choice” to avoid any negative
connotation of ‘dictatorship’ terminology. The plurality rule has been well established
in the literature as being incentive compatible for single binary choice situations. For
showed that neoclassical theory is applicable except when the influence of
participants’ choices on the agency’s actions or decisions, either deterministic or
probabilistic, is considered zero.
9

choice situations involving three or more alternatives like our study, this rule is not
generally incentive compatible because there may exist strategic reasons to
misrepresent true values. For example, the individual’s beliefs relating to the
distribution of preferences within the voting group may alter the incentives for truthful
responses (Taylor, Morrison, & Boyle, 2010).
We compared participants’ values and preferences from consequential DCEs under
these alternative provision rules, which require actual payment and bear direct
financial consequences, and which result in actual implementation of ecosystem
restoration projects. Our results suggest that the preference functions and value
estimates are statistically similar across the provision rules and suggest that regardless
of whether the provision rule is theoretically incentive compatible or not, participants
may respond truthfully to the choices in consequential DCE surveys.
Advancements in mechanism design theory3 (Brams & Fishburn, 2000; Moulin,
1991; Satterthwaite, 1975; Gibbard, 1973) have attracted researchers’ attention to
empirically examining economic incentives in DCE surveys that motivate survey
participants to disclose their privately held information, particularly the values for
public goods under alternative provision rules or mechanisms (Carson & Groves,
2007). In mechanism design theory, an incentive compatible mechanism is one in
which group or collective preferences align with individual preferences such that an
3

Mechanism design theory is a field in game theory studying solution concepts for a

class of private information games and usually involves motivating agents to disclose
their private information. It relates to designing a voting rule or mechanism to
truthfully identify a consistent collective outcome, from a fixed set of alternatives, on
the basis of voters’ privately held preferences.
10

individual can always do at least as well by choosing consistently with truthful
revelation of personal values as by any other choice. For example, when participants
are choosing between two alternative restoration plans in a single4 binary choice, the
majority (or plurality) vote provision rule (the alternative that receives the most votes
wins) is incentive compatible (Arrow et al., 1999). However, when participants are
choosing among three or more alternatives, the plurality vote rule may no longer be
incentive compatible as the voting strategies may depend on individual’s subjective
beliefs about the distribution of preferences within the voting group. Also a participant
may simply select the status quo option to avoid placing an undue burden on others,
when in fact the status quo option is not that participant’s most preferred alternative;
such an altuistic motivation is often called other-regarding behavior (Taylor,
Morrison, & Boyle, 2010). Since many stated preference studies have multinomial
choice situations (three or more alternatives in each choice task), the plurality vote
does not serve as an incentive compatible mechanism. In order to examine incentive
properties of multinomial choice situations, we establish a single decision-maker’s
choice as the incentive compatible base rule against which to compare a model of
values and preferences based on data generated under the plurality vote.
There are few previous studies that have examined the responses to choices in
DCE surveys where a provision rule is explicitly described to the participants. Collins
& Vossler (2009), in their laboratory induced-value experiments, have examined
provision rules using two-alternative and three-alternative choice situations and found
4

Carson & Groves (2007) argued about the independence of choices and Vossler,

Doyon, & Rondeau (2012) formally proved that independence among repeated choices
should be maintained.
11

more deviations from induced preferences for two-alternative choices and for
alternatives to a single plurality vote as compared to results under the rule in which the
outcome was determined by both participants’ and “regulator” votes. They also found
a statistically significant but modest degree of bias towards selecting the status-quo
option. Taylor, Morrison, & Boyle (2010) compared participants’ values under
alternative provision rules using hypothetical choices as well as choices that require
actual payment and bear direct financial consequences for both private and public
goods. For private goods, mWTP estimates from hypothetical choices are not
significantly different than those estimates from the choices that require actual
payment. However, for public goods they found a statistically higher mWTP from
hypothetical choices than corresponding value estimates from choices bearing direct
financial consequences. They also concluded that the bias in value estimates is the
largest when no provision rule was included and found no significant difference in
value estimates across included provision rules for public goods treatments. Vossler et
al. (2012) developed an explicit game-theoretic model of individual decisions and
formalized conditions under which DCE surveys with a single binary choice question
or a series of binary choice questions are incentive compatible following Carson &
Groves (2007). They complemented their theoretical model with field experiments and
concluded that truthful revelation may be possible if participants perceived that they
have more than a weak chance of influencing policy outcomes.
Using a split-sample approach, our study empirically compares marginal values
and mWTP for ecosystem restoration projects focused on non-native plants
management from consequential DCE surveys under two provision rules – a single

12

decision-maker’s choice and a plurality vote – using three-alternative choices. Our
study employed three-option choices because trichotomous choice is a common value
elicitation format in DCE survey for stated preference valuation studies. A single
decision-maker’s choice provision rule is the base incentive compatible rule in our
study, against which the plurality vote rule is compared. We employed the plurality
vote rule because a natural assumption may be that the alternative receiving the
greatest support or votes will be implemented for the provision of public goods, even
though a DCE survey often does not explicitly describe a provision rule (Taylor et al.,
2010).
Our field application involved ecosystem restoration choices with more attributes
than those in previous studies examining provision rules, as well as a unique situation
that allows us to identify potential sub-interest groups representing various
motivations for supporting ecosystem restoration which could lead to strategic voting
or behavior. We produced an experimental design utilizing a state-of-the-art efficient
design approach, which uniquely produced a set of choices that are potentially
implementable from a pool of real, implementable scenarios and also produced a set of
hypothetical choices that extended the range of levels of attributes covered in
implementable choices. Our results suggest that the preference function is statistically
similar across the provision rules irrespective of the incentive compatibility, at least
theoretically, of the provision rule, which is consistent with the findings from DCE
studies using dichotomous choices. We broaden this conclusion to a DCE study
involving trichotomous choices. The results suggest that the value estimates produced

13

by multinomial choice experiment surveys may be consistent with estimates of the
true Hicksian values.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.3 discusses the theoretical framework
to model responses from a DCE survey in relation to incentive compatibility based in
mechanism design theory. Section 1.4 details the field application. Section 1.5
presents the results of hypothesis tests. Section 1.6 concludes and discusses the
implications of the results.

1.3 The conceptual model
1.3.1 Discrete choice experiments and provision rules
We model participants' responses to ecosystem restoration choices using a standard
economic model, the Random Utility Model (RUM) (McFadden, 1974). The RUM
assumes a sample of N participants with the choice of J ecosystem restoration
alternatives on T choice sets or choice tasks. The utility that participant n derives from
choosing restoration alternative j on choice set t is given by Unjt = Vnjt + εnjt, where
Vnjt is an estimable component of the utility estimated from observed attributes
relating to ecosystem restoration alternatives and participants, and where εnjt is a
portion of utility relating to unknown randomness from the researcher’s perspective.
The probability that participant n chooses alternative j in choice task t denoted by Pnjt
is given by:
(1)

Pnjt = Pr ( Unjt > Unkt ∀ j≠k) = Pr (Vnjt + εnjt > Vnkt + εnkt ∀ j≠k)
= Pr (εnjt - εnkt > Vnkt - Vnjt ∀ j≠k)
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According to expression (1), a participant compares utilities received from available
alternatives in each choice set and chooses the alternative that provides him or her the
highest utility. The appropriate assumption about the distribution of random error
terms (εnjt) will yield a corresponding empirical choice model. This expression,
however, does not typically consider any influence of a provision rule on participant’s
utilities from available alternatives and thus choices. We will test whether choices
under different provision rules produce similar estimates of the preference function
that presumably underlies individuals’ choices.
Our survey participants responded to two sets of ecosystem restoration
choices- the first set includes choices representing real-world scenarios and
immediately implementable projects and the second set involves choices representing
future candidate projects (or hypothetical choices) for restoration. In our
questionnaire, we interspersed the real, implementable choice opportunities between
choices involving candidate projects as explained below. Each survey participant
received both sets of choices. We will also examine whether the value estimates
significantly differ between the two sets of choices.

1.3.2 Experimental plan
First we examine the influence of including a single decision-maker’s choice rule on
the estimated utilities from alternatives and how this influence may affect participants’
responses. Under this rule, the researchers will randomly draw a choice task from
among a series of implementable, real choice tasks. This random draw is required to
maintain the independence between choice tasks and one-to-one correspondence
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between choices and the outcomes as noted in Vossler et al. (2012). Under our
incentive-compatible decision rule, the researchers will also randomly select a
participant who will be the “single decision-maker,” whose response on the randomly
selected choice task will be the ecosystem restoration project that will be
implemented. Under this single decision-maker’s choice rule, each participant has an
equal chance of being the single decision-maker and, given that she is chosen as the
single decision-maker, she cannot do better than choosing the true utility-maximizing
alternative based on her preferences in each choice set or task. Thus, a single decisionmaker’s choice rule is a theoretically incentive compatible rule.5 In comparison, we
also examine how the inclusion of a plurality vote provision rule may impact utilities
from alternatives and thus affect the responses. Under this rule, the researchers
randomly selected a choice task and the project that receives the most votes is selected
for implementation. In our ecosystem restoration application participants are asked to
choose among two alternative restoration projects, labeled “Project A” and “Project
B” or to retain the status quo, a “no action” alternative.
The plurality vote rule is not generally incentive compatible in multinomial
choice situations like our study, as the voting strategies may depend on subjective
beliefs about the distribution of preferences within the voting group. For example,
there may be a sub-interest group that may have a favorable, or “pro,” attitude for
restoration projects that involve community members as trained volunteers or specific
5

This rule may not be very appealing in actual decision-making applications, because

many participants would expect something like a voting rule, but we set up this rule as
a "base rule" to compare preferences with plurality vote rule. This rule is the only
incentive compatible rule in case of three-option choice situations.
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preferences regarding the level of public access to restoration sites. In addition,
participants may simply select a status quo option to avoid placing a burden on others 6
when, in fact, the status quo option is not the utility-maximizing alternative. The
potential for the other-regarding behavior may further complicate the incentive
properties of a plurality vote provision rule (Taylor et al., 2010). Thus a plurality vote
rule in case of three-alternative choice situations is not incentive compatible.

1.3.3 Empirical model
We employed a panel mixed logit (Hole, 2008; Train, 2003; Revelt & Train, 1998;
Train, 1998) specification to model participants’ choices of ecosystem restoration
projects. The panel mixed logit model allows the utility coefficients to vary across
participants to incorporate heterogeneity in preferences and does not impose the
assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) which is imposed in a
conditional logit model. Following Revelt & Train, 1998, we assume that a sample of
N survey participants face J alternatives in T choice tasks. The utility derived by
participant n by choosing alternative j in choice task t can be written Unjt=βn’Xnjt+εnjt
where βn is a participant-specific vector of utility parameters, Xnjt is the vector of
observed characteristics relating to survey participant n and attributes relating to
alternative j on choice task t, and εnjt is an IID extreme value distributed error term.
The density for β is represented as f(β|θ) where θ denote the parameters of the
assumed distribution, such as βn ~ N (mean β, σ) for normally distributed parameters.
6

The status quo avoids imposing payments on others in a voting rule.
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The probability of participant n choosing alternative j on choice set t, conditional on
knowing βn, is given by the conditional logit formula (McFadden, 1974):
(2)

Pnjt (βn)= exp (βn’Xnjt) /

Σj’ exp (βn’Xnj’t)

The probability of the observed choices, conditional on knowing βn, is given by: Sn
(βn)=Πt{Pnj(n, t)t (βn)}where j(n, t) indicates the alternative participant n chooses in choice
task t. The unconditional probability of the observed choices is given by the
conditional probability integrated over the distribution of β: Pn(θ)=∫Sn(β) f(β|θ)dβ.
Thus, the unconditional probability is a weighted average of a product of logit
formulas evaluated at different values of β where the weights are given by the density
f. The log-likelihood then is given by: LL (θ)=Σn lnPn(θ). This expression cannot be
solved analytically, but can be approximated using simulated log-likelihood:
SLL(θ)=Σn ln{(1/R) Σr Sn(βr)}, where R is the number of replications and βr is the rth
draw from f(β|θ). The empirical utility function involving attributes of ecosystem
restoration alternatives as well as participant-specific characteristics employed in the
study will be discussed later.

1.3.4 Hypothesis testing
In order to examine whether the decision rule affects the set of mean estimates of
marginal utility parameters and mean estimates of mWTP values for ecosystem
restoration, we formally express the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1: The type of provision rule does not significantly influence a set of
mean estimates of marginal utility parameters, denoted by β.
HO: β singleDC = β pVOTE and HA: β singleDC ≠ β pVOTE ,
where βrule represents a set of mean marginal utility parameters in the population
estimated using responses from a sample of participants making choices under the
single decision-maker’s choice (rule=singleDC) or the plurality vote rule
(rule=pVOTE).
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we will conduct a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test by
imposing restrictions on a set of mean marginal utility parameters for one of the
subsamples to examine whether the restrictions are true. Based on our earlier
discussion on the theoretical predictions regarding the incentive compatibility of the
two provision rules under trichotomous choice scenarios, we expect to reject the null
hypothesis of no significant difference in marginal utility estimates across the rules.

Hypothesis 2: The type of provision rule does not significantly alter mean marginal
willingness to pay (mWTP) estimates for ecosystem restoration attribute X.
HO: mWTPX singleDC = mWTPX pVOTE and HA: mWTPX singleDC ≠ mWTPX pVOTE ,
where mWTPX= -1*(βruleX/ βruleCost) represents the ratio of the mean marginal utility
parameter of an attribute X (βX) and the mean marginal utility of income (negative of
βCost) estimated from the two subsamples, “rule”=singleDC, pVOTE. Since both
numerator (non-monetary restoration attribute X) and denominator (Cost attribute) of
mWTP values will be randomly distributed coefficients from a mixed logit model
(described below), these mWTP estimates can be calculated by using simulation. The
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simulated mWTP distributions can be obtained by dividing the draws from the
distributions of non-monetary coefficients by draws from the distribution of the cost
coefficient.
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we will conduct an empirical numeric procedure,
known as complete combinatorial convolutions, to determine whether simulated
mWTP distributions for restoration attributes are statistically different across the rules
(Poe et al., 2005; Poe et al., 1997; Poe et al., 1994). Based on our earlier discussion on
the theoretical predictions regarding the incentive compatibility of the two provision
rules under trichotomous choice scenarios, we expect to reject the null hypothesis of
no significant difference in simulated mWTP distributions across the rules.
We will also examine whether potential subgroups of participants, representing
specific strategic interests or motivations for certain aspects of restoration, have
significantly different preference functions, by examining significance of relevant
interaction terms (defined below) in the utility function. Furthermore, we will compare
participants’ responses for the potentially implementable, real choices and
hypothetical choices to examine whether participants have similar preferences
irrespective of financial consequences of restoration choices.

1.4 A field application to NROC’s native ecosystem restoration
1.4.1 Study context, restoration attributes and experimental design
We examined the hypotheses using two in-person field experiments employing the
discrete choice experiments (DCEs) framework. The choice surveys were part of a
broader study, which aimed at assessing the effectiveness of alternative management
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techniques to control non-native or invasive plants in order to restore native habitats,
particularly for target bird species. The choice experiments, within the broader project
objectives, were to assess public values and priorities for ecosystem restoration
attributes focused on the native habitats and target bird species and incorporate such
values and priorities into a decision support tool to be used by environmental
managers for prioritizing future restoration efforts. The study site is the Nature
Reserve of Orange County (NROC), which is a 37,000-acre nature reserve in southern
California established in 1996 to restore native habitats and natural processes
supporting grasslands and Cactus Wren and California Gnatcatcher bird species.
Interviews with ecosystem restoration experts from the NROC, Irvine Ranch
Conservancy (IRC), and other local conservation groups and a series of seven focus
groups (Johnston, Weaver, Smith, & Swallow, 1995) with local citizens were
employed to identify relevant project attributes and to develop, revise and pretest
survey instruments for overall clarity, salience of attributes, and comprehensiveness of
ecosystem restoration choices and general instructions. Participants in our focus group
discussions expressed an interest in multiple dimensions of ecosystem restoration in
the NROC. Some examples include favorable attitudes towards involving community
members as trained volunteers in the restoration process7 or preferences regarding the
level of public access sites for various activities. Based on these observations during
focus group discussions, we hypothesize that there may exist subgroup(s) of
participants representing those interests or motivations which may lead those groups to

7

Individuals expressed the belief that volunteers become experienced and educated

advocates for NROC and ecosystem restoration generally.
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respond strategically to the restoration choices. Table 1.1 presents identified project
attributes and their corresponding levels, namely restoration effort, habitat and bird
species focus, size of restoration site, public access, involvement of trained volunteers,
likelihood of success of a restoration project, and cost to the participants.

Table 1.1 Ecosystem restoration project attributes and levels
Attribute
Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus

Public
Access

Variablea
High_Effortb: a dummy variable;
=1 if high effort;
=0 if low effort

Levels
1. High effort: Project
restores 0-30% native cover
up to 51-75%.
2. Low effort: Project
restores 30-50% native cover
up to 51-75%.
Habitat_Cactusb: effects-coded
1. Coastal Cactus Scrub:
variable,
Restoration is implemented
=1 if restoration in coastal cactus scrub; in native cactus scrub
=0 if restoration in native grasslands
habitat, which supports
=-1 if restoration in coastal sage scrub
Cactus wren c, and often
supports California
Habitat_Ngrassb: effects-coded
gnatcatcherd.
variable,
2. Native Grasslands:
=1 if restoration in native grasslands;
Restoration is implemented
=0 if restoration in coastal cactus scrub; in native grasslands habitat,
=-1 if restoration in coastal sage scrub
which supports other native
wildlife.
3. Coastal Sage Scrub:
Restoration is implemented
in native sage scrub habitat,
which supports California
gnatcatcher.
High_Access: effects-coded variable;
1. High Public Access: Area
=1 if area allows high public access;
allows access for running,
=0 if area allows medium public
hiking, mountain biking,
access;
with designated areas for
=-1 if area allows low public access
dogs and horse-back riding
when ecologically feasible.
Medium_Access: effects-coded
2. Medium Public Access:
variable;
Area allows access for
=1 if area allows medium public
running, hiking, mountain
access;
biking.
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=0 if area allows high public access;
=-1 if area allows low public access
Trained
Volunteers

Volunteers: a dummy variable;
=1 if project involves trained
volunteers;
=0 if project does not involve
volunteers.

Likelihood
of Success

High_Success: a dummy variable;
=1 if project has high likelihood of
success;
=0 if project has medium likelihood of
success.

3. Low Public Access: Area
allows access for research
with permits and guided
tours only.
1. Yes: Project involves
trained volunteers in addition
to restoration professionals.
2. No: Project does not
involve trained volunteers in
addition to restoration
professionals.
1. High Likelihood of
Success: Due to easy access
for maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape.
2. Medium Likelihood of
Success: Due to moderate
access for maintenance and /
or surrounded by mixed
native-nonnative landscape.
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9

Size of
Sizeb: Size of candidate restoration
Restoration sites, in acres
Cost to
Costb: Cost to participant from
$40, $60, $75, $90, $105,
participant personal budget of $150
and $110
Status quo SQb: A dummy variable equals 1 for the status quo option or “neither
option
project”, and equals 0 for a parcel (Project A or Project B).
a
Non-monetary ecosystem restoration attributes in vector Xnjt were assumed to follow
normal distribution and the cost attribute (Costnjt) was assumed to follow log-normal
distribution while estimating the utility function in Eq. (3).
b

Ecosystem restoration attributes included in vector X^njt were specified as fixed

parameters in Eq. (3).
c

Cactus Wren is listed as California State Species of Special Concern and was selected

as one of the “Target Species” in Orange County’s Central and Coastal Natural
Community Conservation Plan/Habitat Conservation Plan (NCCP/HCP) in 1993 and a
surrogate for conservation of coastal cactus scrub habitat.
d

California Gnatcatcher is listed as a federally-threatened species by the United States

Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). The gnatcatcher is also a focus of the California
Department of Fish and Game’s Natural Community Conservation Planning Act, and
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is one of the three “Target Species” in Orange County’s Central and Coastal
NCCP/HCP.

We employed an efficient design8 because a full factorial design using
attributes and levels in Table 1.1 will result in a very large number of choice sets,
which is not practical. We used responses to draft surveys, obtained through focus
group pretests, to support priors on the parameters of ecosystem restoration attributes
to produce the final design. Our efficient design process was unique because we
created 14 choice sets or tasks covering the attribute levels in Table 1.1, but the
efficient design was chosen to include 6 choice sets for which projects fit the
description of real, implementable ecosystem restoration projects and the remaining 8
choice sets for which project descriptions represent hypothetical, candidate projects
for future consideration. Experts from NROC and IRC provided a description of a
total of 18 real-world scenarios, which were fed into Ngene to produce a set of 6
potentially implementable choice tasks. The printed survey distinguished the 6 real,
and potentially implementable, choice sets from the 8 hypothetical choice sets using
an explicit label, stating "Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice
“[L],” where L represents one of the following unique letters: P, Q, R, X, Y, and Z.
All 14 choice tasks were efficiently blocked into two groups of 7 tasks to control for
ordering effects, if any, which could produce noise in our analysis. Each participant in
8

This is a design that yields data enabling estimation of the preference parameters

with standard errors as low as possible. Ngene 1.1 (ChoiceMetrics, 2011), a software
specifically designed to produce experimental design for DCE surveys, was used to
produce this design. We are thankful to the technical experts from Ngene software,
who developed a separate software module to accommodate our unique design need.
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our experiments received all 14 choice tasks. In each survey booklet, the 14 choice
questions were arranged beginning with a hypothetical question and alternating with
real, implementable questions. Manuscript 1- Appendix A1 provides the complete 14
choice questions.

Figure 1.1 An example of real, implementable ecosystem restoration choice task

Note: Choices that were not implementable in the 2012 NROC field season did not
have the box shown above the choice question.

Each choice task, real and potentially implementable (or hypothetical),
included two ecosystem restoration projects, labeled “Project A” and “Project B” and
the status quo as a “no action” alternative (Figure 1.1). We developed a choice survey
entitled "Ecosystem Auctions for Decision Support (EADS): Economic Choices for
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Ecosystem Restoration for Environmental Decision-Making in the Nature Reserve of
Orange County (NROC), California". The choice survey consisted of a total of 3
sections. The first section used a 7 point Agree-Disagree scale and asked participants
about their general opinion towards ecosystem restoration, their perspectives on
involving volunteers or public access near restoration sites, and incorporating public
values and priorities in future restoration decisions. The second section presented
participants with the 14 choice tasks along with information and instructions on the
corresponding provision rule. We also included a subsection that asked participants
follow up questions, on a 5-point Likert-scale, about how they answered choice tasks.
The third section asked participants about their socio-demographic characteristics.
Manuscript 1- Appendix A3 provides a complete survey booklet.

1.4.2 Participants, procedures, and the provision rules
Participants for in-person field experiments were recruited through local
environmental organizations, namely Nature Reserve of Orange County (NROC);
Irvine Ranch Conservancy (IRC); Back to Natives Restoration; Laguna Greenbelt;
Newport Bay Conservancy; Laguna Canyon Foundation; Friends of Harbors, Beaches
and Parks; and Sea and Sage Audubon Society. An email invitation was sent to the
email lists of these organizations and individuals were asked to register voluntarily in
one of the two in-person field experiments, called “Ecosystem Restoration DecisionMaking Workshop”, held at an educational facility of Orange County Parks, at the
Peter and Mary Muth Interpretive Center. At least two rounds of email reminders were
sent during the recruitment period, offering a $40 participation fee. The first workshop
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was on Wednesday, May 16, 2012, from 5:30 -7:30 pm and had 57 volunteers sign up,
and the second workshop was on Thursday, May 17, 2012, at the same time and had
53 individuals sign up. Twenty-three individuals who were available for both
workshops were randomly assigned to one.
For field experiments, a PowerPoint presentation about the project in general,
experimental instructions, information about the project attributes, and description of
the corresponding provision rule, was made by the same experiment moderator
(Manuscript 1- Appendix A2). The information provided through the presentation was
kept as similar as possible across the two experiment nights. The only difference in
information provided across the two nights is the description of the corresponding
provision rule. For the field experiments, each participant was provided with a budget
of $150 from the research grant9, of which $40 was guaranteed for participants to take

9

The authors recognize the literature on house money effect, a term coined by Thaler

and Johnson (1990) based on “mental accounting” theory proposed by Thaler (1980),
to describe behavioral discrepancies due to an initial endowment given to participants
to make decisions in economic experiments. They found that participants in risky
lottery experiments who have experienced monetary gains or profit are often willing to
take more risk because they do not treat those gains as their own money. There is
mixed evidence on the presence of the house money effect in a variety of experimental
settings suggesting that the effect may be specific to the environment being tested.
While this effect has been found in dictator game experiments (Cherry et al., 2002;
Engel, 2011), public good experiments (Harrison, 2007), experimental auctions
(Ackert et al., 2006) and capital expenditures (Keasy and Moon, 1996), Clark (2002)
and Cherry et al. (2005) did not find such effect in their public goods experiments.
Spraggon and Oxoby (2009) reported a negative effect of the “windfall gain” on
contribution in their public goods experiment. In our field experiments, the research
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home as a participation fee and participants could spend the remaining $110 on the
projects or take it home, depending on the decision-outcome for the evenings’
experiment. Participants were encouraged to consider the budget provided as their out
of pocket money which they can spend on the projects or take home to spend on utility
bills, family gifts, and donations to charities or any other purposes important to them.
For example, the following excerpt is from the introduction section of the survey:
“…Recall that any money you keep can be used for other personal priorities,
including family expenses, gifts, donations to conservation or important
charities, or any other purpose…”
Participants were also reminded about what they could do with the money not
spent on restoration projects, right before they faced choice tasks, with the following
paragraph:
“…We request that you consider restoration projects in each choice question in
terms of what each project might or might not accomplish, how it matters
to you, whether it is worth the money cost to you, and how your vote
might influence the group outcome for tonight. Recall money not spent on
these projects may be used by you at home for other priority expenses or
charities…” (Emphasis in original)

moderator repeatedly emphasized and encouraged participants to consider money
given to them as their “out of pocket” money by highlighting the personal priorities
they can spend money on if they decided to take the money home in both PowerPoint
presentation and the instructions in the survey booklet; these reminders included the
potential to use retained funds for philanthropic or other conservation organizations.
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At the end of each session, one ecosystem restoration project was determined
as the project to be implemented based on the corresponding rule in force for the
evening and the payment to the participants was made based on the selected project.
Participants were told that NROC and IRC would be implementing the chosen projects
determined by their choices.
Participants were presented with the exact same project background
information, example choices, choice tasks and other questions except the description
of the provision rule used. The following is an excerpt from the instructions of a
plurality vote rule:
“Determining the group outcome at the end of tonight’s workshop
Once everyone has finished responding to all choice questions, one choice
question number will be selected randomly from the group of choice
questions labeled as Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012,
Choice-…”. Each participant’s response on this choice question will be
counted as a vote. The project that gets the most votes will be chosen as the
group outcome of tonight’s decisions and will be implemented in this
(2012/2013) NROC field season. Your payment will be determined based on
the group outcome chosen according to majority vote (or plurality vote) rule
as described above.” (Emphasis in original)
As the single decision-maker's choice rule involved two stages- (i) randomly
choosing a choice task, and (ii) also randomly choosing a single decision-maker whose
response on the selected choice task becomes the project to be implemented, the
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following excerpt was presented to participants to describe how the single decisionmaker's choice rule will be implemented:
“Determining the group outcome at the end of tonight’s workshop
Once everyone has finished responding to all choice questions, one choice
question number will be selected randomly from the group of choice
questions labeled as “Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012
Choice-…” .One Survey ID number will also be selected randomly. The
project, chosen by the person holding the randomly selected Survey ID
number on the randomly selected choice question, will be chosen as the
group outcome of tonight’s decisions and will be implemented in this
(2012/13) NROC field season. Your payment will be determined based on the
group outcome chosen according to the randomly chosen single decisionmaker’s choice as described above.” (Emphasis in original)

1.4.3 Outcome of the decision-making Workshops
After all participants completed their surveys, the survey booklets were collected to
implement the corresponding provision rule on each night of the Workshops. On each
night, the experiment moderator randomly picked a choice task number (or
corresponding letter) on which the corresponding provision rule was implemented. By
random chance, both Workshop nights resulted in drawing the same real,
implementable choice question (“Feasible, potentially implementable projects in
2012 Choice-Q”) and the outcome based on the implementation of corresponding rule
was the same (“Project A”), meaning both nights resulted in selecting the same
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restoration project10. Thus, the decision-making workshops resulted in restoration
projects described as “Low” level of restoration in Cactus Scrub habitat in 2 acres (1
acre from each night) in an area that allows for medium level of public access without
involving volunteers and is expected to result in high likelihood of success.
Participants in both Workshops nights were told that the Nature Reserve of Orange
County (NROC) and Irvine Ranch Conservancy will be responsible for implementing
the selected ecosystem restoration projects and interested experiment participants can
learn more about the projects through these organizations.

1.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Of 57 volunteers for the first workshop, 43 actually arrived on time and participated in
the plurality vote rule. Of 53 for the second workshop, 38 arrived on time and
participated in the single decision-maker’s choice rule. Of these participants, twentythree had been available for either evening and assigned randomly to a workshop.
We utilized responses to seven-point Likert scale statements, varying from
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, regarding participants’ views and attitudes
towards various aspects of ecosystem restoration in the NROC to construct continuous
factor variables using a factor analysis approach (Kaiser, 1958); (Harman, 1976). We
employed a principal component factor (PCF) with varimax rotation to construct four
10

NROC and IRC confirmed that that two projects fitting same description were

feasible, so, in fact, the same project was implemented twice but on slightly different
locations; the precise location within NROC lands was not part of the descriptions in
the choice questions.
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continuous-valued factors from participants’ responses to the statements. The rotated
factor loadings were then used to convert responses to the statements from each
individual participant to “standardized scores” using the regression scores method
(Milan & Whittaker, 1995) in the Stata statistical package. The details of the
statements used and rotated factor loadings are presented in Table 1.2.

“Standardized
Public Access”

“Comprehensive
and Sustainable
Restoration”

“Conservation for
Quality of Life”

“Value
Information”

“Restoration for
Long-term
Events”

I would prefer restoration be
completed quickly utilizing
park staff and contractors or
professionals with higher
expected success rates but
higher costs, than completed
over a greater length of time
(years) utilizing park staff
and volunteers at much
lower cost but more variable
success rate.
I value restoration actions
more when I have access to
information
about
the
project and its goals.
I personally believe that
preservation of the full
ecosystem is the most
effective
means
of
preserving
individual
sensitive species.
I personally believe that
conservation or stewardship
actions are essential parts of

“Involve
Community”

Statementsa

Table 1.2 Rotated factor loadings on Likert-scale statements

-0.7215

0.1425

0.2974

0.0713

-0.0025

0.0638

0.0686

0.0054

0.0025

0.0730

0.9133

0.0425

-0.4753

-0.0728

0.6912

-0.1337

0.2013

0.0175

-0.0005

-0.2312

0.1836

0.6384

0.4017

0.1991
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managing the reserve lands.
Seeing restoration projects
and their associated flagging
or markers detracts from my
outdoor experience.
I personally believe that
restoration of habitat that is
most suitable to native
wildlife is more important
than
vegetation
management
focused
around aesthetics or other
public priorities.
I would rather have public
access to all areas of open
space on a standardized
rotation
cycle
than
unlimited public access in
some areas and restricted or
no public access to others.
For the same cost, I would
rather have less area
restored,
but
involve
underprivileged
groups,
students or other community
members, than more area
restored with contractors or
professionals.
It is important to me
personally
that
land
managers incorporate public
values or priorities as an
input
to
ecosystem
restoration decisions.
I personally believe that
restorations within public
view
should
utilize
educational signage.
I personally believe that
restoration projects should
incorporate
restoration,
monitoring and maintenance
methods that ensure a
sustainable restoration.
I personally believe that
ecosystem
restoration

-0.0089

0.6501

-0.1016

-0.2335

0.2229

-0.2338

-0.0775

-0.6169

0.2233

0.0454

-0.0038

-0.3835

0.1014

0.7324

0.1066

0.1736

-0.1530

-0.0976

0.6602

0.1053

0.1572

-0.2916

-0.0652

0.1092

0.7694

0.1695

0.1012

0.0378

0.2140

-0.0810

0.2289

0.0294

0.7452

0.2290

-0.1409

0.2759

-0.0137

-0.4559

0.5404

0.1614

0.0659

-0.2454

-0.0909

0.0657

0.0352

0.8682

-0.0062

-0.0373
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efforts or activities in the
NROC positively affect the
quality of life of the local
communities around the
reserve.
I personally believe that -0.0564 -0.0380 0.1171 0.0290 0.0674 0.8747
restoration projects should
incorporate
restoration,
monitoring and maintenance
methods
that
address
potential long-term issues of
stochastic events (drought,
fire) and climate change.
a
Survey participants rated each statement using a seven-point Likert-scale varying from
Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly Disagree (7). Numbers in bold represent varimax rotated
highest factor loading (normalized to mean 0 and SD 1) for a given statement indicating
agreement for positive coefficient and vice versa. Total variation explained by the six
factors is 68.54%.
Table 1.3 reports some basic socio-demographic characteristics of the
participants across the two provision rules. A chi-squared test of independence for
categorical variables and two-sample t-test between the means of continuous variables
between the decision rules are reported in Table 1.3. These test results suggest that the
two participant groups are not significantly different in terms of socio-demographic
characteristics and environmental attitudes, except participants in the two workshops
displayed a statistically significant difference between the means of the factor
indicating a favorable attitude for “Comprehensive and Sustainable Restoration.” We
also compared participants’ socio-demographic characteristics to available data on the
population of Orange County, California (US Census Bureau, 2010). These
comparisons suggest that the distribution of the proportion of male and female
participants (Pearson χ2=1.457, df=2, p=0.4826), homeowners and renters (Pearson
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χ2=2.205, df=2, p=0.3320), high ($75,000 or more a year) and low income (<$75,000
a year) (Pearson χ2=3.617, df=2, p=0.1639) are not significantly different from that of
the population of Orange County. However, both field experiments had significantly
higher percentages of individuals with graduate degrees (Pearson χ2=22.927, df=2,
p<0.0001) than that of the population of the county.

Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics about participants across provision rules
Provision rules
Categorical
variables

Description
Plurality
Vote
(pVOTE,
N=43)

Sample
Mean
(SD)
Male
1 if a participant is male;
0.44
0 otherwise
(0.50)
Home owner
1 if a participant owns a 0.67
home; 0 otherwise
(0.47)
Graduate
1 if a participant has a 0.39
degree
graduate degree;
(0.49)
0 otherwise
Low income
1 if a participant’s 0.41
household income is less (0.49)
than $75,000; 0 otherwise
Donate
1 if a participant donates 0.65
money
to
an (0.48)
environmental group;
0 otherwise
Participated in 1 if a participant has ever 0.58
restoration
participated
in
any (0.50)
ecosystem
restoration
projects; 0 otherwise
Hiker
1 if a participant has 0.55
ranked “hiking” as the (0.50)
most
important
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Single
DecisionMaker’s
Choice
(singleDC,
N=38)
Sample
Mean
(SD)
0.52 (0.50)
0.68 (0.47)
0.39 (0.49)

Pearson
χ2, 1df
(p)

0.5763
(0.448)
0.0089
(0.925)
0.0000
(0.996)

0.55 (0.50)

1.4515
(0.228)

0.63 (0.48)

0.0337
(0.854)

0.73 (0.44)

2.1551
(0.142)

0.44 (0.50)

0.9903
(0.32)

recreational
activity
around the NROC;
0 otherwise
Education tour 1 if a participant has
(“EduTour”)
ranked
“educational
tours” as the most
important
recreational
activity
around
the
NROC; 0 otherwise
“Public”
1 if a participant has
aspect
ranked “public aspects of
restoration i.e., public
access
and
trained
volunteers” as the most
influential attributes in
their
decisions;
0
otherwise
Continuous
Description
variables

0.23
(0.43)

0.26 (0.45)

0.1016
(0.75)

0.30
(0.46)

0.34 (0.48)

0.1465
(0.702)

Sample
Mean
(SD)
31.22
(17.14)

t-stat, 79
df
(p)
1.0368
(0.303)

-0.07 (1.00)

0.5933
(0.5547)

-0.07 (0.92)

0.6562
(0.5136)

-0.23 (1.15)

2.0261
(0.0461)

0.001 (0.99)

0.0131
(0.9896)

0.003 (1.04)

0.032
(0.9746)

Sample
Mean
(SD)
Resident
Number of years a 27.30
(years)
participant lived in or (16.84)
around Orange County
“Involve
A continuous factor score 0.06
Community”
indicating pro-attitude for (1.00)
involving
community
members
in
the
restoration
“Standardized A continuous factor score 0.06
Public
favoring
standardized (1.06)
Access”
public access on the areas
of open space in the
NROC
“Comprehensi A continuous factor score 0.20
ve
and indicating a favor for (0.79)
Sustainable
methods
to
ensure
Restoration”
comprehensive
and
sustainable restoration
“Conservation A continuous factor score -0.001
for Quality of indicating a belief that (1.01)
Life”
conservation actions in
the NROC affect the
quality of life around it.
"Value
A continuous factor score -0.003
Information”
indicating
that (0.96)
participants
value
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conservation actions more
when they have access to
information
“Restoration
A continuous factor score 0.06
for Long-term indicating a pro-attitude (0.89)
Events”
for restoration actions that
address long-term issues
of stochastic events like
drought, fire and climate
change

-0.06 (1.11)

0.5803
(0.5634)

1.5 Results
1.5.1 Empirical model specification
We assume that the indirect utility is a linear function of ecosystem restoration
attributes, the cost to participants, and selected interactions. First we established an
unrestricted specification of the utility for a project, as represented below, and
estimated using a panel mixed logit model11 (Hole, 2008; Haan & Uhlendorff, 2006;
Train, 2003; Train, 1998; Revelt & Train, 1998) with the pooled data, and then tested
the parameter restrictions of interest against the unrestricted model. Thus, we defined:
(3) Vnjt=βSQSQj+βXXnjt+βCostCostnjt+(βHikerSQSQj+βHikerXXnjt+βHikerCostCostnjt)!Hikern
11

A Likelihood Ratio (LR) test suggests that a mixed logit model is a better fit than

the corresponding standard conditional logit model (χ2=439.3132, df=10, pvalue<0.0001). We employed the mixlogit module in Stata (Hole, 2007) to estimate
our models with “id (participant id)” option to adjust for the potential nonindependence of responses to 14 choice tasks from a survey participant. Only SQj,
Xnjt, and Costnjt and their interactions with the dummy variable, DP, for a total of 20
variables, were specified as random variables because the software module cannot
accommodate all interactions as random variables. Since the focus of our LR test is on
comparing the significance of coefficients on the SQj, Xnjt, and Costnjt across the rules,
we treated other interactions as fixed parameters.
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+(βEduTourSQSQj+βEduTourXXnjt+βEduTourCostCostnjt)!EduTourn+(βDRealSQSQj
+βDRealX^X^njt+βDRealCostCostnjt)!DRealt+(βSQPSQj+βXPXnjt+βCostPCostnjt)!DP
+(βHikerSQPSQj+βHikerXPXnjt+βHikerCostPCostnj)!Hikern!DP+(βEduTourSQPSQj
+βEduTourXPXnjt+βEduTourCostPCostnjt)!EduTourn!DP+(βDRealSQPSQj+βDRealX^PX^njt+
βDRealCostPCostnjt)!DRealt!DP
where βSQ represents the coefficient measuring the utility of the status quo option
(SQj); SQj represents a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the status quo option or
“no action” alternative and the value of 0 for an ecosystem restoration project; βHikerSQ
βEduTourSQ βDRealSQ adjusts (or adds) the utility of the status quo option due to dummy
variables “Hikern”, “EduTourn” and “DRealt” for participants under a single decisionmaker’s rule (DP=0); “Hikern” is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for a
participant who has ranked “hiking” as the most important recreational activity around
the NROC and a value of 0 otherwise; “EduTourn” is a dummy variable taking a value
of 1 for a participant who has ranked “educational tours” as the most important
recreational activity around the NROC and a value of 0 otherwise; “DRealt” is a
dummy variable equals 1 for real, immediately implementable choice task and equal 0
otherwise; βX represents the vector of coefficients measuring the mean marginal utility
parameters of non-monetary restoration attributes (Xnjt); Xnjt represents a vector of
non-monetary attributes of restoration projects; βHikerX βEduTourX adjusts (or adds) the
fixed marginal utility parameters for the non-monetary restoration attributes due to the
dummy variables “Hikern”, “EduTourn”; βDRealX adjust (or adds) the marginal utility

38

parameters for the selected non-monetary restoration attributes (X^njt)12 due to the
dummy variable “DRealt”; βCost represents the coefficient measuring the mean
marginal utility parameter of cost to participants (Costnjt; negative of which is known
as marginal utility of income); Costnjt represents the cost to participants; βHikerCost
βEduTourCost, βDRealCost adjusts (or adds) the fixed marginal utility parameters to the mean
marginal utility of the cost to participants (Costnjt) due to the dummy variables
“Hikern”, “EduTourn” and “DRealt”; DP represents a dummy variable taking a value
of 1 for the subsample of participants making choices under a plurality vote provision
rule and the value of 0 for the subsample of participants making choices under a single
decision-maker’s choice provision rule. Our model specification in Eq. (3) sets up the
base case as the utility under the single decision-maker’s choice rule (DP=0) and the
corresponding parameters with the last subscript “P” represent the corresponding
adjustments (additions to the utility parameters) under the plurality vote decision rule
(DP=1).

12

Ecosystem restoration attributes defined in Table 1.1 were included in the X^njt, but

“High_Access”,

“Medium_Access”,

“Volunteers”,

and

“High_Success”

were

excluded in the estimation because the levels of these attributes in real, implementable
ecosystem restoration projects for the 2012 field season were constrained by the
availability of real-world scenarios, thus creating colinearity. This reality limits our
ability to compare the utility parameters for these specific attributes across the real,
implementable and hypothetical choices but does not affect other estimations
otherwise.
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1.5.2 Hypothesis test results
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we estimated a panel mixed logit model of the indirect
utility specification in Eq. (3) from the pooled data and examined the significance of a
set of parameter restrictions on the unrestricted model using a likelihood ratio (LR)
test. The LR test failed to reject the null of no significant difference, meaning a set of
mean utility parameters, i.e., the mean marginal utilities of non-monetary restoration
attributes, the mean marginal utility of income, and the mean utility of the status quo
option, are statistically equivalent across the subsamples (across the two workshops)
(LR Test: βSQP=βXP=βCostP=0; χ2=14.77, df=20, p=0.7894)13. This result suggests that
the two provision rules produce statistically equivalent underlying preference
functions.
We also conducted a LR test to examine whether the set of fixed marginal
utility parameters is statistically different for a group of participants characterized by
different interests or motivations.14 For example, a group of participants who has
13

One may question about the “power” of the test in terms of avoiding Type II error.

Type II error is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis, meaning inability of a
statistical test to detect the significant effect when, in fact, the difference exists. The
LR tests reported here are based on the data from 81 individuals each responding to 14
potentially independent choices, totaling 1134 observations. The authors present the
results of the tests on the assumption that 1134 observations will be sufficient to detect
the difference, if there is any, as determining the “power” for already computationallycomplex mixed logit model is beyond the scope of this paper.
14

In an effort to identify individuals who might be more or less likely to respond

strategically to choice opportunities favoring a particular interest, we created one
additional choice task, the 15th choice task, consisting of the status quo and three
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ranked “hiking” as the most important recreational activity around the NROC (see
“Hiker” in Table 1.3) may have a statistically different preference function compared
to the participants who do not represent that interest or motivation. Also this distinct,
if any, preference function may be affected by the type of provision rule, such as under
a plurality vote due to its incentive structure to allow for potential strategic responses.
Similarly, participants who have ranked “educational tours” as the most important
activity around NROC may have such strategic motivations to have a distinct
preference function relative to the participants who do not share those interests or
motivations (see “EduTour” in Table 1.3), for example, under the plurality vote that
allows for strategic opportunities as predicted by the theory. We examined whether
these distinct groups of participants have statistically different functions using a LR
test by imposing the restrictions on the appropriate interactions in Eq. (3). LR tests
suggest that none of these distinct groups have statistically different preference
functions and also these preference functions are statistically equivalent across the
provision rules (LR Test: βHikerSQ=βHikerX=βHikerCost=βHikerSQP=βHikerXP=βHikerCostP=0;
χ2=24.3751, df=20, p=0.2264 and LR Test: βEduTourSQ=βEduTourX=βEduTourCost=
βEduTourSQP=βEduTourXP=βEduTourCostP=0; χ2=13.1761, df=20, p=0.8697). These LR tests
restoration projects using a separate orthogonal design. The three restoration projects
represented a specific focus on the public access, size of candidate sites, and the
involvement of community members as trained volunteers by allowing the attributes
indicating these dimensions in options A, B, and C respectively to vary and keeping
all other attributes, as defined in Table 1.1, constant across the three options. We did
not find significant results of using participants’ response to this 15th choice task in
identifying potential strategic voters in our preliminary models and thus these data are
excluded in the further discussions.
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suggest that these distinct groups of participants, who we expected may have
statistically different preference functions due to their distinct interests or motivations,
have statistically equivalent preference functions and further their underlying
preference functions are not altered by the type of the provision rule.
We further examined whether participants’ marginal utility parameters are
significantly different across the real, implementable and hypothetical choices of
ecosystem restoration. A LR test implies that participants have statistically equivalent
marginal utility parameters between the real and hypothetical choices and the type of
provision rule does not significantly alter these marginal utility parameters (LR Test:
βDRealSQ=βDRealX^=βDRealCost=βDRealSQP=βDRealX^P=βDRealCostP=0; χ2=9.6117, df=12, p=
0.6499).
Since our empirical model specified the coefficients on the attributes of
ecosystem restoration (βX, βXP) as well as the coefficient on the cost to participants
(βCost, βCostP) as random variables, we employed a Monte-Carlo simulation15 to
estimate the mean marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) values for restoration
attributes. These values across the decision rules are reported in Table 1.4. We used
parameter estimates of the unrestricted model presented in Eq. (3) to simulate the
mWTP distributions. In order to test Hypothesis 2, we conducted pair-wise
convolution tests (Poe et al., 2005; Poe et al., 1997) to empirically determine the
significance of the difference in mWTP distributions for restoration attributes across
the provision rules. mWTP distributions and the results of the pair-wise convolution

15

We used simulate command in Stata (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010) to perform Monte-

Carlo simulations with 105 replications.
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tests are presented in Table 1.4. The results of these tests suggest that mWTP
distributions for restoration attributes are statistically equivalent across the provision
rules, implying similar value estimates for restoration attributes across the rules.

Table 1.4 mWTP values for attributes of restoration across the provision rules
Variablea

Provision rules
Convolutions
test (p)c
Single DecisionPlurality vote
Maker’s Choice
(pVOTE)b
b
(singleDC)
[95% C.I.]
[95% C.I.]
High_Effort
79.35
335.73
0.4355
[77.23, 81.49]
[313.61, 359.95]
Habitat_Cactus
-6.55
-28.91
0.4861
[-6.69, -6.41]
[-38.07, -20.07]
Habitat_Ngrass
7.12
105.11
0.4032
[6.24, 7.99]
[97.43, 113.48]
High_Access
-5.38
43.15
0.4661
[-7.24, -3.51]
[29.92, 56,73]
Medium_Access
21.99
154.54
0.3992
[21.23, 22.75]
[144.01, 166.08]
Volunteers
78.40
377.40
0.378
[76.82, 80.01]
[359.59, 396.83]
High_Success
83.26
591.45
0.3695
[81.12, 85.42]
[561.32, 624.61]
Size
23.77
101.76
0.4243
[23.11, 24.45]
[96.01, 108.04]
a
mWTP for a variable is calculated as the ratio of the mean marginal utility of that
variable (i.e., βX) and the marginal utility of income (βCost multiplied by -1). The mean
marginal utility for a continuous variable is the estimated coefficient on that variable
using the indirect utility in Eq. (3). For dummy or effects-coded variables, it is the
difference in the utility of altering an attribute from the level represented by the
omitted and the base category to the level represented by the particular dummy and
effects-coded variable respectively. Table 1.1 defines these variables.
b

These values were calculated by using simulation in Stata’s (version 12) “simulate”

module. The simulated WTP distributions were obtained by dividing draws from the
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corresponding non-monetary restoration attribute (normal distribution assumed) by
draws from the distribution of the “Cost” coefficient (log-normal distribution
assumed) with 105 replications. 95% confidence interval of the mWTP distributions
are reported in squared brackets and were calculated using Krinsky & Robb (1986)
method.
c

P-values from the Convolutions test for difference in mWTP distributions across the

rules, i.e., Ho: mWTPXsingleDC = mWTPXpVOTE, where mWTPXsingleDC is mWTP
distribution for an attribute X for the subsample of participants facing the choices with
the single decision-maker’s choice rule (DP=0) and

mWTPXpVOTE is the

corresponding mWTP distribution under the plurality vote rule (DP=1).

1.5.3 Panel mixed logit model results
The estimation results of the panel mixed logit model of the utility model specification
in Eq. (3) are presented in Manuscript 1-Appendix A.4. Table 1.5 reports the restricted
model after imposing restrictions on statistically insignificant interactions,
i.e.,βHikerSQ=βHikerX=βHikerCost=βHikerSQP=βHikerXP=βHikerCostP=βEduTourSQ=βEduTourX
=βEduTourCost=βEduTourSQP=βEduTourXP=βEduTourCostP=βDRealSQ=βDRealX^=βDRealCost=βDRealSQP=
βDRealX^P=βDRealCostP=0. The estimation results (in Table 1.5) show that the status quo
option, on average, decreases participants’ utility, all other things holding fixed (when
DP=0). Participants have a significant positive marginal utility of income (see Cost in
Table 1.5), meaning the more costly an ecosystem restoration project becomes, the
lower will be participants’ utility, all other things holding constant (when DP=0). A
high level of restoration effort, medium level of public access, involving trained
volunteers in restoration projects, high likelihood of success of restoration projects,
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and the size of the restoration sites all significantly increased participants’ utility and
high significance on the corresponding standard deviation (SD) estimates suggest
heterogeneity in preferences in relation to these attributes (Table 1.5) (when DP=0).
However, the corresponding adjustments (or additions) to the mean marginal utility
parameters for participants facing choices under the plurality vote are not statistically
significant when DP=1.

Table 1.5 Panel mixed logit model results
Variable
Random parameters
SQ (n)
High_Effort (n)
Habitat_Cactus (n)
Habitat_Ngrass (n)
High_Access (n)
Medium_Access (n)
Volunteers (n)
High_Success (n)
Size (n)
Costa
SQ!DP (n)
High_Effort!DP (n)
Habitat_Cactus!DP (n)
Habitat_Ngrass!DP (n)
High_Access!DP (n)
Medium_Access!DP (n)
Volunteers!DP (n)
High_Success!DP (n)
Size!DP (n)
Cost!DPa
Model statistics
Number of observations
Number of participants
Number of parameters
Log-likelihood (LL)
AIC

Coefficient
(se) [p-value]

Std. Dev.
(se of Std. Dev.) [p-value]

-1.4346 (0.6443) [0.026]
1.3392 (0.2785) [0.0001]
-0.1106 (0.1197) [0.355]
0.1201 (0.1749) [0.492]
-0.0906 (0.2530) [0.72]
0.3711 (0.1575) [0.018]
1.3234 (0.2732) [0.0001]
1.4053 (0.3322) [0.0001]
0.4013 (0.1032) [0.0001]
-0.0279 (0.0058) [0.0001]
-1.6581 (1.1274) [0.141]
0.2006 (0.4057) [0.621]
-0.0220 (0.2102) [0.917]
0.3621 (0.2745) [0.187]
0.2884 (0.3349) [0.389]
0.3379 (0.2371) [0.154]
0.4081 (0.3767) [0.279]
1.3080 (0.8723) [0.134]
0.0655 (0.1451) [0.652]
-0.0004 (0.0084) [0.967]

2.3307 (0.4629) [0.0001]
1.1588 (0.2343) [0.0001]
0.0649 (0.1364) [0.634]
-0.5836 (0.1810) [0.001]
1.2508 (0.1683) [0.0001]
0.4486 (0.1560) [0.004]
0.6737 (0.2447) [0.006]
1.1311 (0.2212) [0.0001]
0.3712 (0.0957) [0.001]
0.0225 (0.0037) [0.0001]
5.1163 (0.7086) [0.0001]
1.2111 (0.3531) [0.001]
0.8352 (0.1864) [0.497]
0.2006 (0.2129) [0.346]
0.0477 (0.2847) [0.867]
0.6798 (0.1804) [0.0001]
0.3463 (0.2488) [0.164]
1.2203 (0.3401) [0.0001]
0.0214 (0.0944) [0.821]
0.0601 (0.0079) [0.0001]

3402
81
40
-734.10824
1548.216
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BIC
1793.501
Wald χ2, 20 df (p)
541.41 (p<0.0001)
a
The reported values are parameters (mean and sd) of the underlying normal
distributions of log-normally distributed cost variables.
1.5.4 Additional analysis
Table 1.6 presents follow-up questions asked to participants about how they responded
to choices of ecosystem restoration projects. Results suggest that participants thought
the choices were somewhat difficult and were “almost always” to “often times”
relevant to their concerns about the management of the NROC’s conservation lands.
More than 85% of participants in both subsamples thought that their responses were
never influenced by their perception about what others in the room (the corresponding
experiment group) would do. More than 75% of participants in both subsamples
responded that the proportion of implementable choices presented to them influenced
their responses from “occasionally” to “never at all”. More than 70% of participants in
both subsamples responded that their responses were never influenced by the
corresponding provision rule used to determine the restoration projects for
implementation. Although the follow-up questions may not be incentive compatible,
these results also indicate that the participants’ responses to restoration choices were
neither influenced by the corresponding provision rule used nor by participants’
perception about what other participants in the group would do.
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Table 1.6 Responses to follow up questions across the provision rules
How often did you feel
that…

Degree to which participants perceived each of the
statements belowa
[% pVOTE participants] {% singleDC participants}
Almost Very
Often
Occasionally Never at
always often
times
(%)
al (%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
[2.33] [13.95] [18.60] [55.81]
[9.30]
{2.63} {7.89} {26.32} {47.37}
{15.79}
[27.91] [37.21] [25.58] [9.30]
[0.00]
{36.84} {28.95} {21.05} {10.53}
{2.63}

(1) …the choice questions
were difficult?
(2) …the choice questions
were relevant to your
concerns about the
management of the NROC
conservation lands?
(3) …your responses to
[2.33]
[2.33]
[0.00]
[9.30]
[86.05]
the choice questions were {0.00} {0.00} {2.63} {0.00}
{97.37}
influenced by the
perception about what
others in the room would
do?
(4) …your responses to
[4.65]
[2.33]
[16.28] [37.21]
[39.53]
the choice questions were {2.63} {15.79} {2.63} {10.53}
{68.42}
influenced by the fact that
only a proportion of the
choice questions is a pool
of feasible choices for
implementation in 2012?
(5) …your responses to
[0.00]
[2.33]
[6.98]
[13.95]
[76.74]
the choice questions were {2.63} {2.63} {2.63} {18.42}
{73.68}
influenced by the fact that
the group outcome
tonight, from all feasible
choices, will be
determined by randomly
chosen decision-maker’s
choice on randomly
selected feasible choice
question ? (Emphasis in
original)b
a
We conducted chi-squared test of independence between the responses of participants
to these qualitative attitude statements across the subsamples (DP=1,0) and found no
significant difference on above statements except for the (4th) statement above
(Pearson χ2=17.25, df=4, p=0.002).
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b

The emphasized text (bold and underlined) was replaced by “the majority vote on

randomly selected feasible choice question” in the survey booklet that included the
plurality vote provision rule.

1.6 Conclusions and implications
In this paper, we empirically examined how incentives presented through including
provision rules in consequential discrete choice experiments affect the responses to the
valuation questions. Using a split sample approach, we compared the marginal utilities
and mWTP values for ecosystem restoration attributes focused on non-native plants
management in the NROC under two alternative provision rules: a single decisionmaker’s choice and a plurality vote. A single decision-maker’s choice has been well
established as an incentive compatible provision rule, whereas a plurality vote is
generally not an incentive compatible provision rule for three-option choice situations.
We employed consequential DCE surveys, designed to assess values of ecosystem
restoration focused on non-native plants management, which involved direct financial
consequences for participants, resulting in actual implementation of ecosystem
restoration projects. A panel mixed logit model suggests that marginal utility
parameters and mWTP estimates for restoration attributes are statistically equivalent
across the provision rules.
Of few previous studies that examined provision rules in a DCE study, Collins
& Vossler (2009) examined provision rules using two-alternative and three-alternative
choice situations in a laboratory experimental setting and found more deviations from
induced preferences for two-alternative choices and for alternatives to a single
plurality vote as compared to results under the rule in which the outcome was
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determined by both participants and “regulator” votes. They also found a statistically
significant but modest degree of bias towards selecting the status-quo option. While
the results of no significant difference in marginal utility parameters and mWTP
estimates for restoration attributes across the provision rules, irrespective of theoretical
incentive compatibility properties, are consistent with Taylor et al. (2010) and Vossler
et al. (2012), this study expands the result to the trichotomous choice experiment,
which is widely used in environmental valuation research.

In stated preferences

studies, the trichotomous format has likely been the most common choice experiment
format, and it has been favored because it focuses respondents’ attention on the need
to make tradeoffs across attributes in various scenarios (Louviere, Hensher, & Swait,
2000). Our results here suggest that the absence of incentive compatibility in
trichotomous choice questions may not be a caveat of concern in such stated
preference studies generally. Our descriptive results on the follow-up questions also
suggested that more than two-thirds of participants stated that their decisions were
neither influenced by their perception about what others in the group would do nor by
the corresponding provision rule used, although there is no way to ensure incentive
properties of the responses to these perception statements. Yet these self-reported
perceptions are consistent with our preference model results.
Although participants in our focus group discussions expressed and indicated
some degree of interest or motivation towards specific aspects or dimensions of
ecosystem restoration in the NROC, which led us to hypothesize the potential
existence of strategic voting behavior in the field experiments, we did not find
evidence of the existence of any such behavior. We may not have a clear
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understanding on why participants did not seem to behave strategically as predicted by
the theory under a plurality vote rule, although the strategic motivations may come out
sharply when the participants have highly polarized views, politically motivated or
otherwise, on the public goods under consideration, as noted by Vossler et al. (2012).
Although the attributes included in the restoration choices represented different
aspects or dimensions of restoration efforts and were explained clearly in the
presentation, the strategic effect or bias in case of a novel choice situation may be
arguably a second-order effect and may require higher-level think. The relevance of
strategic effect or bias may depend on the level of familiarity of the good and the
choice setting. Such consideration could explain the outcome from our field
experiment that suggests participants in a three-option choice experiment may
nonetheless make choices in a manner that is statistically equivalent to a choice model
estimated from data produced in an incentive compatible setting. Our results also may
support the idea of “cognitive dissonance” as suggested by Akerlof and Dickens
(1982), a behavior by which individuals facing complex and somewhat unfamiliar
choices may adopt a truth-telling strategy rather than risking sending misleading
signals that may harm the individual’s self-interest.
Furthermore, we found no significant difference in the marginal utilities of
restoration attributes between potentially implementable, real choice tasks and
hypothetical choice tasks, meaning results suggest that participants treated the
attributes between real, implementable and hypothetical choices equivalently. This
result contrasts with previous empirical results of significantly higher WTP estimates
from hypothetical payment compared to real payment situations. This finding may be

50

related to spillover effects (Cherry, Crocker, & Shogren, 2003) from real,
implementable choices to the hypothetical choices, suggesting that a mixed survey
involving at least some real choices might deserve consideration when stated
preference researchers have an opportunity to use at least some consequential
scenarios. This approach is analogous to past efforts to integrate revealed and stated
preferences (e.g., Adamowicz, Louviere, & Williams, 1994), by using the availability
of real choice scenarios to establish a consequential context for survey participants
while using hypothetical scenarios to expand the range and mix of attributes evaluated.
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MANUSCRIPT 1–APPENDIX A
This appendix provides details about the experimental design of ecosystem restoration
choices, background presentation for field experiments participants, a sample survey
booklet and estimation results of the unrestricted model.

A1. Efficient experimental design of ecosystem restoration choices
Our efficient experimental design utilized both real-world scenarios of candidate
restoration projects provided by the experts from NROC and IRC as well as the
hypothetical combinations of levels of ecosystem restoration attributes presented in
Table 1.1. We employed d-efficiency measure in Ngene 1.1 to produce the following

Design
Question #

Restoration
effort

Habitat and
Bird Species
Focus

Size of
Restoration

Public
Access

Trained
Volunteers

Likelihood of
Success

Cost ($)

restoration choices for our field experiments.

1. Project A
Project B
2. Project A
Project B
3. Project A
Project B
4. Project A
Project B
5. Project A
Project B
6. Project A
Project B
7. Project A
Project B
8. Project A
Project B
9. Project A
Project B
10. Project A
Project B
11. Project A

Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
High
Low
High
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
Low
High

Cactus
Coastal Sage
Cactus
Coastal Sage
Native Grassland
Cactus Scrub
Coastal Sage
Cactus Scrub
Native Grassland
Cactus Scrub
Cactus Scrub
Coastal Sage
Coastal Sage
Cactus Scrub
Coastal Sage
Naïve Grassland
Native Grassland
Coastal Sage
Coastal Sage
Cactus Scrub
Native Grassland

1 acre
2 acres
1 acre
2 acres
3 acres
2 acres
1 acre
1 acre
3 acres
2 acres
1 acre
1 acre
9 acres
3 acres
3 acres
3 acres
2 acres
2 acres
5 acres
9 acres
9 acres

Medium
High
Medium
High
Medium
Low
Medium
Low
Medium
Low
Low
High
Low
High
Medium
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

High
High
High
High
Medium
High
High
High
Medium
High
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
High
Medium
High
Medium
High
Medium

40
90
40
90
60
75
110
110
60
105
105
90
110
40
110
40
110
40
75
110
110
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Project B
12. Project A
Project B
13. Project A
Project B
14. Project A
Project B

Low
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

Cactus Scrub
Native Grassland
Cactus Scrub
Coastal Sage
Native Grassland
Cactus Scrub
Coastal Sage

7 acres
5 acres
1 acre
7 acres
7 acres
5 acres
5 acres

Medium
Low
Medium
Low
Medium
High
Medium

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

High
High
High
Medium
High
Medium
High

60
105
60
110
40
90
60

Please note that Design Question # 1-6 represent immediately implementable
restoration choices (or ‘real’ scenarios explicitly labeled as “Feasible, potentially
implementable projects, Choice-L” where L represents one of the letters- P, Q, R, X,
Y, and Z respectively) whereas the remaining 8 combinations (Design Question # 714) represent future restoration projects (or ‘hypothetical’ scenarios). In order to avoid
potential order effects, two groups (first group- Design Question # 12, 1, 13, 3, 9, 4,
14 and the second group- Design Question # 8, 6, 7, 2, 10, 5, 11) of 7 choice questions
were blocked into two orders- the first group followed by the second group and the
vice versa. Each participant was randomly assigned to a survey booklet consisting of
only one of the two orders.

A2. Background presentation to field experiment participants
In order to present participants with same set of information on the ecosystem
restoration in the NROC, inform about what they will be asked to do, and how their
decisions or choices influence the outcomes (or which ecosystem restoration projects
get implemented on the ground), the experiment moderator used the following
PowerPoint presentation slides.
In Slide # 2, the experiment moderator briefly discussed the broader goals of
the project entitled “Orange County Invasive Management (OCIM)” and introduced
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this component of the OCIM called “Ecosystem Auctions for Decision Support
(EADS)” and its main objectives. The moderator gave an overview of major activities
under the OCIM and briefly introduced about the science of ecosystem restoration
through the removal or management of invasive plants in slides # 3-8. The remaining
slides were designed to provide participants with information on the content of the
survey, description of the ecosystem restoration attributes, example choice question,
and how their responses determine the outcomes of the workshops or the
corresponding provision rule.
The presentation also made clear that each participant was provided with a
personal budget of $150 of which $40 was guaranteed as the participation fee and the
participants could decide whether they want to spend the remaining $110 on the
ecosystem restoration projects of their choice or take home for their other priorities
more important than the restoration efforts in the NROC. Participants were also
encouraged to consider their decisions carefully regarding what their personal values
and priorities are, what each project can or can not accomplish, how it matters to them
and whether it is worth the money they pay for the projects while making choices or
decisions. The moderator tried to keep the information and content of the description
as similar as possible across the two groups. The only difference in the background
presentation across the groups of participants was the description of the corresponding
provision rule for each night as shown in slide # 20. The example slides shown below
were presented for the participants’ group that considered single decision-maker’s
choice provision rule.
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62

63
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A3. A sample survey booklet (Single Decision-Maker’s Choice)
The content of the survey was exactly same across the subsamples except the
description of the corresponding provision rule and necessary corrections accordingly.
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Section 2: Ecosystem Restoration Choices
For choice questions in this section, you will make a series of decisions, choosing
between ecosystem restoration projects that differ in levels of restoration effort, native
habitat and bird species focus, size (acreage), public access and involvement of
volunteers, likelihood of success and cost to you. Within each choice question, you
may choose to contribute to one of restoration projects, Projects A or B, or you may
choose Project C, which is the “no action” option. Your task in each question is to
choose the project you prefer most, based on your personal preferences or
priorities and how your choices could influence the group outcome.
For each of the choice questions in this section, each participant will be given a
personal budget of $150 to contribute a portion of it to the restoration project of his
or her choice and a portion he or she keeps for other priorities. The “Cost to you”
attribute describes what you would need to contribute from your personal budget of
$150 if the group outcome at the end of tonight is the project described. The overall
cost of the project will be covered by contributions from the group and our grant
budget. Recall that any money you keep can be used for other personal priorities,
including family expenses, gifts, donations to conservation or important charities, or
any other purpose. " Please check this box.

Section 2.1: Determining the group outcome at the end of tonight’
workshop
Once everyone has finished responding to all choice questions, one choice question
number will be selected randomly from the group of choice questions labeled as
“Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice-…..”. One Survey
ID number will also be selected randomly. The project, chosen by the person
holding the randomly selected Survey ID number on the randomly selected
choice question, will be chosen as the group outcome of tonight’s decisions and will
be implemented in this (2012/13) NROC field season. Your payment will be
determined based on the group outcome chosen according to randomly chosen
single decision-maker’s choice as described above.
Please read the instructions carefully before making any decision. It is very important
that you understand the instructions to make informed decisions. If you have any
questions as we proceed through this session, please do not talk to your friends or
neighbors. Rather, please raise your hand so that the workshop moderator can come to
you and address your question.

Section 2.2: Example Choice Question
Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A, B, and C, how
would you choose?
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Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access

Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Restoration in Native
Grassland, needed to support
other native wildlife
2 acres
Area allows access for
running, hiking, mountain
biking, with designated areas
for dogs and horse-back
riding when ecologically
feasible
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and / or
surrounded by mixed nativenonnative landscape
I will pay $110, from my $150.

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California
Gnatcatcher
3 acres

Project C

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking

Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $60, from my
$150.

"
I choose
PROJECT A

"
I choose
PROJECT B

I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C

Once everyone has finished responding to all choice questions, one question number
among choice questions labeled as “Feasible, potentially implementable projects in
2012-Choice….” will be selected randomly. Suppose, the example question above is
chosen by this random process. One Survey ID number will also be selected
randomly. Suppose, your Survey ID number was selected by this random process.
Suppose you chose Project A. In this scenario, project A will be chosen as the group
outcome for implementation in this (2012/2013) NROC field season as it is chosen by
the person holding the randomly selected Survey ID number on the randomly
selected choice question. You will get paid $40 ($150-$110) as Project A was chosen
as the group outcome.
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Note: We will not reveal the person whose Survey ID number is chosen. After all
surveys are collected, we will randomly choose the Survey ID number. Then we will
ask for 3 volunteers to help us find the correct Survey ID number and the choice
recorded on the randomly chosen feasible choice question of that Survey ID. Then
we will announce the result. We request that you do not show or talk about your
Survey ID number to others in the room.

Section 2.3: Economic Choice Questions
We provide you a personal budget of $150 with which to make decisions in each
choice question below, and we ask that you decide on contributing a portion of this
to the restoration project of your choice and a portion you keep. Please recall that
the group outcome of all these choices for tonight will be based on random selection
of a choice question among choice questions labeled as “Feasible, potentially
implementable projects in 2012-Choice….” and the randomly chosen single
decision maker’s choice on the selected random question as described above. We
request that you consider restoration projects in each choice question in terms of what
each project might or might not accomplish, how it matters to you, whether it is
worth the money cost to you, and how your choice might influence the group
outcome for tonight. Please recall money not spent on these projects may be used by
you at home for other priority expenses or charities. " Please check this box.
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Question 1. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access
Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Project C

Restoration to Native
Grassland, needed to support
other native wildlife

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

3 acres

5 acres

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $60, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT A

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and / or
surrounded by mixed nativenonnative landscape
I will pay $110, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT B

I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C
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Feasible, potentially implementable
projects in 2012, Choice-P
Question 2. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access

Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Project C

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

1 acre

2 acres

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking

Area allows access for
running, hiking, mountain
biking, with designated areas
for dogs and horse-back
riding when ecologically
feasible.
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $90, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT B

I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C

No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition
to restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $40, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT A

Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice-P
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Question 3. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort
Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access
Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

Restoration to Native
Grassland, needed to support
other native wildlife

7 acres

7 acres

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition
to restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and /
or surrounded by mixed
native-nonnative landscape
I will pay $40, from my $150.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $110, from my $150.

"
I choose
PROJECT A

"
I choose
PROJECT B
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Project C

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C

Feasible, potentially implementable
projects in 2012, Choice-R
Question 4. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access
Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Project C

Restoration to Native
Grassland, needed to support
other native wildlife

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

3 acres

2 acres

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and /
or surrounded by mixed
native-nonnative landscape
I will pay $60, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT A

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $75, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT B

I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C

Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice-R
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Question 5. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Project C

Habitat
and Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access

Restoration to Native
Grassland, needed to support
other native wildlife

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

2 acres

2 acres

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only

Trained
Volunteers

No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition
to restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and / or
surrounded by mixed nativenonnative landscape
I will pay $110, from my $150.

Area allows access for
running, hiking, mountain
biking, with designated areas
for dogs and horse-back
riding when ecologically
feasible
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $40, from my $150.

I keep my $150.

"
I choose
PROJECT A

"
I choose
PROJECT B

Likelihood
of Success
Cost to
You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)
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"
I choose
PROJECT C

Feasible, potentially implementable
projects in 2012, Choice-X
Question 6. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access
Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Project C

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

1 acre

1 acre

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition
to restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $110, from my
$150.
"
I choose
PROJECT A

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $110, from my $150.

I keep my $150.

"
I choose
PROJECT B

"
I choose
PROJECT C

Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice-X

75

Question 7. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort
Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access

Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

5 acres

5 acres

Area allows access for
running, hiking, mountain
biking, with designated
areas for dogs and horseback riding when
ecologically feasible
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and /
or surrounded by mixed
native-nonnative landscape
I will pay $90, from my $150.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and mountain
biking

No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $60, from my $150.

"
I choose
PROJECT A

"
I choose
PROJECT B
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Project C

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C

Question 8. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access
Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Project C

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

Restoration to Native
Grassland, needed to support
other native wildlife

3 acres

3 acres

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and /
or surrounded by mixed
native-nonnative landscape
I will pay $110, from my
$150.

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $40, from my $150.

I keep my $150.

"
I choose
PROJECT A

"
I choose
PROJECT B
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"
I choose
PROJECT C

Feasible, potentially implementable
projects in 2012, Choice-Z
Question 9. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access

Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Project C

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

1 acre

1 acre

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only

Area allows access for
running, hiking, mountain
biking, with designated areas
for dogs and horse-back
riding when ecologically
feasible
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $90, from my $150.

I keep my $150.

Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $105, from my
$150.
"
I choose
PROJECT A

"
I choose
PROJECT B

"
I choose
PROJECT C

Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice-Z
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Question 10. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Project C

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

9 acres

3 acres

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only

Area allows access for
running, hiking, mountain
biking, with designated areas
for dogs and horse-back
riding when ecologically
feasible
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and / or
surrounded by mixed nativenonnative landscape
I will pay $40, from my $150.

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access

Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition
to restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $110, from my
$150.
"
I choose
PROJECT A

"
I choose
PROJECT B
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I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C

Feasible, potentially implementable
projects in 2012, Choice-Q
Question 11. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access

Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Project C

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

1 acre

2 acres

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking

Area allows access for
running, hiking, mountain
biking, with designated areas
for dogs and horse-back
riding when ecologically
feasible
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $110, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT B

I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C

No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition
to restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $40, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT A

Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice-Q
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Question 12. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access

Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Project C

Restoration in Coastal Sage
Scrub, supports California
Gnatcatcher

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

5 acres

9 acres

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only

Area allows access for
running, hiking, mountain
biking, with designated areas
for dogs and horse-back
riding when ecologically
feasible
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $110, from my $150.

I keep my $150.

Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and /
or surrounded by mixed
native-nonnative landscape
I will pay $75, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT A

"
I choose
PROJECT B
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"
I choose
PROJECT C

Feasible, potentially implementable
projects in 2012, Choice-Y
Question 13. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Project C

Restoration to Native
Grassland, needed to support
other native wildlife

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California Gnatcatcher

3 acres

2 acres

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than
paying my cost
for either Project
A or B.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and /
or surrounded by mixed
native-nonnative landscape
I will pay $60, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT A

Area allows access for
research with permits and
guided tours only
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $105, from my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access
Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C

Feasible, potentially implementable projects in 2012, Choice-Y
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Question 14. Given a choice between the following ecosystem restoration projects A,
B, and C, how would you choose?
Project
Attributes

Project A

Project B

Restoration
Effort

Habitat and
Bird
Species
Focus
Size of
Restoration
Public
Access

Trained
Volunteers
Likelihood
of Success
Cost to You
HOW
WOULD
YOU
CHOOSE?
(CHOOSE
ONLY
ONE)

Restoration to Native
Grassland, needed to support
other native wildlife

Restoration in Cactus Scrub,
supports Cactus Wren, and
often California
Gnatcatcher
7 acres

9 acres
Area allows access for running,
hiking, mountain biking, with
designated areas for dogs and
horse-back riding when
ecologically feasible
No, project does not involve
trained volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
Medium due to moderate
access for maintenance and / or
surrounded by mixed nativenonnative landscape
I will pay $110, from my $150.

Project C

Neither of these
projects.
I choose to keep
my $150 for my
other priorities
rather than paying
my cost for either
Project A or B.

Area allows access for
running, hiking and
mountain biking
Yes, project involves trained
volunteers in addition to
restoration professionals
High due to easy access for
maintenance and / or
surrounded by native
landscape
I will pay $60, from my $150.

"
I choose
PROJECT A

"
I choose
PROJECT B
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I keep my $150.
"
I choose
PROJECT C

Section 2.4: Follow-Up on Ecosystem Restoration Choices

Never at all

Occasionally

Often times

Very often

How often did you feel that…

Almost
always

Please indicate, by placing (X) under the column, the degree to which you
perceived each of the statements below.

the choice questions were difficult?
the choice questions were relevant to
your concerns about management of the
NROC conservation lands?
your responses to the choice questions
were influenced by your perception
about what others in the room would do?
your responses to the choice questions
were influenced by the fact that only a
proportion of the choice questions is a
pool
of
feasible
choices
for
implementation in 2012?
your responses to the choice questions
were influenced by the fact that the
group outcome for tonight, from all
feasible, choices will be determined by
randomly chosen decision-maker’s
choice on randomly selected feasible
choice question ?
Please rank the following project attributes, that influenced your choices or
decisions most. Please put “1” for most influential and “7” for least influential to
you and so on.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Restoration Effort
Habitat and Bird Species Focus
Size of Restoration
Public Access
Trained Volunteers
Likelihood of Success
Cost to You

…………….
…………….
…………….
…………….
…………….
…………….
…………….
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Section 3.0: About your background
This section is to help us understand our participants’ characteristics. These questions
are also very important to us for interpreting and predicting our results out of sample,
in order to help this research better benefit everyone in society. Recall, after the
session ends, we will never link you to your answers and all information will be kept
strictly confidential.
1. What is your gender?
Male
Female
2. How long have you been lived around Orange County?
…………….years
3. Do you own or rent your primary residence?
Own
Rent
4. What is your highest level of education?
a. High school or less
b. Bachelor’s degree or some college
c. Graduate degree (Masters or Ph.D.) or some graduate school
5. What type of recreational activity, if any, are you engaged in around NROC?
Rank recreational activity below in order of importance to you. Please put “1”
for the most important, “7” for least important, and so on. (Put “N/A” if you
don’t do the activity)
a. Mountain biking
…………….
b. Horse-back riding
…………….
c. Walking with leashed dogs
…………….
d. Running
…………….
e. Hiking
…………….
f. Educational tours
g. Other; please describe……………………………
6. With which of the following groups, if any, are you most closely affiliated
(Circle One)?
a. Irvine Ranch Conservancy (IRC)
b. Back to NativesRESTORATION
c. Laguna Greenbelt
d. Newport Bay Conservancy
e. Laguna Canyon Foundation
f. Friends of Harbor, Beaches and Parks
g. Sea and Sage Audubon Society
h. Other ……………………………….
7. In most years do you donate money to an environmental group?
a. Yes ⇒ approximately how much do you donate in total each year?
$…………….
b. No
8. Have you ever participated in any ecosystem restoration projects voluntarily or
otherwise?
a. Yes ⇒ approximately how many days per year? …………….days
b. No
9. What category best describes your annual household income before taxes?
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

<$25,000
$25,000-$50,000
$50,000-$75,000
$75,000-$100,000
$100,000-$150,000
> $150,000

Thank you for participating in the economic choices of ecosystem restoration for
environmental decision-making. We appreciate your valuable time and input to
this project. Please add any additional comments you may have.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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A4. Unrestricted mixed logit model of the utility specification in Eq. (3)
Variable

Coefficient
(se) [p]

Std. Dev.
(se of Std. Dev.) [p]

Non-random parameters
Base parameters (βHikerSQ, βHikerX, βHikerCost) when Hiker=1 and DP=0
SQ!Hiker
0.1684 (1.5248) [0.912]
N/A
High_Effort!Hiker
1.3420 (0.7355) [0.068]
N/A
Habitat_Cactus!Hiker
-0.3071 (0.3751) [0.413] N/A
Habitat_Ngrass!Hiker
0.4223 (0.5015) [0.4]
N/A
High_Access!Hiker
0.3213 (0.6263) [0.608]
N/A
Medium_Access!Hiker
0.1363 (0.4039) [0.736]
N/A
Volunteers!Hiker
0.0895 (0.6782) [0.895]
N/A
High_Success!Hiker
1.6809 (0.9064) [0.064]
N/A
Size!Hiker
0.8976 (0.2648) [0.001] N/A
Cost!Hiker
0.0046 (0.0158) [0.769]
N/A
Additions to base parameters (βHikerSQP, βHikerXP, βHikerCostP) when Hiker=1 and DP=1
SQ!Hiker
1.7695 (1.9715) [0.369]
N/A
High_Effort!Hiker
-0.1695 (1.2993) [0.896] N/A
Habitat_Cactus!Hiker
1.3894 (0.5496) [0.011]
N/A
Habitat_Ngrass!Hiker
-1.2465 (0.8078) [0.123] N/A
High_Access!Hiker
-0.1395 (0.8423) [0.868] N/A
Medium_Access!Hiker
0.3239 (0.6029) [0.591]
N/A
Volunteers!Hiker
1.2759 (0.9988) [0.201]
N/A
High_Success!Hiker
-2.7282 (1.4033) [0.052] N/A
Size!Hiker
-0.7290 (0.3351) [0.03]
N/A
Cost!Hiker
0.0013 (0.0205) [0.951]
N/A
Base parameters (βEduTourSQ, βEduTourX, βEduTourCost) when EduTour=1 and DP=0
SQ!EduTour
-2.5629 (1.3338) [0.055] N/A
High_Effort!EduTour
0.7867 (0.7351) [0.285]
N/A
Habitat_Cactus!EduTour
-0.0739 (0.3899) [0.85]
N/A
Habitat_Ngrass!EduTour
0.2304 (0.4806) [0.632]
N/A
High_Access! EduTour
-0.3844 (0.5469) [0.482] N/A
Medium_Access! EduTour
-0.5687 (0.4042) [0.159] N/A
Volunteers! EduTour
-1.0234 (0.6980) [0.143] N/A
High_Success! EduTour
-0.1108 (0.7248) [0.878] N/A
Size! EduTour
0.2024 (0.2321) [0.383]
N/A
Cost! EduTour
-0.0138 (0.0133) [0.299] N/A
Additions to base parameters (βEduTourSQP, βEduTourXP, βEduTourCostP) when EduTour=1 and
DP=1
SQ!EduTour!DP
3.9187 (2.3669) [0.098]
N/A
High_Effort! EduTour!DP
-0.0884 (1.1079) [0.936] N/A
Habitat_Cactus! EduTour!DP
0.2199 (0.5873) [0.708]
N/A
Habitat_Ngrass! EduTour!DP
0.6128 (0.9394) [0.514]
N/A
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High_Access! EduTour!DP
0.0651 (0.7613) [0.932]
N/A
Medium_Access! EduTour!DP 0.3955 (0.7126) [0.579]
N/A
Volunteers! EduTour!DP
-0.5968 (1.0283) [0.562] N/A
High_Success! EduTour!DP
-0.3835 (1.1938) [0.748] N/A
Size! EduTour!DP
-0.2046 (0.3374) [0.544] N/A
Cost! EduTour!DP
-0.0161 (0.0200) [0.42]
N/A
Base parameters (βDRealSQ, βDRealX^, βDRealCost) when DReal=1 and DP=0
SQ!DReal
-0.9596 (2.3199) [0.679] N/A
High_Effort!DReal
0.1369 (2.0957) [0.948]
N/A
Habitat_Cactus!DReal
-0.8039 (1.1180) [0.472] N/A
Habitat_Ngrass!DReal
0.5886 (1.2855) [0.647]
N/A
Size!DReal
0.4940 (0.7501) [0.51]
N/A
Cost!DReal
-0.0259 (0.0220) [0.238] N/A
Additions to base parameters (βDRealSQP, βDRealX^P, βDRealCostP) when DReal=1 and DP=1
SQ!DReal!DP
2.6022 (3.4962) [0.457]
N/A
High_Effort!DReal!DP
-0.6749 (3.0820) [0.827] N/A
Habitat_Cactus!DReal!DP
1.6147 (1.6913) [0.34]
N/A
Habitat_Ngrass!DReal!DP
-1.4263 (1.8915) [0.451] N/A
Size!DReal!DP
0.2434 (1.1267) [0.829]
N/A
Cost!DReal!DP
0.0387 (0.0328) [0.237]
N/A
Random parameters
SQ (n)
-1.2403 (1.4384) [0.389] 2.7863 (0.4298) [0.0001]
High_Effort (n)
1.1470 (0.5712) [0.045] 1.5481 (0.3191) [0.0001]
Habitat_Cactus (n)
0.3717 (0.4507) [0.41]
-0.5986 (0.2683) [0.026]
Habitat_Ngrass (n)
-0.4455 (0.5229) [0.394] 0.9866 (0.3083)[0.001]
High_Access (n)
0.1896 (0.5036) [0.707] 1.7918 (0.3364) [0.0001]
Medium_Access (n)
0.3936 (0.4377) [0.369] -0.9079 (0.2494) [0.0001]
Volunteers (n)
2.2449 (0.6344)[0.0001] -1.1389 (0.2921) [0.0001]
High_Success (n)
1.8765 (0.7505) [0.012] 1.7229 (0.3854) [0.0001]
Size (n)
-0.0199 (0.2265) [0.93] 0.2407 (0.0698) [0.001]
a
Cost
-0.0253 (0.0143) [0.078] 0.0380 (0.0057) [0.0001]
SQ!DP
-2.4774 (2.2896) [0.279] -4.8679 (0.8065) [0.0001]
High_Effort!DP (n)
-0.0721 (0.8653) [0.934] -1.0598 (0.3178) [0.001]
Habitat_Cactus!DP (n)
-1.2293 (0.6995) [0.079] 0.2388 (0.3514) [0.497]
Habitat_Ngrass!DP (n)
1.4158 (0.8413) [0.092] -1.0701 (0.3535) [0.002]
High_Access!DP (n)
0.5819 (0.7461) [0.435] 1.3096 (0.3011) [0.0001]
Medium_Access!DP (n)
-0.0033 (0.6822) [0.996] -1.1762 (0.2430) [0.0001]
Volunteers!DP (n)
-0.2823 (0.8455) [0.738] 0.2484 (0.1080) [0.664]
High_Success!DP (n)
Size!DP (n)
Cost!DPa
Model statistics
Number of observations
Number of participants

1.9599 (1.3949) [0.16]
3.7768 (0.8078) [0.0001]
0.6063 (0.3777) [0.108] 0.1674 (0.0681) [0.014]
-0.0188 (0.0223) [0.398] 0.0464 (0.0069) [0.0001]
3402
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Log-likelihood (LL)
-710.17241
AIC
1604.345
BIC
2168.5
Wald χ2, 20 df (p)
522.54 (p<0.0001)
a
The reported values are parameters (mean and sd) of the underlying normal
distributions of log-normally distributed cost variables.
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MANUSCRIPT 2

DO REPEATED CHOICE TASKS AFFECT CHOICE OUTCOMES IN DISCRETE
CHOICE EXPERIMENTS? AN APPLICATION TO RHODE ISLAND’S WOODED
WETLAND PROTECTION

Prepared for submission to mainstream journal of environmental and natural
resource economics
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2.1 Abstract
The Discrete choice experiment (DCE) method often asks survey participants a series
of choice tasks to elicit values for multi-attribute environmental goods and services.
Asking a repeated sequence reduces data collection cost because the cost of recruiting
the participants is high and getting more data from each person is cost effective.
Although the repeated choice format increases the preference information obtained
from each survey participant, the stated preference literature raises questions, in theory
and with empirical evidence, of order effects regarding the truthfulness and thus
usefulness of such additional preference information, and to what extent these
concerns affect the validity of valuation estimates. Order effects refer to various
behavioral phenomena that create a systematic change in expressed preferences across
a series of choice tasks. Employing a split sample approach, this paper empirically
compares survey participants’ marginal values and marginal willingness to pay
(mWTP) for attributes of protecting wooded wetlands using two survey lengths or
formats. The first survey format asks a group of survey participants only two choice
tasks and the second format asks a different group of participants a series of twelve
choice tasks. Both survey formats involve trichotomous choices regarding protection
of wetlands. Our results suggest that the alternative survey formats produce
statistically different underlying preference functions as well as statistically different
estimates of scale parameters related to the uncertainty in participants’ responses. We
further examined participants’ choices from a series of twelve choice tasks, by
creating a set of variables or interactions representing the corresponding effects, to
investigate potential heterogeneity (or effect) in the mean of the cost parameter and the
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utility of the status quo option across the sequence. We discovered no evidence of
position-dependent order effects in our application. But, our results produce evidence
of precedent-dependent effects relating to a potential to retain higher net surplus from
the most-valued alternative in the current task relative to the most-valued alternative in
the preceding task may induce participants to be less cost- sensitive and thus appear to
have a higher WTP across the sequence.

Key words: Discrete choice experiment, order effects, precedent-dependent effects,
repeated choice tasks, strategic responses, wooded wetland protection
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2.2 Introduction
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) elicit values for multi-attribute environmental
goods and services by asking survey participants a series of choice tasks consisting of
two or more alternatives. DCE studies using the repeated format assume that survey
participants have stable preferences across the repeated sequence of choice tasks,
meaning there is no systematic change in stated preferences along the series of
valuation scenarios. Even though participants are told to consider each choice task as
an independent scenario, the repeated format may confound the incentive structures of
the choice task and thus may produce responses that may not be truthful or may suffer
from strategic or other biases. Participants' responses on a series of repeated choices
may depend on their own preferences, expectations or beliefs about other participants'
preferences, as well as an assumed rule or process by which preference information
from the repeated choices will be aggregated across the sequence of choices (Carson
& Groves, 2007; Moulin, 1994). Moreover, empirical evidence of systematic change
in stated preferences observed along the sequence of valuation scenarios also
strengthens the theoretical predictions (Day et al., 2012). Therefore, the truthfulness of
additional preference information obtained from such repeated choice format has been
challenged.
In this paper, we empirically examine whether the two survey formats, the first
format involving two choices tasks and the second format involving a series of twelve
choice tasks, yield statistically equivalent underlying preference functions by
comparing marginal values and mWTP estimates for wetland parcel attributes. We
employed a split sample approach where one group of participants faced two choice
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tasks and a different group of participants faced a series of twelve choice tasks. Both
groups faced trichotomous choices, two wetland parcels that differ in the levels of
attributes representing various characteristics of forested wetlands and a “conserve
neither parcel” option as the status quo alternative. Our results suggest that the
alternative survey formats yield statistically different preference functions as well as
scale parameters relating to the uncertainty in responses. We further explored whether
the responses from the survey format involving twelve choice tasks suggest any form
of systematic alterations of stated preferences along the sequence of choice tasks,
broadly termed as order effects in the stated preference literature. This exploration
suggests that our data display evidence of precedent-dependent order effects relating
to a potential to retain higher net surplus from the most-valued alternative in the
current task relative to the most-valued alternative in the preceding task may induce
participants to be less sensitive to cost and thus appear to have a higher WTP across
the sequence.
A well-known result from mechanism design theory (Gibbard, 1973;
Satterthwaite, 1975) is that a single binary discrete choice question, one alternative
usually being the status quo option, with majority provision rule16 is an incentive
16

A provision rule is a rule or process by which participants’ responses determine

choice outcomes, and thus provides an explicit nexus between survey choices and
outcomes. Explicit description of a provision rule may give participants certain
incentives to truthfully respond to, and thereby identify their most preferred option in
choice tasks. Previous studies examining responses under alternative provision rules
suggest that participants may still make consistent choices irrespective of incentive
compatible provision rules as defined by mechanism design theory (Vossler, Doyon,
& Rondeau, 2012; Manuscript 1 in this dissertation).
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compatible mechanism, meaning truthful responses are dominant choices and
participants would do no better by choosing alternative options (Farquharson, 1969;
Arrow et al., 1999; Carson & Groves, 2007). A repeated sequence of binary choices is
often used to improve informational efficiency of preference data relative to a single
binary choice and the cost of data acquisition.
This repeated survey format, however, may create incentives for non-truthful
responses. For example, participants’ beliefs about how their responses or the
preference information will be aggregated across the sequence of the choices by the
surveying agency may induce them not to truthfully state their preferences (Carson &
Groves, 2007). Furthermore, when participants are presented with multiple variants of
more or less the same environmental good or service at very different prices along the
sequence of valuation scenarios, uncertainty surrounding the price may create
incentives not to truthfully respond to the choices in the sequence. In sum,
participants’ responses to the repeated sequence may depend on their own preferences,
the person’s experience relating to learning their own preferences through the
sequence of choices for an unfamiliar choice context, expectations about others’
preferences, and also the assumed rule or process by which the preference information
across the sequence will be aggregated, suggesting that truthful responses may not be
dominant choices for participants under the repeated survey format (Moulin, 1994).
Employing an explicit game-theoretic model of individual decisions, Vossler,
Doyon, & Rondeau (2012) showed that incentive compatibility requires independence
between the choice tasks and at most one choice task (or a policy option) can be
implemented or provided from a sequence of binary choices. The incentive properties
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of repeated survey format involving multinomial choice tasks are further complicated
by a core result in mechanism design theory that no response format involving more
than two alternatives can be incentive compatible without substantial additional
restrictions on participants’ preferences (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975). These
theoretical predictions about the incentive structures of the repeated survey format
suggest that truthful responses may not always be dominant choices when participants
are asked a series of choice tasks in a DCE study.
There exist a number of studies that show a systematic change in preferences
along the sequence of valuation scenarios. A number of phenomena of preference
formation and different explanations for such systematic alterations of stated
preferences along the sequence of choice tasks have been proposed. Day et al. (2012)
reviewed the previous studies and broadly categorized order effects, a term
representing various phenomena of a systematic change in stated preferences along a
sequence of choice tasks, into two groups. The first relates to a systematic change in
preferences due to the position of choice task in the sequence, also known as positiondependent order effects. The second relates to systematic changes in expressed
preferences along the sequence of valuation scenarios due to the nature of alternatives
in the previous tasks, also known as precedent-dependent order effects.
Position-dependent order effects represent a set of confounding of standard
choice behaviors, which may result from different forms of learning effects such as
institutional learning (Braga & Starmer, 2005) or value learning (Plott, 1993) or
fatigue effects (Bradley & Daly, 1994; Savage & Waldman, 2008) or a lack of
credibility (Carson & Groves, 2007). The learning effects may arise when participants
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become more familiar with the environmental good or service under consideration, the
context, and the choice tasks in early choices and ultimately make choices consistent
with their preferences later in the sequence. Early choice tasks serve as opportunities
to learn about less familiar environmental goods or services and the choice context,
resulting in institutional learning (Braga & Starmer, 2005). Likewise, participants,
after initial confusion, may be ‘discovering’ features of their own preferences, also
called value learning (Plott, 1993), while responding to the sequence of choices. These
learning effects may be characterized by an initial increased randomness17 in early
choice tasks followed by less random responses in later choice tasks in the sequence.
Alternatively, participants may become fatigued answering a series of choice tasks,
resulting in the fatigue effects, which may be characterized when participants
increasingly favor the status quo option or a particular attribute along with an
increased randomness in responses in the sequence. Also, participants face a series of
choice tasks representing more or less the same level of the environmental good at
varying price levels in the sequence. This presentation may induce a sense of failing
credibility in the surveying agency or the alternatives as potential options for
implementation, which could manifest as an increasing tendency to reject costly
options in favor of the status quo, as well as an increased randomness in responses in
the sequence, because participants may simply not invest time and effort to make
choices consistent with their preferences.

17

Randomness in choices is represented by an estimate of scale factor using a

heteroskedastic model and is inversely proportional to the variances of error terms.
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Precedent-dependent order effects occur when participants systematically
change their preferences based on the nature of the choice task in the sequence and
represent a set of non-standard choice behaviors. Participants may compare
subsequent choice tasks relative to the options or levels of attributes in the “first
choice task” often referred to starting task effects (Herriges & Shogren, 1996;
Ladenburg & Olsen, 2008). Participants may take subsequent choice tasks as a ‘good
deal’ or a ‘bad deal’ relative to the “reference” alternatives or “reference” level of
attributes developed from observations in previous choice tasks, often termed as
reference effects (Isoni, 2011; Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005). Participants may
interpret a series of options offering a non-market good at varying prices as an
opportunity to manipulate the outcome or the optimal level of provision or pricing to
their advantage or both, and thus may judge subsequent choice tasks relative to the
“best” alternative or “best” level of attributes presented in previous choice tasks,
resulting in strategic misrepresentation (Carson & Groves, 2007).
There are also studies that examined the effect of advanced disclosure or stepwise disclosure of the repeated survey format on the order effects. Employing a
contingent valuation (CV) study to value nested levels of environmental improvement,
Bateman et al. (2004) examined the advanced and stepwise disclosure formats and
found a significant difference in value estimates due to order of presentation in the
step-wise disclosure format, but the advanced disclosure response format did not
produce such a significant difference, implying the advanced disclosure format may
mitigate position-dependent order effects. Likewise, Scheufele & Bennett (2013) did
not find any influence of advanced awareness of repeated choices on the implications
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for order effects in the sequence of choices. However, Bateman, Day, Dupont, &
Georgiou (2009), in a DCE study involving two binary choice tasks, found statistically
different preferences in the second choice task relative to the choices in the first task,
resulting in precedent-dependent order effects relating to starting task effects.
Previous studies examining order effects in the repeated response survey
format employed binary choice elicitation in which participants faced a choice
between an alternative level of the environmental good or service under investigation
and the status quo alternative. A recent study by Scheufele & Bennett (2012), using
repeated binary discrete choice experiments, examined whether strategic opportunities
provided by the order in which choice sets are presented affect choice decisions and
found evidence of such effects in terms of participants’ increased cost sensitivity and
thus lowering willingness to pay (WTP) estimates if the same or similar level of
provision was offered in the previous choice task at a lower cost than if it was not.
However, they found that the cost sensitivity and thus WTP remains unaffected if the
same or similar level of provision was offered in the previous choice task at a higher
cost. Their results also indicate that the cost sensitivity increases (and WTP decreases)
as participants progress through the sequence of choice tasks. As noted by Scheufele
& Bennett (2012), the order effects reported in the SP literature have not been
adequately examined under multinomial response format. A trichotomous choice
elicitation format as applied here asks participants about two wetland-parcel
preservation alternatives and the status quo option. Since each choice task provides
two non-status quo alternatives at different cost levels across the sequence, this choice
situation may provide strategic opportunities for participants that may manifest
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through the effects on the cost parameter estimate as well as on the utility of the status
quo option. Thus, the major objective of this paper is to examine the effect of a set of
variables and interactions, representing position-dependent as well as precedentdependent effects, on the marginal utility of cost to participants and also on the utility
of the status quo option. Statistically significant effect of these variables on the cost
parameter and the utility of the status quo option may subsequently imply effects on
the marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) for wetland attributes, as well as total WTP
for alternative wetland parcels, relative to the status quo option across the sequence.
We employed a split sample approach, meaning one group of participants
received two choice tasks and a different group of participants received a series of
twelve choice tasks, to examine whether the alternative survey formats influence
marginal values as well as marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) for attributes of
protecting forested wetland parcels. This paper utilized data from a stated preference
survey using discrete choice experiment (DCE) method to assess values of various
attributes for protecting forested wetland parcels in the northern towns of Rhode
Island, USA.

Our results suggest that the alternative survey formats produce

statistically different preference functions. We further examined participants’
responses from the twelve choice tasks (or the repeated survey format) to investigate
whether these responses suggest any form of order effects discussed in the stated
preference literature in terms of participants’ cost sensitivity across the sequence.
Analysis of responses from repeated choice format suggests evidence of precedentdependent order effect relating to a potential to retain higher net surplus from the
most-valued alternative in the current task relative to the same in the preceding task
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may induce participants to be less sensitive to cost and thus appear to have a higher
WTP across the sequence in our application using trichotomous choice tasks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.3 discuses the theoretical
framework of random utility model (RUM) to model participants’ choices for
protecting forested wetland parcels. Section 2.4 details identification of relevant
attributes, experimental design of forested wetland parcels, and implementation of a
stated preference survey developed in this study. Section 2.5 presents the results of
hypothesis tests. Section 2.6 concludes the paper by discussing the implications of our
results.

2.3 The conceptual model
Following standard practice, we employ a random utility model or the RUM
framework (McFadden, 1974) to model survey participants' choices for conserving
wooded wetland parcels. The RUM assumes that participants’ choice is dictated by the
maximization of the utility. The utility that participant n receives from alternative j in
choice task t can be represented by: Unjt=V(β, Xnjt)+εnjt, where V(β, Xnjt) represents the
observed portion of utility estimated from a vector of attributes of wetland parcels
(Xnjt) with a vector of parameters to be estimated, β, and where εnjt represents the
portion of utility unobserved or unknown from the researcher’s perspective and is
assumed to be an iid type 1 extreme value. Given these assumptions, the probability
that participant n chooses alternative j in choice task t is given by the following logit
specification:
(1)

Pnjt=exp(λVnjt)

/ Σ exp(λV
j’

nj’t)
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where λ is a scale parameter and is inversely proportional to the error variance, σε2
(λ=π/√[6σε2]). Since the preference parameter vector, β, and the scale parameter, λ,
cannot be identified simultaneously, the scale parameter is often normalized to 1 for
identification purpose. The assumption of a constant error variance across individuals
could mislead the results of hypothesis tests while comparing preferences across
subsamples of participants because the preference vectors, β, are confounded by the
corresponding scale parameters. A heteroskedastic conditional logit model (DeShazo
& Fermo, 2002; Hensher, Louviere, & Swait, 1998) allows one to estimate the scale
parameter as a function of participant-specific characteristics, and thus allows us to
compare both preference vectors as well as the scale parameters across different
subsamples of participants. Moreover, estimated scale parameters provide us with an
indication of uncertainty in responses, in addition to the effect of all unobserved
factors or variables, across the two response formats.
Our comparison of preferences and the scale parameters between the two
response formats is limited to an estimation of a heteroskedastic conditional logit
model because two choice observations from each survey participant may not allow us
to discover statistically different random parameters under our two choice task survey
format (Rose, Hess, Bliemer, & Daly, 2011). However, we will utilize a mixed logit
model to further explore the responses under our repeated response format involving
twelve choice tasks.
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2.3.1 Hypothesis tests regarding survey formats
DCE studies using the repeated choice format assume that participants’ preferences do
not change or are stable across the choice tasks in the sequence. Therefore, our first
hypothesis is related to examining a set of marginal utility parameters to compare
underlying utility functions, scale parameters, and mWTP estimates for attributes
across the two survey formats. We formally express the hypothesis as follows:

Hypothesis 1: A set of marginal utility parameters, β, is not significantly altered by
the repeated response format.
HO: βChoice2= βChoice12 and HA: βChoice2≠ βChoice12
where βC represents a set of marginal utility parameters estimated from a subsample
facing two choice tasks (C=Choice2) and a different subsample facing twelve choice
tasks (C= Choice12).
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we will conduct a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test by
imposing restrictions implied by the null hypothesis (HO) examine whether the
restrictions are true. Additionally, we will compare the scale parameter estimates to
examine underlying error variances across the survey formats, i.e., Hypothesis 1a: test
λChoice12 / λChoice2=1, where the scale parameter (λC) for a subsample facing two choices
(C=Choice2) is normalized to 1 and the scale parameter for a different subsample
facing twelve choice tasks (C=Choice12) is estimated relative to 1 for identification
purpose. Therefore, the test of scale parameters between the subsamples is whether the
ratio of scale parameters (or the relative values) is equivalent to 1.
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Hypothesis 2: Marginal willingness to pay (mWTP) values for wetland attributes are
not significantly affected by the repeated survey format.
HO: mWTPChoice2= mWTPChoice12 and HA: mWTPChoice2≠ mWTPChoice12
where mWTPCX represents marginal willingness to pay for an attribute X defined as
the ratio of the marginal utility of an attribute X (βX) and the marginal utility of
income (-βCost) or (-1)*(βX/ βCost), using coefficients estimated from a subsample
facing two choice tasks (C=Choice2) and a different subsample facing twelve choice
tasks (C= Choice12).
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we will conduct a series of pair-wise Wald tests
of equality of mWTP estimates for wetland attributes across the two choice formats.

2.3.2 Exploring order effects under repeated choice format
Given that Hypothesis 1 and 2 above are rejected, we will further examine responses
from the repeated survey format. We will estimate a mixed logit model to examine
both forms of orders effects, position-dependent and precedent-dependent effects,
under the repeated survey format involving twelve choice tasks. We will specifically
examine these effects by creating a set of variables or interactions representing the
corresponding type and examining whether these variables alter marginal utility of
cost to participants (and thus mWTP) as well as the utility of the status quo option
across the sequence. The actual empirical model estimated to examine these effects
will be discussed later.
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2.4 Empirical application
2.4.1 Wetland survey design and implementation
We examined the hypotheses regarding preferences across alternative survey formats
using stated preference (SP) data to assess values of forested wetlands in Rhode
Island, USA. The SP data utilized in this paper were part of a larger study involving
both hypothetical and real-money choices (Newell, 2003; Newell & Swallow, 2013),
but the present study utilizes responses only from hypothetical choices of wooded
wetland parcels. Details about the original study can be found in (Newell, 2003).
Responses from the 12-choice format have not previously been analyzed.
Personal interviews and a total of eight focus groups (Johnston et al., 1995)
with the members of Wood Pawcatuck Watershed Association, several school parents’
organizations, and members of the general public were conducted during the process
of identifying relevant attributes to describe various aspects of conserving wooded
wetland parcels (Newell, 2003). These focus groups and personal interviews were
primarily concentrated on learning Rhode Island residents’ attitudes and views
towards different dimensions of forested wetlands and other natural resources in
general. These discussions also helped to develop, pretest, and revise the survey
instrument in terms of clarity of instructions and presentation as well as
comprehensiveness of the content of the survey.
Table 2.1 presents identified attributes of forested wetland parcels that were
considered to be relevant by conservation biologists, local residents and the focus
group participants, including type of road passing by a wetland parcel, character of
surrounding land, level of wildlife diversity, level of public access, sustainability of
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habitat quality, role of parcel as conservation area, size of parcel (acres) and one-time
cost ($) to participants to protect a wetland parcel for a ten-year period. An example
choice task is presented in Figure 2.1.

Table 2.1 Wetland parcel attributes and levels
Attribute
Type of road

Character
surrounding land

Wildlife diversity

Public access

Sustainability
habitat quality

Variable and description
Common_Road: An effects-coded variable equals 1 for a
commonly travelled road adjacent to the wetland parcel,
equals -1 for a locally traveled road; and equals 0
otherwise.
Heavy_Road: An effects-coded variable equals 1 for a
heavily travelled road adjacent to the wetland parcel,
equals -1 for a locally traveled road; and equals 0
otherwise.
of Woodland: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the
wetland parcel is surrounded by woodland, equals -1 if the
parcel is surrounded by rural residential land; and equals 0
otherwise.
Farmland: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the
wetland parcel is surrounded by farmland, equals -1 if the
parcel is surrounded by rural residential land; and equals 0
otherwise.
Medium_WLDiversity: An effects-coded variable equals
1 if the wildlife diversity of the parcel is medium, equals 1 if the diversity is low; and equals 0 otherwise.
High_WLDiversity: An effects-coded variable equals 1
if the wildlife diversity of the parcel is high, equals -1 if
the diversity is low; and equals 0 otherwise.
Limited_Access: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if
limited public access to the parcel is allowed, equals -1 if
no public access is allowed; and equals 0 otherwise.
Full_Access: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if full
public access is allowed to the parcel, equals -1 if no
public access is allowed; and equals 0 otherwise.
of Medium_Sustain: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if
the parcel sustains medium level of habitat quality, equals
-1 if the parcel sustains low level of habitat quality; and
equals 0 otherwise.
High_Sustain: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the
parcel sustains high level of habitat quality, equals -1 if
the parcel sustains low level of habitat quality; and equals
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0 otherwise.
Role as conservation Expands: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the parcel
area
expands an existing protected areas, equals -1 if the parcel
is isolated from other protected areas; and equals 0
otherwise.
Connects: An effects-coded variable equals 1 if the parcel
connects two protected areas, equals -1 if the parcel is
isolated from other protected areas; and equals 0
otherwise.
Size of parcel
Size: The size of wetland parcels (in acres)- 29 acres, 45
acres and 60 acres
One-time
cost
to Cost: One-time payment that participant’s household is
participant’s
required to make for the conservation of wetland parcel
household
for a 10-year period- $5, $10, $15, $20, $25 and $30.
Status quo option
SQ: A dummy variable equals 1 for the status quo option
or “conserve neither parcel”, and equals 0 for a parcel
(Parcel A or Parcel B).
Figure 2.1 An example choice task of forested wetland protection
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StatDesign Inc.18 provided a fractional factorial design of choice tasks by
combining levels of eight wetland parcel attributes (see Table 2.1). The fractional
factorial design of the attribute combinations produced a total of 36 choice tasks. Each
choice task consisted of two wetland parcels that differ in the levels of the eight
attributes. Participants were asked to evaluate the attributes of the two parcels and
indicate their most preferred parcel: Parcel A or Parcel B or “Neither parcel,” making
each choice task a trichotomous valuation scenario.
In order to examine whether the survey format or sequence length affected
modeling of preferences and values, the researchers created two wetland survey
booklets entitled “Are Rhode Island’s Wetlands Valuable?”. The first survey booklet
consisted of two different choice tasks (Choice2 subsample), and the second survey
booklet consisted of a series of twelve different choice tasks (Choice12 subsample),
from the same pool of original 36 choice tasks produced by the fractional factorial
design. The two choice tasks were chosen from the pool of 36 choice tasks such that
the first choice task was picked at an interval of five choice tasks relative to the second
choice task. For example, if the first choice task is the 6th in the pool of 36 tasks, then
the second choice task was 1st from the pool of 36 tasks. This was to ensure that the
two choice tasks were different in the survey booklet. The fractional factorial design
produced 36 choice tasks that were then efficiently blocked into three sets of twelve
choice tasks. That is the first set consists of choice tasks 1st through 12th; the second
set consists of choice tasks 13th through 24th; and the third set consists of choice tasks
18

We are indebted to Don A. Anderson of Evergreen, CO, who created the design and

suggested the 12-choice format be implemented.
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25th through 36th. Each participant was then randomly assigned to one of the three sets.
Except for the number of choice tasks faced by participants in the two survey booklets,
both surveys consisted otherwise of the exact same information on the purpose of the
survey and the benefits of protecting forested wetlands and the questions regarding
their socio-demographic characteristics.
The researchers employed the Dillman method (Dillman, 1978) to distribute
the surveys to randomly-drawn residents of the towns of North Smithfield and
Scituate, Rhode Island, USA, in the summer of 2000. The Dillman method, as applied
in this study, involved sending a cover letter, the survey and a $1 coin as financial
token of appreciation. For non-respondents, additional mailings were sent, including a
reminder postcard, followed by a letter with a replacement survey, a second reminder
postcard, plus a letter with a final post card asking non-respondents about their basic
(age, gender, and education as described below) socio-demographic information.

2.4.2 Descriptive statistics about survey participants
A total of 1000 surveys involving two choice tasks were mailed out and 402 were
returned of the 906 surveys actually delivered, registering a response rate of 44.37%.
A total of 200 surveys involving twelve choice tasks were mailed out and 82 surveys
were returned of 180 deliverables providing a response rate of 45.56%. Table 2.2
reports summary statistics for the available socio-demographic characteristics of
participants in the two subsamples. A chi-squared test of independence for categorical
variables suggests the two subsamples have statistically similar proportions of male
and female participants (see Table 2.2), but the subsamples who faced a series of
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twelve choice tasks had significantly higher proportion of participants with a college
degree or higher than the participants who faced only two choice tasks (see Table 2.2).
Two-sample t-test shows that the mean age of the participants across the subsamples is
statistically equivalent (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Participants' characteristics across the choice formats
Choice formats
Two choice Twelve
tasks
choice tasks
(Choice2)
(Choice12)
Sample
Sample
mean
mean
(SD)
(SD)
Male
=1 if participant is male;
0.68
0.67
0 otherwise.
(0.47)
(0.47)
College
=1 if participant has a college 0.75
0.87
degree or higher;
(0.43)
(0.34)
0 otherwise.
Age
Age of participants
48.95
48.99
(13.64)
(12.19)
a
Two sample t-stat, 482 df, (p-value)
Variables

Description

Pearson
χ2, 1df
(p)

0.066
(0.7973)
4.922
(0.0265)
0.0268a
(0.9786)

2.5 Results
2.5.1 Empirical model specification for hypothesis tests regarding choice formats
We assume the indirect utility (Vnjt) is a linear function of the attributes of wetland
parcels (Xnjt) including the cost to buy the parcel19 for conservation (Costnjt), as well as
participant-specific socio-demographic characteristics (Zn). The indirect utility
function can be expressed as follows:
19

The survey asked about paying the cost to secure a 10-year easement preventing

development; this restriction was related to the broader purpose of the study, such as
described in (Newell & Swallow, 2013).
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(2)

Vnjt=βSQSQj+ βXXnjt+ βCostCostnjt+βZSQZn!SQj
+(βSQC12SQj+ βXC12Xnjt+βCostC12Costnjt+βZSQC12Zn! SQj)!Choice12,

where20 βSQ , βSQC12 represent the coefficients measuring the utility of the status quo
option (SQj) across the choice formats as captured by dummy variable Choice12 for
which 1 indicates the 12-choice presentation, and 0 indicates the 2-choice
presentation; βX represent the coefficients measuring the marginal utility of the nonmonetary attributes of wetland parcels (Xnjt) in the 2-choice format and, when
Choice12 =1, the addition of βXC12 captures any addition to the marginal utility due to
the 12-choice format; similarly βCost, βCostC12 together represent the marginal utility of
cost to participants (Costnjt), often known as the negative of the marginal utility of
income, across the survey formats (Choice12=1,0); βZSQ, βZSQC12 represent the
coefficients adjusting the utility of the status quo option due to participant-specific
socio-demographic characteristics (Zn) across the survey formats (Choice12=1,0); SQj
represents a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for the status quo option, or the
“Neither Parcel” alternative, and the value of 0 for a wetland parcel (Parcel A or
Parcel B); Xnjt represents the vector of non-monetary attributes of wooded wetland
parcels (Table 2.1) and the cost to the participant to buy the parcels (Costnjt); Zn
represents the vector of participants’ socio-demographic characteristics21.
20

Note that in Eq. (2), parameters βn relates to the marginal utilities for the 2-Choice

format (Choice12=0) while (βn+ βnC12) gives the marginal utilities for the 12-Choice
format (Choice12=1).
21

Since participants who faced a series of twelve choice tasks had significantly higher

proportion of participants with a college degree or higher than the participants who
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2.5.2 Hypothesis test results regarding the choice formats
We estimated a heteroskedastic conditional logit model of the utility specification
presented in equation (2) using the pooled data from both survey formats. In order to
test Hypothesis 1, we conducted a LR test by imposing restrictions on a set of the
utility parameters, including the utility of the status quo option, the marginal utility
parameters of the attributes of wetland parcels, and the marginal utility of income. The
LR test22 suggests that the two survey formats produce statistically different
underlying preference functions (LR Test: βSQC12=βXC12=βCostC12=0; χ2=60.43, 15 df,
p<0.0001). We also examined whether the two choice formats produce statistically
different estimates of the scale parameters representing uncertainty or randomness in
responses across the formats. The LR test23 suggests that the scale parameter is

faced only two choice (see Table 2.2), we examined, in our preliminary models not
discussed here, whether this difference in education level could affect the potential
difference in estimated preference functions across the survey formats (Choice12=1,0)
and found that the effect on wetland attributes was not statistically significant and thus
excluded from further consideration (χ2=14.1758, 15 df, p=0.5122).

22

The LR test statistic was calculated as 2*(LLU-LLR) with 15 df, is asymptotically

chi-square distributed. LLU is the log-likelihood value of the unrestricted model
specified in Eq. (2) and reported in Table 2.3 and LLR is the log-likelihood value of
the restricted model after imposing a set of restrictions (βSQC12=βXC12=βCostC12=0)
estimated using the pooled dataset from both survey formats.
23

The LR test statistic was calculated as 2*(LLVS-LLES) with 1df is asymptotically

chi-square distributed. LLVS is the log-likelihood value of the pooled model allowing
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significantly lower (or, equivalently, shows higher error variances, and thus higher
uncertainty or randomness, in choices) for the subsample that faced only two choice
tasks (Hypothesis 1a- LR Test: [λChoice12 / λChoice2]=1; χ2=17.23, 1 df, p<0.0001).
The heteroskedastic conditional logit model results of the utility specification
in Eq. (2) estimated using the pooled data from both response formats are reported in
Table 2.3. These results suggest that the marginal utility parameters for variables
representing wetland parcel surrounded by woodland, medium level of wildlife
diversity, high level of sustainability of habitat quality, wetland parcel connecting two
protected areas, the size of the parcel and the marginal utility of the cost to participants
are statistically different across the survey formats (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Heteroskedastic conditional logit model results
Variable (n)

Coefficient (se) [p-value]

Base Parameters (βn) when Choice12=0
Status quo (SQ)
-0.5113 (0.6492) [0.431]
Common_Road
.0216 (0.0775) [0.780]
Heavy_Road
-0.1072 (0.0776) [0.167]
Woodland
0.3418 (0.0803) [0.0001]
Farmland
-0.0037 (0.0804) [0.963]
Medum_WLDiversity
0.0128 (0.0649) [0.843]
High_WLDiversity
0.3767 (0.0644) [0.0001]
Limited_Access
-0.0311 (0.0749) [0.678]
Full_Access
0.3141 (0.0802) [0.0001]
Medium_Sustain
0.1337 (0.0676) [0.048]
High_Sustain
0.1746 (0.0699) [0.012]
Expands
-0.0253 (0.0765) [0.740]
Connects
0.0535 (0.0742) [0.471]
Size
0.0218 (0.0046) [0.0001]
Cost
-0.0119 (0.0055) [0.031]
varying scale parameters across the choice formats and LLES is the log-likelihood
value of the pooled model assuming equal scale parameters in both response formats.
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Male!SQ
0.3067 (0.2633) [0.244]
Age!SQ
0.0178 (0.0094) [0.059]
College!SQ
-0.3633 (0.2748) [0.186]
Additions to Base Parameters (βnC12) when Choice12=1
SQ!Choice12
1.6184 (1.2447) [0.194]
SQ!Choice12
1.6184 (1.2447) [0.194]
Common_Road!Choice12
0.1137 (0.1007) [0.259]
Heavy_Road!Choice12
0.1139 (0.1019) [0.264]
Woodland!Choice12
-0.2896 (0.1173) [0.014]
Farmland!Choice12
0.0256 (0.1173) [0.827]
Medium_WLDiversity!Choice12 0.2097 (0.0921) [0.023]
High_WLDiversity!Choice12
-0.0394 (0.0988) [0.690]
Limited_Access!Choice12
0.1235 (0.1046) [0.238]
Full_Access!Choice12
-0.0851 (0.1275) [0.504]
Medium_Sustain!Choice12
0.1261 (0.0900) [0.161]
High_Sustain!Choice12
0.3637 (0.0981) [0.0001]
Expands!Choice12
-0.1319 (0.1043) [0.206]
Connects!Choice12
0.2685 (0.1046) [0.010]
Size!Choice12
-0.0106 (0.0059) [0.076]
Cost!Choice12
-0.0176 (0.0092 [0.056]
Male!SQ!Choice12
-0.5512 (0.4677) [0.239]
Age!SQ!Choice12
-0.0259 (0.0182 [0.153]
College!SQ!Choice12
-0.6752 (0.6146 [0.272]
Model statistics
Log-likelihood value
AIC
BIC
Number of parameters
Wald χ2, 36 df (p)
Number of choices
Number of participants
Relative scale parameter
(λChoice12/ λChoice2)
Pseudo R2

-1682.465
3436.93
3673.429
36
258.46 (p<0.0001)
1756
484
1.8484 (p<0.0001)
0.1279

In order to test Hypothesis 2, we conducted a series of pair-wise Wald tests of
equality of mWTP values for wetland attributes using estimates from the
heteroskedastic conditional logit model presented in Table 2.3 across the response
formats. mWTP estimates and results of the Wald tests are reported in Table 2.4. The
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test results suggest a very weak statistical significance on the difference of mWTP
estimates across the survey formats when examined individually; the mWTP estimate
is statistically different (at the 10% level) for only one of thirteen variables across the
response formats. A Wald test for only the variables, whose marginal utility
coefficients for the 12-choice presentations were significantly different (see Table 2.3)
suggests a statistically different mWTP estimates across the survey formats (χ2=21.56,
9 df, p= 0.0104). However, that test is biased in favor of rejecting the null, and this
result did not hold when we conducted a Wald test of equality of mWTP estimates for
all thirteen variables (χ2= 25.69, 25 df, p= 0.4245).

Table 2.4 Marginal WTP for wetland attributes across the survey formats
Variablesa
Common_Road
Heavy_Road
Woodland
Farmland
Medium_WDiversity
High_WDiversity
Limited_Access
Full_Access
Medium_Sustain
High_Sustain
Expands

Choice formats
Two choice tasks
Twelve choice tasks
b
(Choice12=0)
(Choice12=1)b
-5.38
9.40*
(-27.09, 16.33)
(-0.39, 19.20)
-16.22
5.04
(-41.59, 9.15)
(-3.53, 13.62)
57.21*
4.28
(-0.18, 114.59)
(-5.45, 14.01)
28.14
3.26
(-5.64, 61.93)
(-6.66, 13.17)
33.85*
26.52***
(-1.94, 69.65
(12.35, 40.69)
64.47**
30.41***
(2.64, 126.29)
(14.46, 46.35)
21.19
14.02**
(-8.07, 50.46)
(2.97, 25.08)
50.24**
18.66***
(0.48, 99.99)
(6.26, 31.05)
37.19*
35.86***
(-1.04, 75.42)
(17.14, 54.59)
40.64*
45.30***
(-1.11, 82.39)
(23.36, 67.24)
0.24
0.25
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Wald test
p-valuec
0.2238
0.1196
0.0747
0.1660
0.7089
0.2958
0.6534
0.2274
0.9512
0.8463
0.9994

(-22.06, 22.54)
6.87
(-15.47, 29.22)
Size
1.84*
(-0.01, 3.69)
a
mWTP for a continuous variable (Size) is simply
Connects

(-7.33, 7.82)
16.49***
0.4503
(5.33, 27.66)
0.38**
0.1285
(0.06, 0.69)
calculated as the ratio of marginal

utility of that variable and the marginal utility of the income (negative of βCost). For
effects-coded variables, mWTP is calculated as an addition to WTP for a wetland
parcel when the indicated level of the attribute is added relative to the base level of the
corresponding attribute, ceteris paribus.
b

c

95% confidence intervals (CIs) of mWTP estimates are reported in parentheses.

P-values from the pair-wise Wald test of equality of mWTP estimates across the

subsamples (Choice12=1,0), i.e., HO: mWTPXChoice2 = mWTPXChoice12, where
mWTPXChoice2 is mWTP for an attribute X for the subsample of participants that faced
two choice tasks (Choice12=0) and mWTPXChoice12 is mWTP for an attribute X for the
subsample of participants that faced a series of twelve choice tasks (Choice12=1).
Three, two and one asterisk(s) (***, ** and *) indicate significantly different from
zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

2.5.3 Order effects in repeated response survey format
Hypothesis test results regarding the alternative survey formats above suggested that
the two formats produced statistically different underlying preference functions.
However, our results of pair-wise Wald tests of mWTP estimates for the variables did
not show statistical difference across the response formats. Therefore, we now
examine responses from the repeated response format or the DCE involving twelve
choice tasks to explore the pattern of participants’ preferences implied across the
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sequence of the repeated tasks if we maintain the presumption that individuals’
responses are consistent with utility maximization.
We will examine both forms of order effects, position-dependent and
precedent-dependent, by creating a set of variables or interactions representing the
corresponding effect-type and examining their significance to alter the marginal utility
of income as well as their effect on the utility of the status quo option across the
sequence. We focus our analysis of order effects in terms of the effect on the marginal
utility of income which then translates to the effect on marginal willingness to pay
(mWTP) and the effect on the utility of the status quo option which will translate to
the effect on total WTP values for an alternative relative to the status quo option. Prior
research has focused on carefully designed, dichotomous choice with few attributes.
This focus allows researchers to identify choice sequences providing scenarios that
increase (or decrease) utility from one question to the next. But existing studies have
not adequately explored whether precedent-dependent effects might arise in a complex
choice experiments that are more typical of modern applications. Yet such applied
surveys do not allow researchers as much flexibility in designing a survey with choice
sequences for which trends in utility can be expected to be known with high
confidence a priori. We address this limitation by using out 2-Choicesurvey data to
create an independent means to identify the trends in utility offered in a sequence of
choice questions.

117

2.5.3.1 Variables to examine position-dependent order effects
As already mentioned, 3 sets of 12 choices tasks were created from our
experimental design procedure from the pool of 36 choice tasks. First we examined
the percentages of participants choosing the status quo option along the sequence of 12
choice tasks. Figure 2.2 shows these results by a graphical representation. Figure 2.2
also shows the percentages of participants choosing the status quo option in the 2choice presentation and these are within the ranges of the values from the three sets
under the 12-choice presentation. Observations from Figure 2.2 suggest that
percentages of participants choosing the status quo option are consistent in initial tasks
(Task # 1- Task #3) as well as later tasks (Task # 9 – Task #12) between the sets.
However, there exists some variation in the responses with respect to the choice of the
status quo option in the middle tasks (Task #4 -Task # 8). This observation suggests
that we consider a step-wise, discrete group of choice tasks to examine participants’
responses along the sequence, which we examine in the following section.
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Figure 2.2 Pattern of the choice of the status quo option across tasks between sets

In order to examine whether these discrete group of choice tasks impact the
marginal utility of income as well as the utility of the status quo option across the
sequence, we created two dummy variables: Position4_8 = 1 for the choice tasks
occurring in the 4th through 8th position in the sequence and Position9_12 = 1 for the
choice tasks occurring in the 9th through 12th position in the sequence, with zero
indicating otherwise respectively. We included interaction terms in the utility
specification by interacting these dummy variables (Position4_8 and Position9_12)
with the cost attribute (Costnjt; Table 2.1) and also with the dummy variable
representing the status quo option (SQj; Table 2.1) to examine the position-dependent
order effects on the cost sensitivity (and thus mWTP) as well as the effect on the status
quo utility (and thus total WTP) across the sequence.
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2.5.3.2 Variables to examine precedent-dependent order effects
In order to examine whether participants’ responses in the current choice task were
affected by the type (or nature) of alternatives that appear in the preceding choice
tasks, collectively termed as precedent-dependent order effects, we created a
continuous variable that represents the proportion (or the rate) at which the status quo
option was chosen in the preceding choice task as predicted using the responses from
the Choice2 subsample data. In order to create this variable, we first estimated a
conditional logit model using the utility specification represented in Eq. (2) using the
responses from the Choice2 subsample only (so the interaction terms involving
Choice12 in Eq. (2) were absent). The estimation results are presented in Manuscript
2- Appendix B1. Then we predicted the probabilities of each alternative being chosen
using the estimates from this conditional logit model24. The predicted probability for
the status quo option was averaged across the participants in the Choice2 subsample,
producing the predicted probability of the status quo option for each of 36 choice
tasks. This newly created variable “PrevSQChosen” consists of zeros for the first
choice task and the estimated probability of the status quo option being chosen in the
preceding choice task predicted from the Choice2 subsample model for the subsequent
choice tasks in the sequence. This variable is then interacted with the cost variable
(Costnjt; Table 2.1) as well as with the dummy variable for the status quo option (SQj;
Table 2.1) to examine its impact on the marginal utility of income (and thus mWTP)
and the utility of the status quo option (and thus total WTP).

24

Accordingly, we used Eq. (1) with the scale parameter normalized to one.
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Next, we also created a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a net surplus
value, the difference between the predicted willingness to pay for the most-valued25
wetland parcel and the actual cost asked of respondents to buy that parcel in the choice
task, is higher in the current choice task relative to the preceding task, and zero
otherwise. In order to generate the net surplus value for the most-valued alternative,
we used the coefficient estimates from the conditional logit model of the utility
specification in Eq. (2) using the responses from the Choice2 subsample only; these
coefficients were used to calculate the total utility of the non-status quo alternative and
the utility of the status quo option. We then used these utility values (see Manuscript
2-Appendix B) to estimate total WTP26 values for an alternative relative to the status
quo option for each participant for the Choice12 subsample participants using their
socio-demographic characteristics. This process provided total WTP value estimates
for each non-status quo alternative (Parcel A and Parcel B) for each participant for the
12 choice tasks she or he faced. Then we calculated the difference between the
25

Since we are asking participants to state their most preferred alternative in a task, it

is certainly relevant for participants to think about the net surplus value they could
retain by choosing their most preferred alternative and change in that surplus across
the tasks may affect their responses across the sequence.
26

Total WTP for an alternative wetland parcel relative to the status quo was calculated

as -1*[U(Alternative)-U(totalSQ)]/βCost, where U(Alternative) is the total utility for a
non-status quo alternative, U(totalSQ) is the total utility of the status quo option (the
βSQ adjusted by βZSQ using participants socio-demographic profiles) and βCost is the
marginal utility of the cost to participants, using the coefficient estimates from the
conditional logit model of utility specification in Eq. (2) using the Choice2 subsample
data only (see Manuscript 2-Appendix B).
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estimated total WTP value for an alternative parcel and the corresponding amount of
money participants were asked to pay for that alternative, providing us with the net
surplus value for each non-status quo alternative. We then compared the net surplus
value for the most-valued alternative in each choice task across the sequence to
determine whether the potential surplus value in the current choice task is increasing
or decreasing relative to the preceding choice task. We created a dummy variable
“IncrSurplus”, which takes the value 1 if the net surplus for the most-valued
alternative in current choice tasks is increasing relative to the corresponding value in
the preceding choice task, and the value of 0 otherwise. For the first choice task, this
variable will take a value of zero. This newly created dummy variable is then
interacted with the cost variable (Costnjt; Table 2.1) as well as with the dummy
variable for the status quo option (SQj; Table 2.1) to examine their impact on the
marginal utility of income (and thus mWTP) and the utility of the status quo option
(and thus total WTP).

2.5.3.3 Empirical model estimation and the LR tests
We estimated a panel mixed logit model (Train, 2003; Revelt & Train, 1998; Train,
1998)27 assuming a linear utility function using the choices from the survey response

27

The mixlogit module in Stata (Hole, 2007) was employed to estimate panel mixed

logit model using “id (participant id)” option to adjust for the potential nonindependence of responses to 12 choice tasks from a survey participant. Only nonmonetary attributes of wetland parcels (Xnjt) and cost to participants (Costnjt) were
specified as normally distributed random variables. All the other variables and
interactions were modeled as fixed parameters.
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format involving twelve choice tasks only. In order to examine the significance of a
set of variables representing corresponding order effects, we first estimated an
unrestricted model defined below and tested the parameter restrictions of interest
against the unrestricted model. Thus, we defined:
(3)

Vnjt=βSQSQj + βZSQZn!SQj + βXXnjt+βCostCostnjt
+(βCost_P48Position4_8+βCost_P912Position9_12
+βCost_PrevSQPrevSQChosen+βCost_IncrSurplusIncrSurplus)!Costnjt
+(βSQ_P48Position4_8+βSQ_P912Position9_12
+βSQ_PrevSQPrevSQChosen+βSQ_IncrSurplusIncrSurplus)!SQj

where βSQ, βZSQ represent the coefficients measuring the utility of the status quo option
(SQj) and adjusting the utility of the status quo option due to participant-specific
socio-demographic characteristics (Zn); βX represent the coefficients measuring the
marginal utility of the non-monetary attributes of wetland parcels (Xnjt); βCost
represents the marginal utility of cost to participants (Costnjt), often known as the
negative of the marginal utility of income; βCost_P48, βCost_P912 represent the coefficients
adjusting the marginal utility of cost to participants due to position-specific dummy
variables, Position4_8 and Position9_12 respectively; βSQ_P48, βSQ_P912 represent the
coefficients adjusting the marginal utility of the status quo due to position-dependent
variables, Position4_8 and Position9_12 respectively; βCost_PrevSQ, βCost_IncrSurplus
represent the coefficients adjusting the marginal utility of cost to participants due to
precedent-dependent variables,

PrevSQChosen and IncrSurplus respectively;

βSQ_PrevSQ, βSQ_IncrSurplus represent the coefficients adjusting the marginal utility of the
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status quo due to precedent-dependent variables, PrevSQChosen and IncrSurplus
respectively.
Estimation results of a panel mixed logit model of the utility specification
represented in Eq. (3) are presented in Table 2.5. This is the unrestricted model against
which a set of parameter restrictions was tested to examine significance of the
variables representing the corresponding order and precedent-dependent effects. The
LR test suggests that the interactions representing position-dependent order effects are
not statistically different from zero (LR Test: βCost_P48=βCost_P912=βSQ_P48=βSQ_P912=0;
χ2=4.4446, 4 df, p=0.3492). Next, we conducted a LR by imposing restrictions on the
interactions involving the precedent-dependent order effects and found a weak
statistical significance (LR Test:βCost_PrevSQ=βCost_IncrSurplus=βSQ_PrevSQ=βSQ_IncrSurplus=0;
χ2=7.5036, 4 df, p=0.1116). This weak significance is mostly resulted from the
relatively stronger significance of the interaction of the precedent-dependent variable
IncrSurplus with the cost variable and the status quo option (LR Test:
βCost_IncrSurplus=βSQ_IncrSurplus=0; χ2=4.8884, 2 df, p=0.0868).

Table 2.5 Panel mixed logit model results from repeated survey format
Variable
Non-random parameters
SQ
Male!SQ
Age!SQ
College!SQ
Position4_8!SQ
Position4_8!Cost
Position9_12!SQ
Position9_12!Cost

Coefficient
(se) [p-value]
0.5818 (1.2916) [0.652]
-0.2006 (0.4906) [0.683]
-0.0313 (0.0210) [0.137]
-0.4131 (0.6151) [0.502]
0.1884 (0.5166) [0.715]
-0.0247 (0.0239) [0.303]
0.4541 (0.5709) [0.426]
0.0107 (0.0243) [0.658]
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Std. Dev.
(se of Std. Dev.)
[p-value]
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

PrevSQChosen!SQ
PrevSQChosen!Cost
IncrSurplus!SQ
IncrSurplus!Cost
Random parameters
Common_Road (n)
Heavy_Road (n)
Woodland (n)
Farmland (n)
Medium_WDiversity (n)
High_WDiversity (n)
Limited_Access (n)
Full_Access (n)
Medium_Sustain (n)
High_Sustain (n)
Expands (n)
Connects (n)
Size (n)
Cost (n)
Model statistics
Number of observations
Number of participants
Log-likelihood (LL)
Number of parameters
AIC
BIC
LR(χ2), 14 df (p)

-1.6687 (2.7676) [0.547]
-0.1567 (0.1404) [0.265]
0.7473 (0.5799) [0.198]
0.0677 (0.0269) [0.012]

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.0754 (0.1303) [0.563]
0.2358 (0.1333) [0.077]
0.1573 (0.1486) [0.290]
-0.0462 (0.1474) [0.754]
0.3495 (0.1198) [0.004]
0.6904 (0.1500) [0.0001]
0.0521 (0.1344) [0.698]
0.4569 (0.1771) [0.010]
0.2162 (0.1190) [0.069]
1.1284 (0.1582) [0.0001]
-0.2594 (0.1195) [0.030]
0.6457 (0.1377) [0.0001]
0.0179 (0.0088) [0.043]
-0.0609 (0.0277) [0.028]

0.1445 (0.3374) [0.668]
0.1942 (0.2937) [0.508]
0.4089 (0.2009) [0.042]
0.6043 (0.1692) [0.0001]
0.2371 (0.1940) [0.222]
-0.5653 (0.1297) [0.0001]
-0.2570 (0.2732) [0.347]
0.9598 (0.1772) [0.0001]
0.3483 (0.1675) [0.038]
0.3207 (0.1980) [0.105]
-0.1604 (0.1986) [0.419]
0.4725 (0.1698) [0.005]
0.0493 (0.0071) [0.0001]
0.1221 (0.0201) [0.0001]

2880
82
-703.56108
40
1487.122
1725.744
366.35 (p<0.0001)

Table 2.5 presents estimation results of the panel mixed logit model
represented in Eq. (3) using the responses only from the repeated response survey
format involving twelve choice tasks. Results show that the mean coefficient estimates
for most of wetland attribute variables, assumed to be normally distributed, are
statistically significant except for a few variables (namely the variable representing
type of road as Common_Road, character of surrounding land- Woodland, Farmland,
and variable representing a limited public access- Limited_Access) (see Table 2.5).
All of the non-monetary wetland attribute variables (random) whose mean coefficient
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estimates are statistically significant have a positive impact on participants’ utility
except for the variable that represents the role of the wetland parcel as expanding an
existing protected areas (see Table 2.5), ceteris paribus. Statistically significant
estimates of standard deviation (SD) for most of the wetland attributes suggest
heterogeneity in preferences in relation the corresponding attributes. Results also show
that none of parameters for the fixed variables and interactions are statistically
significant except for a positive and significant estimate for the interaction of the cost
variable with IncrSurplus- the variable representing precedent-dependent effect (see
Table 2.5). This positive coefficient estimate indicates that participants who could
have a higher predicted net surplus value for the most-valued alternative in the current
task relative to the preceding task are less cost sensitive than on average and thus have
a higher WTP than on average, everything else being fixed.

2.6 Conclusions and implications
In this paper, we examined whether alternative survey formats, i.e., a survey format
involving two choice tasks compared to the survey format involving a series of twelve
choice tasks, yield statistically equivalent choice outcomes. In particular, we examined
whether a set of utility parameters, scale parameters and marginal WTP estimates
differ across the response formats. Our application involved a SP survey of
trichotomous choices for protecting wooded wetlands in Rhode Island, USA. Our
results suggest that the survey format or sequence length results in statistically
different marginal utility parameters for some attributes as well as the significantly
different scale parameters. A significantly lower scale parameter for the subsample
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that faced only two choice tasks indicates higher error variance or increased
uncertainty or randomness in the two-choice sequence compared to the variance for
the subsample that faced a series of twelve choice tasks. Nonetheless, we found only a
weak statistical difference of mWTP estimates across the survey formats when
compared individually, but found no difference when compared jointly.
We further examined the responses under the repeated response format to
explore any form of order effects discussed in the literature. Particularly, we examined
position-dependent as well as precedent-dependent order effects by generating a set of
variables or interaction terms representing the corresponding effect type and their
effect on the marginal utility of cost to participants (and thus marginal WTP) as well
as on the utility of the status quo option (and thus total WTP) across the sequence. Our
results suggest evidence of a precedent-dependent effect relating to a potential to
retain higher net surplus from the most-valued alternative in the current task relative to
the most-valued alternative in the preceding task may induce participants to be less
cost-sensitive and thus appear to have a higher WTP due to the precedent-dependent
effect.
Our application using trichotomous choice format of wetland parcel
preservation provides evidence of precedent-dependent effects. A recent study by
Scheufele & Bennett (2012), using repeated binary discrete choice experiments,
examined whether strategic opportunities provided by the order in which choice sets
are presented affect choice decisions and found evidence of such effects in terms of
participants’ increased cost sensitivity and thus lowering estimated willingness to pay
(WTP) estimates if the same or similar level of provision was offered in the previous
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choice task at a lower cost than if it was not. However, they found that the cost
sensitivity and thus WTP remains unaffected if the same or similar level of provision
was offered in the previous choice task at a higher cost. Their results also indicate that
the cost sensitivity increases (and WTP decreases) as participants progress through the
sequence of choice tasks. There is also a large number of studies which documented
order effects of precedent-dependent type, such as starting task effects ( Bateman,
Day, Dupont, & Georgiou, 2009; Herriges & Shogren, 1996; Ladenburg & Olsen,
2008) or reference effects (Isoni, 2011; Mazumdar, Raj, & Sinha, 2005). There are
also studies that documented order effects of position-dependent type such as learning
effects (Braga & Starmer, 2005; Plott, 1993) or fatigue effects (Bradley & Daly, 1994;
Savage & Waldman, 2008). Our results, however, did not display any evidence of
position-dependent order effects. Advanced awareness (or disclosure because
participants were able to see the repeated choice tasks in a printed survey booklet
mailed to them) of the repeated format may have mitigated these position-dependent
orders effects in our application, consistent with the conclusions by Bateman et al.
(2004) and Scheufele & Bennett (2013).
We also note one important observation from the previous studies, however,
that these studies differ substantially in terms of number of choice tasks, choice
context, experimental design as well as empirical models to estimate preference
parameters and scale parameters. These differences between the studies could have
contributed to different results in terms of whether and how these order effects are
observed in those studies. Nonetheless, it may be worth deeper exploration of orders
effects- both position-dependent as well as precedent-dependent in multinomial
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response formats. Since our application involved only two lengths of choice tasks, we
could not test the idea of learning effect in relation to fatigue effect across the
sequence which we could have done if we had more survey length subsamples such as
surveys involving four, six or eight choice tasks. Future research could also investigate
the type of strategic responses or other biases in terms of latent class modeling to learn
about these behavioral phenomena across the classes of participants represented by
their distinct preference functions.
Our results, however, are consistent with the idea that may not be readily
influenced by position-dependent effects once analysts account for heteroscedasticity.
However, our evidence that precedent-dependent effects, linked to the potential that a
sequence of choice questions could offer increasing (or decreasing) net benefits
influences estimates of the marginal utility of income raises concern about the validity
of WTP estimates. Survey respondents might view a sequence to which net benefits
tend to increase as one offering “good deal”, whether this situation triggers a strategic
behavior of respondents seeking to signal a demand for increasing surplus or avoiding
“bad deals” may not be resolved by this one study. But the effect found here would
tend to increase estimates of WTP. Future research may be needed to identify whether
it is this increased WTP estimate that is or is not closer to true WTP.
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MANUSCRIPT 2–APPENDIX B
This appendix provides the estimation results of the conditional logit model of the
utility specification in Eq. (3) using the responses from the survey involving only two
choice tasks, so that the interaction terms involving Choice12 were absent.

B1. Conditional logit model results from Choice2 subsample
Variable

Coefficient (se) [p-value]

Status quo (SQ)
Common_Road
Heavy_Road
Woodland
Farmland
Medum_WLDiversity
High_WLDiversity
Limited_Access
Full_Access
Medium_Sustain
High_Sustain
Expands
Connects
Size
Cost
Male!SQ
Age!SQ
College!SQ
Model statistics
Number of observations
Number of participants
Log-likelihood value
AIC
BIC
Wald χ2, 18 df (p)
Pseudo R2

-0.5113 (0.6492) [0.431]
.0216 (0.0775) [0.780]
-0.1072 (0.0776) [0.167]
0.3418 (0.0803) [0.0001]
-0.0037 (0.0804) [0.963]
0.0128 (0.0649) [0.843]
0.3767 (0.0644) [0.0001]
-0.0311 (0.0749) [0.678]
0.3141 (0.0802) [0.0001]
0.1337 (0.0676) [0.048]
0.1746 (0.0699) [0.012]
-0.0253 (0.0765) [0.740]
0.0535 (0.0742) [0.471]
0.0218 (0.0046) [0.0001]
-0.0119 (0.0055) [0.031]
0.3067 (0.2633) [0.244]
0.0178 (0.0094) [0.059]
-0.3633 (0.2748) [0.186]
2388
402
-791.8468
1619.69
1723.70
109.45 (p<0.0001)
0.0945
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MANUSCRIPT 3

DOES LINDAHL-INSPIRED INDIVIDUALIZED PRICE AUCTION (IPA)
GENERATE HIGHER OFFERS THAN A VOLUNTARY DONATION
ELICITATION? A REAL-MONEY FIELD EXPERIMENT ON ECOSYSTEMSERVICE PUBLIC GOODS
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3.1 Abstract
Benefits from provision of public goods cannot be made exclusive. This nonexclusive characteristic of the public goods naturally creates an incentive for
individuals to ‘free-ride’ on others’ contribution, resulting persistently in underprovision of such goods. Some individuals still contribute towards the private
provision of such public goods despite the well-known free-rider problem in both
laboratory experiments as well as actual fund-raising efforts. One relatively pragmatic
public good institution, that may mitigate the ‘free-riding’ behavior, is an
individualized price auction (IPA) motivated by Lindahl’s framework for public
goods. We solicit individualized offers for multiple successive units or a range of
quantities (or units) of the good under the IPA approach. These multiple successive
offers generated from the IPA approach are then empirically compared against the
corresponding offers generated from a voluntary donation institution, both
incorporating the incentive mechanisms from experimental economics literature
including a provision point (PP) with a money back guarantee (MBG) and
proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds beyond the PP. Using a split sample
approach in a field experiment setting, we ask participants to contribute real dollars
towards public good projects focused on water quality improvements resulting from
implementing best manure management practices in local livestock farms in their local
watershed system. Our results suggest that participants under the voluntary donation
approach made higher offers, on average, than those under the IPA. Even though
individuals’ average offers were approximately constant across the available range of
improvements (or quantities of the good) in water quality under both institutions, we
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discovered a statistically different pattern of offers. Results from a two-limit tobit
model further suggest a statistically significant effect of participants’ sociodemographic profiles on the expected total offers for the public good across the two
public good institutions.

Key words: Public good provision, individualized price auction, proportional rebate,
provision point, voluntary donation, best manure management practice, water quality
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3.2 Introduction
Valuing public goods and their efficient provision have posed a fundamental challenge
to both economists and fundraisers because the providers of public goods cannot
exclude potential beneficiaries who do not pay toward the cost of provision. Thus
public goods naturally create an economic incentive for individuals to “free-ride” on
others’ contributions. The game-theoretic prediction in a public good experiment is
that contributing nothing may be a dominant strategy for an individual (Ledyard,
1995), no matter how much the others contribute. The total free rider prediction seems
evidently not true in previous public good experiments. Existence of the “free rider
problem” obviously cannot be denied in these experiments, but it is also true that a
change in public good institutions, under which individuals contribute to provide these
goods, may mitigate the free rider problem. Without any additional change in
institutional structure, for example, a voluntary donation approach will not produce the
Pareto28 optimal level of public good provision. But it may be possible to create a
Pareto improvement by changing the institutional structure, and thus the incentive
structure, under which individuals make contributions (Groves & Ledyard, 1977;
Ledyard & Palfrey, 1994).
One promising and relatively more pragmatic institutional structure is a public
good auction approach developed by (Swallow, Smith, & Anderson, 2013), hereafter
referred to as the individualized price auction (IPA)29, which is motivated by Lindahl’s
28

Pareto optimal, also known as Pareto efficient, outcome is a state of allocation of a

public good in which it is not possible to make any individual better off without
making at least one individual worse off.
29

The IPA is patented business process, patent number US 8,429,023 B2 sponsored by
138

framework for public goods (Lindahl, 1919). Lindahl’s equilibrium (Lindahl, 1919;
Samuelson, 1954, 1955) is an efficient equilibrium for public goods and the IPA
approach, motivated by this framework, can reach a Pareto optimal level of public
good provision theoretically if each individual were to contribute their full marginal
value on each unit of the good (Groves & Ledyard, 1977; Walker, 1981) However,
economic consensus has long held that it may be impossible to generate enough
funding for the Pareto optimal level of public goods in real situations (Nicholson,
2005). This consensus among economists has not been well tested in empirical
framework except Smith & Swallow (2013) and Smith (2012). One of the simple
institutions most tested in laboratory public good experiments is a voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM).

Our study empirically compares the revenue

generation potential of the IPA approach compared to voluntary contribution
mechanism (VCM) with the provision point (PP) and a money back guarantee (MBG)
and the proportional rebate (PR) incentive mechanisms.
We employed a split sample design to compare offers under these two public
good institutions. We utilized a field application in which participants contributed real
dollars towards implementing manure management projects in their local watershed.
Our results suggest that higher offers, on average, are realized under the voluntary
donation approach than those under the IPA, although average contributions remain
approximately constant for the available range of improvements in water quality (or
units of the good) across the public good treatments. Our results also suggest

NSF, grant No DEB0621014.
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heterogeneous contributions across socio-demographic profiles of participants
between the public good treatments.
In previous experimental studies of the voluntary donation elicitation,
participants have been provided with an endowment of experimental dollars and are
asked to voluntarily provide some of the endowment towards the provision of the
public good. Participants receive benefits the public good provides net of the cost they
voluntarily paid. Under this institution, the Pareto optimal level of provision results
when all participants contribute their full endowment (Davis & Holt, 1993), but the
dominant strategy for an individual is to contribute nothing, producing a noncooperative equilibrium that is not a Pareto optimal level (Ledyard, 1995). However,
experimental evidence also suggests that many participants contribute to the public
good, usually 40-60% of endowed experimental dollars, although, conditional on
everyone else’s contribution, one individual could maximize his or her payoffs by
contributing nothing (Dawes & Thaler, 1988). Economists have incorporated various
incentive mechanisms into the voluntary donation institution to mitigate “free-riding”
behavior. One important modification is a provision point or a threshold, i.e.,
minimum amount of money required to implement the public good (Bagnoli &
Lipman, 1989; Bagnoli & Mckee, 1991). It is found to induce participants to make
higher offers than occurs without the provision point (Bagnoli & Mckee, 1991;
Suleiman & Rapoport, 1992; Rondeau, Schulze, & Poe, 1999; Rondeau, Poe, &
Schulze, 2005). Under the provision point mechanism, “free-riding” is no longer a
dominant strategy. Furthermore, a money back guarantee (MBG) ensures participants
that their offers will be returned if the group is unable to meet the pre-determined
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provision point. A MBG has been found to generate higher offers than the experiments
without the MBG (Isaac, Schmidtz, & Walker, 1989; Rapoport & Eshed-Levy, 1989;
Marks & Croson, 1998; Cadsby & Maynes, 1999; Spencer, Swallow, Shogren, & List,
2009). In case of the excess funds beyond the provision point, a proportional rebate
(PR) rule, which returns excess funds to the participants in proportion to their original
offer, imposes a weaker marginal penalty for over-contributions than does a
mechanism without a rebate (Marks & Croson, 1998) and thus has been found to
garner higher offers (or at least no lower offers) when used with a provision point and
a MBG (Marks & Croson, 1998; Rondeau, Schulze, & Poe, 1999; Poe, Clark,
Rondeau, & Schulze, 2002; Spencer et al., 2009). These previous public goods
experiments employing a voluntary donation elicitation with the incentive mechanisms
solicit participants’ offers for a single unit of the public good.
A long-held consensus among economists that it may be impossible to raise
enough revenues for efficient provision of public goods has been put into an empirical
test recently by Smith & Swallow (2013) and Smith (2012) by developing a public
good auction approach- the IPA. The IPA approach solicits offers on successive
cumulative units of a public good. For each unit of the good, the IPA establishes many
individualized prices, one for each participant. An equilibrium quantity of the good,
for a group of individuals, is determined based on the last unit of the good for which
the aggregate offers from all individuals on that unit covers or exceeds the delivery
cost of that unit (Smith & Swallow, 2013). A chief motivation of the IPA is that the
auctioneer evaluates bids sequentially, so that bidders know in advance that bids on
each unit must be sufficient to provide that unit in order for the auctioneer to move on
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to evaluate bids on the subsequent unit, while the payment will be determined by bids
on that last unit provided. This conditional bid evaluation process may encourage
participants to offer a sequence of non-increasing bids in hopes of building an excess
of benefits over costs as the auction delivers a higher number of units. In theory, the
IPA approach can reach the optimal level of public good provision if each individual
offers his or her full marginal value on each unit. In this study, we employed the IPA
approach by incorporating the provision point (PP) with a money back guarantee
(MBG) and the proportional rebate (PR) of the excess funds, if any, beyond the PP.
There exists almost no empirical study examining the empirical performance
of Lindahl’s framework for provision of public goods in experimental settings except
Smith & Swallow (2013) and Smith (2012). Smith (2012) explored the feasibility of
implementing the IPA using incentive mechanisms – proportional rebate (PR) and
pivotal mechanism (PM)30 - by eliciting offers on successive units of the public good,
thus obtaining individual marginal offer curves. Employing a split-sample design, she
used laboratory experiments to explore the IPA and also compared the results using
field experimental settings involving actual implementation of public goods with real
contribution to pay for provision. Her results suggest that participants were making
30

The pivotal mechanism (PM) is adapted from the Vickrey-Groves-Clarke

mechanism, which employs a provision point (PP) to provide the marginal unit of a
public good if the sum of the groups’ contributions covers the delivery cost of the
public good. In this case, a participant is considered to be pivotal on the marginal unit
if the public good cannot be provided without his or her contribution. Also,
participants who are considered to be pivotal will pay only the contribution required to
meet the provision point.
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offers consistent with decreasing marginal benefits for additional units of the good.
The IPA may perform better than many public good experiments seen in the literature
in terms of higher average proportion of induced value offered in the first unit of the
good in the IPA (Smith, 2013) relative to one-shot single-unit induced value
experiment. She also compared the marginal offers (or estimates) elicited from the
IPA with the marginal values (i.e., marginal willingness to pay or mWTP) estimated
from a discrete choice experiment (DCE) involving binary choices with the incentivecompatible majority provision rule. This comparison suggested that the marginal
estimates from the IPA are not statistically different from the mWTP estimates from
the DCE, which supports the promising result in favor of the IPA process. Yet, the
empirical performance of the IPA process for the private provision of public goods
still remains inadequately understood.
This study empirically compares the performance of the IPA approach in terms
of revenue generation potential relative to a voluntary donation elicitation for private
provision of public goods in a framed field experiment (Harrison & List, 2004; List,
2008). Unlike most previous public good experiments, our study elicits participants’
offers on successive and non-uniform discrete units of a public good by employing the
IPA process. The marginal offers on the successive non-uniform discrete units of the
good elicited under the IPA approach are empirically compared to the donations
elicited under a voluntary donation when both approaches use the PP with a MBG and
the PR of any excess funds beyond the PP. Employing a split sample approach, this
study utilizes a field application where participants contributed real dollars to provide
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an ecosystem service regarding water quality in their local watershed system through
improved manure management practices in local livestock farms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.3 outlines the theoretical
framework. Section 3.4 described the field experimental design and procedures.
Section 3.5 reports the results and section 3.6 discusses the conclusions and
implications of the results.

3.3 The conceptual model
Consider a problem of delivering multiple units of a public good, but when these units
are only available in discrete packages. This situation could apply to protection of
water quality by implementing manure management on farms of various sizes. Then
consider raising funds for the public good by soliciting donations. Rather than openended donations, we take a more structured approach of requesting donations for a
task, where each task j adds qj units of public good to the preceding task, for an
accumulated provision of Qj in task j, which incorporates all the qk for k <= j
(Qj=Σjqj).

We will empirically examine the solicitation of donations through a

sequence of donation tasks, numbering J’, as compared to a sequence of the IPA tasks,
numbering J = 2J’, covering the same range of total units (QJ’ = QJ) using the more
structured IPA approach.
Now, consider a group of N field experiment participants. Each individual
participant i is provided with a fixed personal budget (B). Each auction participant is
asked to offer his or her contribution for a collection of units of a public good Qj in
task j. A task j included a collection of units of a public good and the number of units

144

of the good offered in a task is based on a discrete project that providers can deliver.
Therefore, each task consists of non-uniform discrete collection of units of the good.
Participants are asked to make offers for multiple tasks, j=1,2,3, …, J.
Under the IPA approach, participants choose a “contribution per unit” to buy
all the units included in a particular task, multiplying the “contribution per unit” offer
with the total units included in that task equals the total offer for that task. Participants
faced two types of constraints regarding their decisions to contribute to a particular
task under the IPA process: (i) their total offer in a task cannot exceed the fixed
personal budget B and (ii) they could only offer the same or less “contribution per
unit” in the subsequent tasks than in the preceding task. Unlike other public goods
institutions examined in a majority of previous experiments, the IPA process in our
experiments elicited participants’ offers on successive non-uniform discrete collection
of units of the public good, thus producing a total of J offers on the corresponding J
tasks.
Under the voluntary donation approach, participants choose a lump-sum
amount to offer, any amount between $0 and the fixed personal budget B, for all the
units of the good included in a particular task. Participants faced only one constraint
regarding their decisions to contribute to a particular task, i.e., the lump-sum amount
of donation for a particular task cannot exceed the fixed budget B. Moreover, J tasks
presented to IPA participants were reduced to J’ (=J/2) by merging successive pairs of
tasks under IPA to create tasks under the voluntary donation approach. This merging
of successive pairs of tasks allows a comparison of the IPA to a multi-unit ordinary
donations approach. While the IPA approach looks at discrete lumps of units, based on
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price per unit that can be delivered (but the units had to be delivered in packages
corresponding to on-farm projects), the donations approach just asks for money that
will be used to carry out as many projects as possible to deliver as many units within a
given range as possible. Unlike previous experiments using the voluntary donation
approach, our field experiment participants made a total of J’ lump-sum amounts of
donations to be used for the corresponding J’ non-uniform discrete sets of units of the
public good to go as far as possible delivering units within a particular range covered
in the task. Thus, like common philanthropic donation, payment was not tied to
specific quantity delivered, except that delivery of within the range of a given tasked
assured delivery of all units from the preceding task.
We employed a provision point (PP) mechanism with the MBG, if no units of
the public good are provided, and proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds beyond
the PP from offers that apply to the units of the delivered task. The PP mechanism
requires that the sum of the offers from all participants in a particular task equal or
exceed the delivery cost of providing the units of the public good in that task. Since
each participant makes an offer for each task for a total of J IPA tasks (or J’ Donation
tasks), there will also be the corresponding J (or J’) number of provision points or one
provision point for each task, denoted by PPj. The implemented level of the public
good will be the task, hereafter referred to as a binding task, for which the sum of
offers from all participants is equal to or exceeds the corresponding provision point
PPj. If no bundle of units of the good is provided i.e., no PPj is met, the MBG ensures
that participants would receive their fixed budget B back. If a set of units of the good,
the units of the good in some task j, are provided and result in excess funds collected
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(based on offers for task j) beyond the corresponding provision point PPj, participants
would receive the excess funds back in a rebate. The rebate amount will be in
proportion to their total offer in the binding task j, as defined by the PR rule.
The payoff function for participant i in the field experiment based on the PR rule is
given by the following expression:
(1) Πij*=(B-Oij*)+Vij*+ (Oij*/ΣiOij*) (ΣiOij*-PPj*) for j{1,…,J}, j*=max{j| ΣiOij≥PPj for
all j≤j*
Πij=B only if max j with ΣiOij≥PPj does not exist for j≥1.
where Πij gives the earning for a participant i in the experiment which is equal to their
budget net of the total offer in the binding task j (B-Oij) plus the (monetized) benefits
of the units of the good to participant i denoted by Vij and any rebate in proportion to
the original total offer Oij in the binding task j beyond the PPj given by last term in the
first line of Eq. (1). Since the MBG feature is included in our experiments, participants
receive their full budget B if no collection of units of the good is provided, as given by
the second line of Eq. (1) above.
As discussed and illustrated graphically in Swallow (2013), Smith & Swallow
(2013) and Smith (2012), participants in the IPA framework may have a unilateral
incentive to make offers reflecting their marginal value in an expectation to retain
added surplus value if the auction settles on later units. Moreover, the IPA approach
asks participants about their “price per unit” offer trying to mimic a familiar market
purchasing decisions, although they were asked about the public good. In sum, the
IPA approach constituted a framework to induce participants to think in a more
structured way to decide on their contribution for the public good. A voluntary
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donation elicitation, on the other hand, asks participants about their lump-sum amount
of donation for units of the good, which is a less-structured framework for public
goods. Unlike previous public good experiments employing a voluntary donation
approach, our field experiments asked a series of donations for the corresponding
successive non-uniform discrete set of units of the good. Although none of the public
good institutions in our field experiments is theoretically incentive-compatible,
incentives embedded in the IPA approach from Lindahl’s framework for public goods
may suggest that the IPA may garner higher offers than the voluntary donation
elicitation.

3.4 A field application to water quality ecosystem service in local watershed
3.4.1 Study background and area
This study was part of a larger project that aimed to demonstrate a market-like process
for delivery of ecosystem services by bringing together both sides of the market, i.e.,
the suppliers of ecosystem services and the potential consumer beneficiaries from
provision of such services (Uchida et al., 2014). In the larger part of the project, a
spatially-explicit watershed simulation model was developed using the Soil and Water
Assessment Tool (SWAT)31 to model the relationship between the manure
management decisions on local livestock farms within a watershed and the change in
31

SWAT is a watershed hydrological transport model developed to quantify the

impact of land management practices on water, sediment, and agricultural chemicals
using components like weather hydrology, soil temperature and properties, plant
growth, nutrients, pesticides, bacteria and pathogens and land management (Arnold et
al., 2012).
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phosphorus loadings (kg P reduced per year for 20 years) into the Scituate Reservoir
waters in Rhode Island, USA.
Phosphorus is a naturally occurring nutrient that helps plants grow. The natural
environment in a watershed system can absorb and use phosphorus without pushing
the natural function of the ecosystem outside its normal character. However, human
actions also contribute phosphorous to the watershed system via various activities, and
thus human actions can push the natural system to that threshold or beyond. One such
prominent, human-induced source of phosphorous to the watershed system is
pastureland where livestock are raised. A recent limnological study documents
evidence of phosphorus-driven eutrophication and algal blooms in some portions of
the reservoir system (ESS Group, Inc., 2011). One way to reduce phosphorus loadings
from human-induced sources into the reservoir water is to implement manure
management practices in local livestock farms, which may prevent leaching
phosphorous from livestock manure by rainwater which drains to the nearest water
bodies and ultimately to the reservoir system.
We collaborated with local conservation groups, focus group participants and
mailings to identify livestock owners who could voluntarily agree to participate in our
supply side field experiment. Best manure management practices in our project
involved two types of practices: i) building a manure pad to store livestock manure
instead of piling manure in nearby woods leaving it exposed to rain; and ii) installing a
gutter system to redirect rain water off the manure piles to a safer outlet. Phosphorus
prevented from entering the water bodies through the manure management practices
reduces the excessive growth of plants, thereby reducing the algal bloom events and
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thus prevents the surface water quality from deteriorating. In order to derive a supply
curve for improved water quality, Uchida et al. (2014) conducted a reverse auction
process to solicit bids for payments from local livestock owners to implement best
manure management practices on their farms in exchange for compensation.
The major objective of the present study is to bring the demand-side
dimension, meaning potential consumer beneficiaries’ values in terms of willingnessto-contribute for improved water quality, into a market-like process for improved
water quality. In order to do so, we conducted field experiments to ask local residentvolunteers how much they would be willing to contribute for water quality
improvements in their watershed system. We conducted these demand-side field
experiments in the context of the Scituate reservoir system, which supplies drinking
water to residents of the city of Providence and surrounding suburb communities in
Rhode Island, USA. The reservoir system is composed of six interlinked subwatersheds. The town of Scituate constitutes the major part of the watershed system
including some portions of the towns of Foster and Glocester, Rhode Island, USA.
The reservoir system does not serve drinking water to the residents of these towns
directly, but the residents are known to enjoy recreating in the watershed.
Furthermore, many resident volunteers, who participated in our focus group
discussions, expressed their sense of being responsible ‘stewards’ of the watershed.
Some also considered a potential hydrologic linkage between surface water quality
and ground water sources that provide their own household with drinking water.
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3.4.2 The public good
Many ecosystem services, like improved water quality in our study, are public goods
because the providers (or local livestock owners) of these services cannot require
potential beneficiaries to pay for these services. The consumer beneficiaries of
improved water quality in a local watershed system may enjoy the benefits without
having to pay for those benefits. Therefore, the public good in our field experiment is
the improvement or protection of water quality in the local watershed system, with the
unit of the good described as the phosphorus reduction at the reservoir that would have
resulted from a proportional number of tons of cow manure prevented from entering
the reservoir directly. Tons of cow manure prevented from entering the reservoir
represents the units of the good (affecting water quality); these units were chosen to
present water quality improvements in more familiar terms to the field experiment
participants as potential donors.

3.4.3 Field experiment participants
A commercial marketing company, Lighthouse Consulting Group, recruited
participants for our field experiments. Participants for the experiment were adult
citizens living in one of the towns of Scituate, Foster and Glocester in Rhode Island,
USA and were contacted through posting invitation flyers to the town email listserv,
town websites, local newsletters, and on-the-ground distribution, as well as posters in
local public places. Contacted individuals were asked to sign up for one of the
available nights and were offered a $50 participation fee.
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3.4.4 Experimental procedures
Participants were gathered in a local community building of the town of Scituate to
participate in a 2-hour session titled “Water Quality Decision-Making Workshop”. A
total of three sessions were conducted among which two involved the IPA treatment
and the remaining one involved the voluntary donation treatment. Each participant
took part in only one of the three sessions. Participants were requested to avoid talking
to their friends or neighbors about the workshop and were told multiple sessions
would be held during a 2-week period. Each session was led by the same experiment
moderator and involved the same set of experimental procedures to keep information
provided to participants across the sessions as similar as possible. The only difference
between the treatments was the description of the corresponding treatment. To
summarize, each session involved the following steps.

3.4.4.1 Background presentation
The experiment moderator32 began each session with a scripted PowerPoint
presentation to provide participants with information on the linkages between manure
management practices in local livestock farms, phosphorus and the implications for
the water quality of the reservoir system. The presentation involved illustrations using
example photographs of water bodies affected by excessive phosphorus loadings, as

32

The authors gratefully acknowledge the excellent moderation of the field

experiments by Carrie A. Gill, Graduate Research Assistant at the Department of
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (ENRE), University of Rhode Island,
Kingston, Rhode Island, USA (see Manuscript 3-Appendix C2 for additional details).
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well as structures to be installed, if implemented, as best manure management
practices. After the background presentation on manure management, phosphorus and
water quality, participants were told that each would receive $100, in addition to the
$50 participant fee, with which they could decide between contributing to a collective
fund to pay for implementing on-farm manure management projects or to take some
money home to spend on other priorities. A brief question-answer session was allowed
at the end of the presentation and the moderator carefully answered questions raised to
maintain neutrality of the information given to the participants, without leading them
in any direction.

3.4.4.2 Survey instrument
Each participant was provided with a survey packet that consisted of a survey booklet
(see Manuscript 3-Appendix C3) and an official envelope of University of Rhode
Island, Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (ENRE).
Before participants started making decisions on contributions toward on-farm manure
management projects, each participant was asked to write their home address on a
mailing envelope so that the research team could send the remaining portion of their
$100, if any, to participants based on the outcome of the workshops at the end of all
sessions to be held in a 2-week period (October 28- November, 12, 2014). The survey
booklet was developed to solicit participants’ contributions or offers for on-farm
manure management projects. The booklet contained written instructions for soliciting
participants’ offers and the experiment moderator read these instructions aloud, along
with the participants. Participants were provided with a form soliciting their offers for
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the manure management projects; in the IPA they made six offers (J=6), while in the
donations workshop, participants made three offers (J’=3).
In the IPA workshop (treatment group), participants were asked to evaluate a
series of six “tasks” representing a set of on-farm manure management projects. Two
or more on-farm projects from participating livestock owners were combined33, by
preserving the ranking of the projects in terms of cost per kg of P reduced per year for
20 years so that the most cost-efficient projects appear first in the sequence and the
least cost-efficient at the end, to form these tasks. IPA participants were asked to make
a “price per ton” offer for manure management projects, multiplying with the tons of
cow manure managed by a given task to obtain the total offer for that project in the
first task. The second task included the manure management from the first task (q1)
and an additional increment (q2), that could be delivered at the second cheapest cost
per kg P reduced per year for 20 years, by combining tons of cow manure prevented
from both the tasks, (so task 2 would deliver a total of Q2 = q1 + q2 kg reduction in P
loadings) and so on to define tasks 3 through 6 for the IPA. Participants were
instructed that their total contribution or offer in each task was not allowed to exceed

33

A farmer or provider of improved water quality implements a fixed-impact project

and these are ordered by cost per kg of phosphorus loading to the reservoir. In
practice, we sometimes merged two or more on-farm projects into one discrete onfarm project, but the main idea for the economics is that the qj increments were fixed
by the technology of on-farm manure management, which was tied to farm or
livestock-herd size and location in the watershed and its hydrologic connectivity to
loadings as modeled by SWAT.
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their fixed budget of $100.34 In the subsequent tasks, participants were only allowed to
make equal or less “price per ton” offers on the preceding task.35 Participants were
provided with a chart to help calculate their total offer corresponding to the chosen
“price per ton” value in an increment of 10 cents in all tasks (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 An example task under Individualized Price Auction (IPA)

In the voluntary donation workshop (treatment group), participants were asked
to evaluate a series of three “tasks” consisting of the same set of on-farm manure

34

This limited contributions to funds by the researchers, in compliance with IRB

approved protocol for research involving human subjects.
35

Participants were explicitly instructed to make non-increasing bids.
155

management projects as in the IPA workshop. However, as previously described, two
successive IPA “tasks” were simply merged to construct one donation “task”, thus
producing a total of three donation “tasks” from the six IPA “tasks”. Participants were
asked to make a lump-sum donation amount to contribute toward implementing the
greatest possible number of on-farm projects included in a particular “task” and the
total donation was not allowed to exceed their fixed budget of $100 in each of the
three tasks.
The survey booklet also contained a set of follow-up questions asking
participants about how they responded to the “tasks” as well as their general opinion
on various statements about the water quality issues in the surrounding communities
and local livestock farms using 7-point scale Likert-scale questions from “Strongly
Agree” to “Strongly Disagree” Finally, the survey booklet contained questions
soliciting socio-demographic characteristics of participants.

3.4.4.3 Outcome of the workshops
Participants were told, on the day of their workshop, that the outcome would be
determined after collecting survey responses from all three sessions. All survey
responses were collected from all three sessions and gathered at the University of
Rhode Island. Then the research team evaluated the aggregate offers in a particular
task from all participants from all three sessions against the cost of delivering the onfarm manure management projects in that task. Offers in the donations task 1 could be
applied in aggregate to supplement offers from IPA task 1. If the aggregate amount
exceeded the cost of providing IPA task 1, we proceeded to evaluate IPA task 2 using
156

offers from IPA task 2 and combining this money again with offers from donation task
1. Similarly, in evaluating IPA task 3 and, subsequently, IPA task 4, we applied offers
from donations task 2. We continued this bid evaluation process until we found a task
in which aggregate offers were not enough to cover the cost(s) of the project(s) in that
task. In our field experiments, aggregate offers, evaluated by the process described
above, for IPA task 3 were not enough to cover the cost(s) of the project(s) included in
that task. Therefore, IPA task 2 (or the corresponding donation task 1) was determined
as the binding task, and the on-farm manure management projects included in that task
would be implemented. Participants’ actual payments for the corresponding on-farm
manure management projects ($100 minus total offer in the binding task) plus any
rebate amount would also be calculated based on their total offers or donations in the
binding task.

3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics about experiment participants
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics about the participants across the public
good treatments. Continuous variables discussed at the bottom of Table 3.1 (except
Age, Resident (Years) and Income) were constructed using factor analysis approach
(Milan & Whittaker, 1995). We utilized participants’ responses to attitude statements
about their views and opinions regarding local livestock farms, water quality and
quality of life on a 7-point Likert scale to construct continuous factor score variables
by employing a principal component factor (PCF) with varimax rotation method. The
rotated factor loadings on each statement presented in Table 3.2 are then used to
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convert Likert scale responses to “standardized scores” for individual participants by
the regressions scores method (Milan & Whittaker, 1995) in Stata statistical package.
A participant who has a high value for Factor One tends to represent the belief that
local livestock farms should adopt farming practices to reduce nutrient inputs like
phosphorus to water bodies affecting the water quality; they would be willing to
support these farmers; and manure management operations in local livestock farms
should be regulated to improve water quality. Factor Two tends to indicate that a
participant with a high value for this factor is concerned about water quality in lakes
and streams near their home because they value water quality even if they do not
directly use lakes and streams and they believe local livestock farmers in their
neighborhood are good stewards of the land. A high value for Factor Three for a
participant seems to suggest the belief that local farms face difficult competition to
survive in a modern economy and they should receive financial and technical
assistance to be better environmental stewards. A participant who displays a high
value for Factor Four seems to be concerned about the water quality in lakes and
streams for recreational activities such as swimming, fishing, or boating and doesn’t
believe that the homes that actually drink Scituate reservoir water should pay the costs
of manure management.
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of participants across public good treatments

Categorical
variables
Male
Livestock
owner
Home owner
Lawnfertilizer user
Member

Graduate
degree
Lakes visitor

Donate

Volunteer

Continuous
variables
Age
Resident

Public goods treatments
Voluntary
Combined
Description
donation
IPA
(N=30)
(N=69)
Sample
Sample
Mean
Mean
(SD)
(SD)
1 if a participant is male; 0.43 (0.50)
0.42 (0.49)
0 otherwise
1 if a participant owns a 0.07 (0.26)
0.14 (0.35)
livestock; 0 otherwise
1 if a participant owns a 0.83 (0.38)
0.88 (0.32)
home; 0 otherwise
1 if a participant fertilizes 0.65 (0.49)
0.52 (0.50)
their lawn and garden; 0
otherwise
1 if a participant is 0.13 (0.35)
0.22 (0.42)
currently affiliated to any
environmental groups or
causes; 0 otherwise
1 if a participant has a 0.13 (0.35)
0.22 (0.42)
graduate
degree;
0
otherwise
1 if a participant visited 0.83 (0.38)
0.79 (0.41)
freshwater
lakes
or
steams either for personal
enjoyment or recreations
in the past 12 months; 0
otherwise
1 if a participant donated 0.37 (0.49)
0.26 (0.44)
to environmental causes
or groups in the past 12
months; 0 otherwise
1
if
a
participant 0.40 (0.49)
0.28 (0.45)
volunteered
in
environmental projects or
causes in the past 12
months; 0 otherwise
Description
Sample
Sample
Mean
Mean
(SD)
(SD)
Age of participant in 50.68
48.38
years
(13.81)
(16.42)
Number of years a 19.89
23.96
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Pearson
χ2, 1df
(p)

0.0146
(0.904)
1.0964
(0.295)
0.4716
(0.492)
1.2642
(0.261)
1.0140
(0.314)
0.9526
(0.329)
0.1770
(0.674)

1.1299
(0.288)
1.5102
(0.219)

t-stat,
(p)

df

0.6724, 97
df (0.5029)
1.1657, 97

(Years)

participant lived in or
around towns of Scituate,
Foster or Glocester
Income
Participant’s
total
household income (in
‘000 dollars)
“Support and A continuous factor score
Regulate
indicating attitude that
Farms”
local livestock farms
(Factor One) should be required to
adopt farming practices
to reduce degradation of
water
quality
and
livestock
operations
should be regulated.
“Good
A continuous factor score
Stewardship” indicating
pro-attitude
(Factor Two) toward protecting water
quality in lakes and
streams to affect the
quality of life, local
livestock farms are good
stewards and value water
quality even without
using directly.
“Assist
A continuous factor score
Farms”
indicating a belief that
(Factor
local farms face difficult
Three)
competition to survive in
a modern economy and
should receive financial
and technical assistance.
“Water
A continuous factor score
quality
for indicating a pro-attitude
Recreation”
for water quality for
(Factor Four) recreational
activities
such
as
swimming,
fishing or boating.

(15.11)

(16.29)

84,913.29
(46,456.98)

65,624.50
2.0022, 91
(41,427.89) df (0.0482)

0.05
(0.92)

-0.02
(1.03)

-0.05
(1.16)

0.02
(0.93)

0.33
(1.26)

-0.13
(0.85)

0.36
(1.12)

-0.15
(0.92)

df (0.2466)

0.3283, 92
df (0.7434)

0.3258, 92
df (0.7454)

2.0348, 92
df (0.0448)

2.2797, 92
df (0.0249)

Firstly, we compared the socio-demographic profiles of participants across the
two IPA sessions using a chi-squared test of independence for categorical variables
and a two-sample t-test for continuous variables and found no significant difference
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for all demographic characteristics presented in Table 3.1 (see Manuscript 3Appendix C1). Thus the two IPA session data were combined. Then we also compared
socio-demographic profiles of participants under this combined IPA participantsample with those of the voluntary donation using a chi-squared test of independence
for categorical variables and a two-sample t-test of mean values of continuous
variables. The test results suggest that the subsamples (the combined IPA and the
voluntary donation) are not significantly different from each other in terms of sociodemographic characteristics except participants in the voluntary donation treatment
had significantly higher income (at the 5% level of significance) and statistically
higher and positive average score (at the 5% level of significance) for the factor
variables “Assist Farms” and “Water Quality for Recreation” than the participants in
the IPA treatment.

Table 3.2 Varimax rotated factor loadings of Likert-scale statements
Factor One
Statements
“Support
and Regulate
Farms”
The quality of water in 0.4811
lakes and streams near
my home affects my
quality of life.
I am concerned about 0.3519
water quality in lakes
and streams near my
home.
I am concerned about 0.1438
water quality in lakes
and streams near my
home because they are
used for recreation, such
as swimming, fishing, or
a

Factor Two
Factor
“Good
Three
Stewardship” “Assist
Farms”
0.6296
-0.0211

Factor Four
“Water
Quality for
Recreation”
0.2019

0.7492

0.1821

0.1900

0.0695

0.1685

0.8219
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boating.
I value water quality in
lakes and streams near
my home even if I do
not use them.
I believe local livestock
farms
affect
water
quality of lakes and
streams near my home.
I believe local livestock
farms are a significant
source of nutrients like
phosphorus,
which
adversely affects water
quality in lakes and
streams near my home.
Livestock farms should
adopt farming practices
that reduce the amount
of
nutrients
like
phosphorus
from
entering
lakes
and
streams near my home.
Livestock farmers in my
neighborhood are good
stewards of the land.
I would be willing to
support local livestock
farmers that improve
their farming practices
in order to improve
water quality.
Local livestock farmers
should receive financial
and technical assistance
so that they can be better
environmental stewards.
I believe local farms
face
difficult
competition to survive in
a modern economy.
I believe homes that
actually drink Scituate
Reservoir water should
pay the costs of manure
management.

0.4231

0.6718

0.0649

0.0751

0.7791

0.2727

0.0276

-0.0095

0.8586

0.1409

0.0714

0.0625

0.8305

0.1566

0.1424

0.0198

-0.2489

0.6268

0.2592

-0.2221

0.4780

0.4251

0.3563

0.0198

0.2036

0.1211

0.7917

0.0864

-0.0289

0.4099

0.6589

0.1621

0.2579

-0.3408

0.4776

-0.5262
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I
believe
manure 0.6271
-0.0792
0.3509
0.3754
management operations
in local livestock farms
should be regulated.
Eigen Value
4.8291
1.5817
1.2955
1.0485
a
Survey participants rated each statement using a seven-point Likert-scale varying
from Strongly Agree (1) to Strongly Disagree (7). Numbers in bold represent varimax
rotated highest factor loading (normalized to mean 0 and SD 1) for a given statement
indicating agreement for positive coefficient and vice versa. Total variation explained
by the four factors is 67.34%.

3.5.2 Participants’ contributions across the tasks
We first examined participants’ average contribution across the tasks under the two
public good treatments. Participants in the donations-based Workshop donated, on
average, about $53 in the first task and about $58 in the third task. These average
donations are higher after excluding $0 donors, ranging from $66 in the first task to
$75 in the sixth task and are in increasing order, although statistically insignificant,
across the tasks. Likewise, participants in the IPA-based Workshop contributed, on
average, about $29 in the first task, slightly increased the mean contributions in the
second task and then decreased in the subsequent tasks to $28 in the sixth task. After
excluding $0 contributors, the pattern of average contributions across tasks in the IPA
workshops remains the same, but higher in magnitude, ranging from $41 in the first
task to $39 in the sixth task. Two-sample t-test results36 suggest that the average
36

Since the even-numbered IPA tasks correspond to equivalent Donation tasks, we

compared mean contributions between Donation task 1 and IPA task 2 (t-stat= 2.4029,
97 df, p= 0.0182), Donation task 2 and IPA task 4 (t-stat= 2.9332, 97 df, p=0.0042),
and Donation task 3 and IPA task 6 (t-stat=3.6238, 97 df, p=0.0005).
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donations from donations-based Workshop are significantly higher than the mean
contributions from the IPA workshops. These results remain unchanged37 after
excluding $0 contributors.
Figure 3.2 shows the average contribution across tasks in both donations-based
and IPA-based workshops. These results suggest that the average contributions tended
to be relatively constant, although there is a slight increase across the three successive
tasks in donations-based Workshops, while average offers from participants in the
IPA-based Workshop showed a slight decrease across the six successive tasks; these
trends, however, are not statistically significant.

Figure 3.2 Average contribution across tasks

37

Test results after excluding $0 contributors are as follows: Donation task 1 and IPA

task 2 (t-stat=1.9830, 62 df, p= 0.0518), Donation task 2 and IPA task 4 (t-stat=
2.6574, 62 df, p=0.0042), and Donation task 3 and IPA task 6 (t-stat= 3.2609, 62 df,
p= 0.0018).
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Moreover, we examined mean values of “Per unit” contribution across the
tasks. “Per unit” contributions are always significantly higher across the tasks in
donations-based workshops relative to the IPA-based workshops. “Per unit”
contributions sharply decreased, in both treatment groups, after the first task and
remain constant in the subsequent tasks as represented in Figure 3.3. This is because
the tons of cow manure managed sharply increased from IPA task 1 to task 2 (from
about 16 to 75 tons), but mean values of total contribution across the tasks were
approximately constant.

Figure 3.3 Average "per-unit" contribution across tasks

We also examined the proportion of participants contributing $1-33, $34-66
and $67-100, between the two Workshop-types, and found a statistically significant
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difference on the proportions across the treatments.38 These results are shown
graphically in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4 Amount of contribution

We further examined whether participants follow a particular pattern of
contribution across the tasks, classifying each participant as having made a constant
offer across tasks, increased their offer on successive tasks, decreased their offer, or
exhibited a mixed pattern (sometimes increasing their offer between tasks and other
times decreasing their offer) (Figure 3.5). Participants in the donations-based
38

Since the even-numbered IPA tasks correspond to equivalent Donation tasks, we

compared the number of participants contributing an amount within a selected range
between Donation task 1 and IPA task 2 (Pearson χ2=7.853, 2 df, p= 0.0197),
Donation task 2 and IPA task 4 (Pearson χ2=20.342, 2 df, p<0.0001), and Donation
task 3 and IPA task 6 (Pearson χ2=16.809, 2 df, p<0.0001).
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Workshop were more likely to exhibit a constant or increasing pattern in their offers
(Pearson χ2=11.456, df 3, p=0.0095; Figure 5).39

Figure 3.5 Pattern of contribution across tasks

Although participants had an overall different pattern of contribution across
tasks, both public good treatments produce constant contributions for a range of
improvement in water quality. Participants’ total contributions in the first task were
not significantly different from the total contributions in the subsequent tasks in both

39

We only considered even-numbered IPA tasks and the corresponding Donation

tasks to examine the pattern of contribution across the tasks. The significance
disappears when we included participants who donated $0 (23% in donations
workshop) or contributed $0 (36% in combined IPA session) for all of the three evennumbered IPA tasks (Task 2, 4, and 6) and the corresponding Donation tasks (Pearson
χ2=5.061, df 3, p=0.1674; Figure 3.5)
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treatment groups, implying that the rule requiring “contribution per unit” in successive
tasks to be less than or equal to the “contribution per unit” in the preceding task in the
IPA treatment may not have influenced the contributions.

3.5.3 Two-limit tobit regression model results
Since the participants were only allowed to choose a total offer amount between $0
and $100, we estimated a two-limit tobit regression (Tobin, 1958; Long, 1997;
Davidson & MacKinnon, 2003; Maddala & Lahiri, 2010; Cameron & Trivedi, 2010;
Wooldridge, 2012) to model participants’ total offers as a linear function of tons of
cow manure managed (or equivalently quantities or units of the public good) and a set
of socio-demographic variables. Both the quantities of the good and the set of sociodemographic characteristics were allowed to vary across the subsamples (the
combined IPA and the voluntary donation) to examine the effect of these variables on
the expected total offers across the treatments. The empirical model40 employed in the
Tobit regression model is given by:
(2)

Oij= α + αIPAIPA + (β+ βIPA!IPA)!Qj + (δ+ δIPA!IPA)!Zi ,

where Oij is the total offer by participant i in task j in which certain tons of cow
manure are prevented from entering the reservoir water by on-farm manure
management projects, denoted by Qj (or equivalently total units of the good provided
in reduction of kg P loadings); αs represent the intercept terms for the two treatments;
βs represent the slopes of the tons of cow manure managed (or the quantities or units
40

We used a “vce (cluster)” option in Stata packages to estimate standard errors to

account for non-independent offers from a single participant.
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of the public good); δs represent coefficients measuring the effect of participantspecific characteristics (Zi) on the total offers; IPA is a dummy variable taking a value
of 1 for participants under the IPA approach and the value of 0 for participants under
voluntary donation approach.
Table 3.3 reports the estimation results of the empirical two-limit tobit model
described in equation (2). Model 1 utilizes observations on each participant from all
six tasks from the IPA treatment and all three tasks from the donation treatment,
whereas Model 2 utilizes observations on each participant excluding IPA tasks 1 and 2
and the corresponding Donation task 1. We first estimated an unrestricted model using
the pooled data (combined IPA and Donation Workshops) of the specification
represented in Eq. (2) above and conducted a series of Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests to
examine the significance of parameter estimates. A LR test suggests that a set of
regression coefficients estimated from the Donation treatment is statistically different
from the corresponding estimates from the IPA treatment (LR Test: αIPA=βIPA=δIPA=0;
χ2=123.2408, 10 df, p<0.0001 using Model 1 data, and χ2=87.2641, 10 df, p<0.0001
using Model 2 data). These significantly different estimates are the result of the effect
of socio-demographics and environmental attitude variables on the expected
contributions across the treatments (LR Test: δIPA=0; χ2=96.7984, 8 df, p<0.0001
using Model 1 data, and χ2=72.2697, 8 df, p<0.0001 using Model 2 data). The
Donation and IPA treatments have statistically equivalent coefficients on the
quantities of cow manure managed (LR Test: βIPA=0; χ2=0.2034, 1 df, p=0.6519 using
Model 1 data, and χ2=0.1448, 1 df, p=0.7036 using Model 2 data), meaning expected
contributions tend to be constant for a range of tons of cow manure managed by on-
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farm manure management projects, ceteris paribus. The intercept term, that is
expected contribution when all other variables are evaluated at 0, in Model 1 for
donation treatment is positive and significantly higher than the intercept term for the
IPA (which is statistically equivalent to 0; see Table 3.3). However, this significance
of the intercept term for donation treatment disappears in Model 2 which utilized
participants’ offers by excluding the observations from IPA tasks 1 and 2 and the
corresponding Donation task 1.

Table 3. 3 Two-limit Tobit model results
Model 1
Variable
Donation
Intercept (α)
Quantity (β)
Socio-demographics
(δ)
Lawn-fertilizer user

Coefficient (se)
87.6455**
(35.6971)
-0.061085
(0.09022)

-41.2058*
(21.1998)
Member
34.2613
(38.3443)
Lakes visitor
-29.80505
(26.4775)
Donate
-22.7804
(18.4909)
Volunteer
-45.9575**
(20.4231)
Income
0.0004819
(0.0003182)
“Support
and -53.5092***
Regulate Farms”
(14.2463)
“Good Stewardship” -11.1662*
(5.7645)
IPA
Intercept (α + αIPA)
1.0685 (20.2063)

Model 2
Variable
Donation
Intercept (α)
Quantity (β)
Socio-demographics
(δ)
Lawn-fertilizer user

Coefficient (se)
51.0924
(49.7455)
0.3303 (0.3455)

-42.5594*
(25.144)
Member
45.0304
(39.2665)
Lakes visitor
-39.4927
(35.1467)
Donate
-23.5887
(19.0661)
Volunteer
-53.5137***
(19.8988)
Income
0.0006166*
(0.0003742)
“Support and Regulate -56.8636***
Farms”
(16.1375)
“Good Stewardship”
-14.6913**
(7.3543)
IPA
Intercept (α + αIPA)
20.0294
(24.3240)
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Quantity (β + βIPA)
Socio-demographics
(δ +δIPA)
Lawn-fertilizer user

0.02243
(0.04287)

Quantity (β + βIPA)

-34.5038***
(13.0819)
Member
-36.01815*
(19.6696)
Lakes visitor
33.42931**
(16.8636)
Donate
38.0785**
(18.2499)
Volunteer
-5.4388
(16.1173)
Income
0.0001973
(0.0001413)
“Support
and -18.4831***
Regulate Farms”
(7.1565)
“Good Stewardship” -34.0249***
(8.7719)
Model statistics
Log pseudolikelihood = -1405.6484
Number of observations: 468
Number of participants: 78
F (19, 449) = 4.48, p-value <0.0001
Pseudo R2 = 0.1145
Sigma: 40.70765a
a
”Sigma” is the estimated standard error

-0.2134
(0.1878)

Socio-demographics
(δ +δIPA)
Lawn-fertilizer user

-35.5039***
(13.4867)
Member
-38.7542*
(19.9292)
Lakes visitor
33.4078*
(17.7317)
Donate
40.5951**
(18.5147)
Volunteer
-1.6875
(16.7685)
Income
0.0001867
(0.0001432)
“Support and Regulate -17.9655**
Farms”
(7.2775)
“Good Stewardship”
-34.2368***
(9.0543)
Model statistics
Log pseudolikelihood = -920.63103
Number of observations: 312
Number of participants: 78
F (19, 293) = 4.12, p-value <0.0001
Pseudo R2 = 0.1186
Sigma: 41.04164 a
of the regression and is comparable to the

root mean squared error that would be obtained in an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression.

The estimation results presented in Table 3.3 clearly suggest that participants’
socio-demographic characteristics and environmental attitude variables significantly
affected expected total contributions for water quality improvements and there also
exists heterogeneity in expected total contributions based on participants’ sociodemographic profiles across the public good treatments. Participants who fertilize their
lawn and garden significantly decreased their expected total contribution compared to
the participants who do not fertilize their lawn; the direction and magnitude of effect is
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the same in both public good treatments, all other things holding fixed. Likewise,
participants who would be willing to support local farms to adopt best farming
practices and would favor regulating manure management operations in the farms
(“Support and Regulate Farms) as well as those who are generally concerned about
water quality in their neighborhood and view local farmers as good stewards of the
land (“Good Stewardship”) tended to contribute less (significant effect in both
treatments groups), ceteris paribus.

Furthermore, participants who are currently

affiliated with any environmental groups or causes (significant effect in the IPA group
only) as well as those who volunteer in environmental projects or causes (significant
effect in Donation groups only) showed a significant reduction in the expected total
contribution, all other things remaining unchanged. However, participants who visited
freshwater lakes or steams either for personal enjoyment or recreation or who donate
to environmental groups or causes, significantly increased their contribution; both
effects are significant in IPA group only.

3.5.4 Additional analysis
Table 3.4 presents participants’ responses to follow up questions regarding how they
responded to contribution-allocation tasks for on-farm manure management projects.
We conducted a chi-squared test of independence between participants’ responses to
the degree of agreement to qualitative statements between the two public good
treatments and found no significant difference except for the fourth statement (Table
3.4; χ2=8.7208, df=4, p=0.0685). This suggests a significantly different pattern of
responses to the statement asking participants whether they thought that their
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contribution would be sufficient to implement the projects; a higher percentage of
participants under donation (about 52%) than those under the IPA (about 28%) were
neutral and a higher percentage of participants under IPA (about 33%) than those
under the donation (about 14%) disagreed with this statement. Although we do not
have any measures to examine whether their responses were truthful or not, the results
suggested that higher percentages of IPA participants were more skeptical about
whether their contributions would be sufficient to implement the on-farm manure
management projects than the participants under voluntary donation.

Table 3. 4 Participants' responses to follow up questions on tasks
Degree to which participants agree or disagree with
following statements
[% Donation participants] {% IPA participants}
Strongly Agree
Neutral Disagree Strongly
agree (%) (%)
(%)
(%)
disagree (%)
(1) The decisions were [3.45]
[44.83] [31.03] [17.24]
[3.45]
difficult.
{11.76}
{29.41} {30.88} {23.53} {4.41}
(2) The decisions were
relevant to my concerns
about water quality in [13.79]
[55.17] [17.24] [13.79]
[0.00]
lakes and rivers in my {21.21}
{46.97} {15.15} {15.15} {1.52}
neighborhood.
(3) My decisions were
influenced
by
my
perception about what [3.33]
[6.67]
[6.67]
[73.33]
[10.00]
others in the room would {1.47}
{4.41} {2.94} {79.41} {11.76}
do.
(4) My donation would
be
sufficient
to
implement the water [13.79]
[20.69] [51.72] [13.79]
[0.00]
quality projects listed in {5.97}
{32.84} {28.36} {28.36} {4.48}
each task.
(5) I was trying to keep
my total donation near a [10.34]
[27.59] [27.59] [31.03]
[3.45]
constant value of the {10.29}
{23.53} {27.94} {35.29} {2.94}
budget ($100).
Statements
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(6) I was trying to keep
my total donation near a [13.79]
certain percentage of the {14.71}
budget ($100).

[31.03] [20.69] [31.03]
{30.88} {20.59} {29.41}

[3.45]
{4.41}

3.6 Conclusions and implications
The well-known free-rider problem persistently results in under-valuation and thus
under-provision of public goods in both laboratory experiments and fund-raising
efforts in the field. Economists have been testing various public good institutions to
identify institutions that may mitigate free-riding behavior pervasive in these
experimental settings. One relatively pragmatic institution is a newly established
individualized price auction (IPA) motivated by Lindahl’s framework for public
goods. Empirical performance of the IPA process in generating revenues for private
provision of public goods has not been well tested except Smith & Swallow (2013).
Our field experiments implemented the newly established individualized price auction
(IPA) to solicit offers on multiple successive and non-uniform sets of units of the
public good incorporating incentive mechanisms from experimental economics
literature such as the provision point (PP) with a money back guarantee (MBG) and
proportional rebate (PR) of any excess contributions beyond the PP to mitigate freeriding behavior. Contributions generated under this IPA approach were then compared
with the contributions generated under a less-structured voluntary donation elicitation.
Employing a spilt sample approach, we asked participants in a framed field
experiment to pay real dollars into a collective fund, which would be used to pay
livestock owners to implement on-farm manure management projects. Under both
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public good institutions, participants were asked to make an offer on successive units
of the public good, a lump-sum amount under the donation approach and “price per
unit” offer under the IPA. Our results suggest that participants under the voluntary
donation approach made higher total offer, on average, than participants under the
IPA. However, total contributions across the tasks were statistically equivalent within
both treatment groups, suggesting that participants’ contributions were constant across
a range of water quality improvements (or quantities of the public good). Moreover,
we modeled participants’ total contributions as a linear function of the tons of cow
manure managed (or quantities of the public good) and a set of socio-demographic
characteristics and discovered statistically significant heterogeneous effect of
participants’ characteristics on the total contributions between the treatment groups.
Our results contrast with the expectations that the IPA approach might garner
relatively higher contributions than the traditional voluntary donations. While neither
approach is incentive compatible, Smith (2012) previously showed that marginal value
estimates obtained from the IPA approach may be consistent with marginal
willingness to pay (mWTP) estimated from a discrete choice experiment involving
binary choices that bear direct financial consequences under an incentive-compatible
provision rule. Our field experiments produced higher contributions, on average, from
the less-structured donation approach relative to the more-structured IPA. The simpler,
more straightforward Donations worked better in this field setting. This may be
because there was a lot for participants to understand about phosphorus, manuremanagement on farms, and water quality outcomes in addition to the rules (for
example, participants had to make non-increasing offers in the subsequent tasks) of the
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IPA approach. Moreover, our field experiments produced statistically equivalent
average contributions for a range of quantities (or units of the good) across the tasks.
This may be due to the fact that the magnitude of tons of cow manure managed
changed very little between tasks, except from IPA task 1 to IPA task 2 where tons of
cow manure managed sharply increased from about 16 tons to 75 tons. These small
increments from one task to the next would imply small changes in protection of water
quality in the reservoir. Participants may have concluded there was a large potential
for variation in impact such that they just decided a relatively constant contribution
was likely enough to have a measurable impact with little change in impact. Or
perhaps the changes in ranges across the tasks were just not big enough to matter in
the scope of the $100 budget. Although the experiment moderator clearly described
the linkages between phosphorus in the watershed system, manure management, and
the ultimate impact on water quality, a “loosely” defined public good “product” may
have influenced participants’ contributions. Uncertainty associated with the complex
natural process about phosphorus and its connection with the actual impact on water
quality may have also impacted participants’ thought process while making
contributions, but we do not have any measures to identify whether this uncertainty
played a role in our field experiment.
The two-limit tobit regression results suggest that there exists statistically
significant heterogeneity in expected total contribution across the socio-demographic
and environmental attitude profiles of the participants between the two public good
institutions. For example, members of environmental groups (statistically significant
effect in IPA group only) and volunteers in environmental groups or causes
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(statistically significant effect in Donation group only) tended to contribute less. This
may mean environmental groups were not favorably inclined to the IPA approach
raising money in a manner that is more like a common commodity; and volunteers
may feel that they have already contributed through their time. Likewise, participants
who would be willing to support local farms to adopt farming practices and would
favor regulating manure management practices in the farms, and who are generally
concerned about the water quality and view local farmers in their neighborhood as
good stewards of the land seemed to make lower offers under both approaches.
However, participants who visit lakes or streams for recreational activities and who
donate to environmental groups or causes offered higher contributions (significant
effect in the IPA group only). Overall, these results suggest that participants in the two
public good institutions responded differently to offer solicitations for improved water
quality, and the institutions themselves appear to have influenced their response. This
result might signal heterogeneity in how people will react under novel markets for
ecosystem services, suggesting research will be needed to better understand for which
groups novel approaches will best mitigate free-riding behavior. The result is
analogous to Kafle et al.’s (2014) results regarding whether supplemental government
funding stimulates crowding in or crowding out of contributions to watershed
management.
One speculation the authors may put forward is that participants in donationsbased Workshop may be motivated by personal ‘altruistic’ interest or simply social
motivations for doing ‘good things’ for the surrounding environment in the
neighborhood and may have donated without particular regard for the quantity of
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manure management. However, participants in the IPA-based Workshops may be
making decisions more thoughtfully because they were put into a framed mindset of a
regular ‘market purchasing situation’ by asking the “price per unit” offer. Our IPA
experiment asked participants to consider “Price per unit” first and then allowing them
to evaluate the total contribution in a task. Future studies may explore whether asking
participants a maximum total offer they would be willing to contribute and then
allowing then to see the corresponding “price per unit” that the maximum contribution
implied could garner higher offers.
Finally, we note that our study is an example of research to develop novel
approach that may (or may not) improve the potential for integration of donorbeneficiaries in future (and evolving) markets for ecosystem services. As such, we
encourage others to pursue such topics, noting its consistency with Portney’s (2004)
obligation of the “policy economist”, to contribute directly to creation of potential
policy (or market-based) alternatives.
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MANUSCRIPT 3 – APPENDIX C
This appendix provides additional information on participants’ socio-demographic
profiles across the two IPA sessions, background presentation for experiment
participants and a sample survey booklet.

C1. Participants’ socio-demographic profiles across the two IPA sessions
The following table presents the descriptive statistics about participants across the two
IPA sessions.
Descriptive statistics of participants across public good treatments

Description
Categorical
variables
Male
Livestock
owner
Home owner
Lawnfertilizer user
Member

Graduate
degree
Lakes visitor

1 if a participant is male;
0 otherwise
1 if a participant owns a
livestock; 0 otherwise
1 if a participant owns a
home; 0 otherwise
1 if a participant fertilizes
their lawn and garden; 0
otherwise
1 if a participant is
currently affiliated to any
environmental groups or
causes; 0 otherwise
1 if a participant has a
graduate
degree;
0
otherwise
1 if a participant visited
freshwater
lakes
or
steams either for personal
enjoyment or recreations
in the past 12 months; 0

IPA sessions
IPA session IPA
1 (N=26)
session 2
(N=43)
Sample
Sample
Mean
Mean
(SD)
(SD)
0.31
0.49
(0.47)
(0.510
0.08)
0.19
(0.27)
(0.39)
0.81
0.93
(0.40)
(0.26)
0.42
0.59
(0.50)
(0.49)

Pearson
χ2, 1df
(p)

2.1710
(0.141)
1.5570
(0.212)
2.3737
(0.123)
1.7843
(0.182)

0.27
(0.45)

0.19
(0.39)

0.5793
(0.447)

0.23
(0.43)

0.21
(0.41)

0.0439
(0.834)

0.88
(0.33)

0.74
(0.44)

1.9757
(0.160)
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otherwise
1 if a participant donated 0.19
to environmental causes (0.40)
or groups in the past 12
months; 0 otherwise
Volunteer
1
if
a
participant 0.27
volunteered
in (0.45)
environmental projects or
causes in the past 12
months; 0 otherwise
Continuous Description
Sample
variables
Mean
(SD)
Age
Age of participant in 46.35
years
(14.79)
Resident
Number of years a 18.21
(Years)
participant lived in or (14.81)
around towns of Scituate,
Foster or Glocester
Income
Participant’s
total 62,499.50
household income (in 45,276.93
‘000 dollars)
“Support and A continuous factor score
Regulate
indicating attitude that -0.19
Farms”
local livestock farms (0.99)
should be required to
adopt farming practices
to reduce degradation of
water
quality
and
livestock
operations
should be regulated.
“Good
A continuous factor score
Stewardship” indicating
pro-attitude 0.18
toward protecting water (1.02)
quality in lakes and
streams to affect the
quality of life, local
livestock farms are good
stewards and value water
quality even without
using directly.
“Assist
A continuous factor score
Farms”
indicating a belief that 0.03
local farms face difficult (0.94)
competition to survive in
a modern economy and
Donate
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0.30
(0.46)

1.0171
(0.313)

0.28
(0.45)

0.0079
(0.929)

Sample
Mean
(SD)
49.60
(17.39)
27.43
(16.32)

t-stat,
(p)

67,762.66
39,058.99

0.4962, 62
df (0.6215)

0.08
(1.06)

-0.08
(0.87)

-0.23
(0.78)

df

0.7965, 67
df (0.4285)
2.3520, 67
df (0.0216)

1.0563, 65
df (0.2947)

1.1273, 65
df (0.2638)

1.2552, 65
df (0.2139)

should receive financial
and technical assistance.
“Water
A continuous factor score -0.16
quality
for indicating a pro-attitude (0.93)
Recreation”
for water quality for
recreational
activities
such
as
swimming,
fishing or boating.

-0.13
(0.92)

0.1239, 65
df (0.9017)

C2. Background presentation slides and the core scripts
I gratefully acknowledge an excellent moderation of all the field experiments as well
as the receipt of the presentation slides and the written scripts included below by
Carrie A. Gill, graduate research assistant at the department of Environmental and
Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island. The example presentation
slides and the scripts were used for the IPA based workshops. For Donation workshop,
the information and content of the survey were exactly same except the description of
Donation treatment and necessary corrections accordingly.

Background (by Carrie A. Gill, Dept of ENRE, URI)
Each session began with a scripted PowerPoint presentation that was designed
to give participants a common review and understanding of the linkages between P,
manure management, and water quality. This presentation used simple illustrations
and clear language, including photographs of a range of potential manure management
projects. We were careful about differences in connotation and denotation for our
word choices and directly addressed preconceptions and nuances. To ensure
understanding, the presenter addressed questions from participants prior to explaining
instructions soliciting individuals’ donations or contributions to pay for on-farm
manure management projects.
In addition to the PowerPoint presentation, participants were provided with a
booklet to review as instructed by the moderator. This booklet contained written
instructions for soliciting voluntary contributions under the approach used for that
Workshop (IPA or donations), and these instructions were reviewed orally by the
moderator as well. The booklet also included a form soliciting offers of contributions;
in the IPA workshops individuals made six offers, while in the donations workshops
individuals made three offers. Finally, the booklet included a follow-up survey
soliciting socio-demographic characteristics of the individual.
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All participants were told that there were other Workshops being held in a 2week period (Oct. 28 – Nov. 12, 2013) and results would be determined by the
combined choices of participants in these Workshops.

Presentation slides (by Carrie A. Gill, Dept of ENRE, URI)
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Note: This is NOT a real bill. This was used for illustration purpose only.
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Presentation script (by Carrie A. Gill, Dept of ENRE, URI)
Our project aims to learn how RI residents who live or work in the Scituate Reservoir
area, like you, value water quality. In order to figure that out, we’re going to hold an
economic auction to implement actual manure management projects in the Scituate
Reservoir watershed that will maintain good local water quality.
When we talk about water quality, we’re referring to how clean the water is.
Clean water is easy to treat to turn it into safe drinking water. It’s safe for you, your
children, and your pets to come into contact with. And its aesthetically pleasing.
One reason why water quality may be bad is phosphorus. You might
recognize phosphorus from bags of fertilizer that you use on your lawn and garden.
Phosphorus is a nutrient, which means it’s essential for plants to grow. However, too
much phosphorus means lots of growth.
A while ago, a group of scientists performed an experiment in a lake in a
freshwater Canada. They divided the lake in half and added phosphorus to one side.
The additional phosphorus caused little plants to grow in the water. We know these
plants as algae. One additional pound of phosphorus in a freshwater lake will cause
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300 to 500 pounds of wet algae to grow. While algae are natural, too much algae
means that water is difficult to treat, could be unsafe or toxic for contact, and becomes
murky. In other words, too much phosphorus means too much algae, which in turn
means poor water quality.
You may have seen the impact of algae in water bodies around RI. For
example, signs that warn against swimming and fishing, or news stories warning about
toxic algae blooms.
In the Scituate Reservoir System, 68% of phosphorus in the Scituate Reservoir System
is from naturally occurring, uncontrollable sources. The other 32% is from human
sources. This includes agriculture and crops, livestock that graze on pastures, and
residential sources like garden fertilizer and septic systems. Our project is only
focusing on the phosphorus that comes from pastures.
Livestock like cows graze on pasture. What they eat contains phosphorus. And
as you know, what goes in must come out, and that contains phosphorus, too. One ton
of manure contains about 5 pounds of phosphorus. An average cow produces about 80
pounds of manure every day. That adds up to 15 tons per year per cow. When manure
is scattered over the land, the plants can use the phosphorus in it to grow. However,
the common practice is for livestock owners to make big manure piles. The plants
around the big manure piles can’t use all the phosphorus in the manure. And, when it
rains, this excess phosphorus washes into the soil and surface water and makes its way
through streams and rivers into the reservoir water. And why is excess phosphorus bad
for water quality? Because it causes too much algae to grow.
We can reduce the phosphorus that enters the reservoir water through better
manure management on local livestock farms. There are two ways. First, we can store
animal manure properly. Like I mentioned, the current practice is for livestock owners
to gather manure into a big pile. There are no regulations governing this practice.
However, big manure piles lead to excess phosphorus in reservoir water. A better way
to store manure is on a concrete pad. The concrete acts as a barrier that the phosphorus
can’t cross between the manure and the soil.
The second good manure management practice is to prevent rainwater from
getting on the manure. Practically speaking, this means installing gutters around
animal sheds. and places where manure can pile up.
Local livestock owners have reached out to URI because they feel responsible
for water quality and want to be better environmental stewards. These livestock
owners are your neighbors and friends. Many feel that local farmers are integral to the
unique rural and historic culture of the Scituate area.
Being a farmer is hard. It’s lots of work and its difficult to make ends meet.
The farmers that have reached out to us want to implement concrete pads and gutters
but they can’t afford the cost, which can range from a couple hundred to a couple
thousand dollars. The projects that these farmers want to implement are the projects
that we’ll see in the auction coming up. There, you’ll have the option to contribute
some money to getting some, all, or none of these projects actually implemented.
All the livestock owners involved in our project are located in the Scituate
Reservoir System. Local water scientists have reported that most reservoirs here still
have good water quality, while a couple have already shown signs of degradation and
algae blooms. Once a water body shows signs of degradation, it gets increasingly
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difficult and costly to restore back to having good quality. (If asked - this is because
feedback systems start, which release even more phosphorus into the water.) The more
we can prevent phosphorous from getting into the reservoir--through better manure
management, for example--the longer we can prevent the system from degrading, and
hence preserve the good water quality.
We want to know how much you’d be willing to contribute to local manure
management projects, in order to reduce phosphorus in reservoir water and preserve
good water quality. Some people may have other priorities and may not want to
contribute any money, while others might be completely indifferent. Still others might
consider water quality to be top priority and want to contribute a lot. Some people are
in the middle. Whatever your values are, we want to know. There are no right or
wrong answers and all of your responses will be kept strictly confidential.
Now, we’ll go over how the auction works and then how we choose which
projects will actually get implemented. My colleagues and I were talking about how
much we’re asking of you during this two hours and decided that we needed to
compensate you more. So, congratulations, you’ve earned yourselves another $100 for
participating tonight. Imagine opening up your wallet to see a crisp $100 bill in there.
Yes, we are actually giving you another $100. Take a second to think about what
you’re going to use your hard earned money for. On page __ we’ve provided two fill
in the blank sentences. The first states what you will spend your money on (or save it
for). The second states what cause or charity you will donate your money to, if you’re
so inclined. Take a minute to jot down your thoughts.
One thing you can do with your hard earned money is contribute to manure
management projects in our auction. We’ve talked to actual local livestock owners
who want to install concrete pads and gutters. Local experts from the Northern Rhode
Island Conservation District have visited these farms and have deemed these projects
appropriate for reducing phosphorus in the reservoir. These farmers have signed
contracts with us promising to implement these projects by the end of next year if
there is a big enough contribution from the auction to cover the costs of the projects.
Some, all, or none of these projects will actually be implemented because of your
decisions tonight.
All projects in the auction are projects that the farmers want to implement. If
some projects do get implemented, that does not mean that all farmers will have to
implement these projects, too.
And just because you might contribute something tonight, that does not mean
that others will be forced to contribute. The images here are representations of the
actual projects but they don’t show the real thing. And, we’re not going to give you
most of the details about the actual projects either. That’s because we want to know
how much you value the reduction in phosphorus from manure management, not how
much you’d like to contribute to your neighbor Fred’s project down the road.
We’ve taken all these projects, figured out how much phosphorus from manure
they’d reduce, and ranked them from most cost effective to least cost effective. We’re
going to present them in our auction from most cost effective to least so that you get
the most bang for your buck out of your contribution. This auction will consist of a
series of tasks, which will include one or several projects. In each task, you’ll see a
table and two fill-in-the-blank sentences. We want to know how much you’d be
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willing to contribute per ton of cow manure reduction for the project or projects in
each task.
This isn’t a math test, so the table is here to help you out. You choose how
much you want to contribute per ton, and then the table does the math to tell you how
much your total contribution would be and how much you’d end up taking home. So
your job is to circle the row in the table that best represents what you want to
contribute to the project or projects in the task.
The sentences are here to help you understand how much you’re contributing. We
encourage you to fill in the blanks.
You can contribute a maximum of $100 to each task. This does not change, regardless
of how much you contribute in previous tasks. In the end we’re only going to choose
one task and implement only those projects in that task.
So let’s see an example of how this works in practice. The first task includes
the most cost effective project, because - remember - we want to get the most bang for
your buck. You’ll see that this project reduces phosphorus from 15.7 tons of cow
manure. You might want to contribute your entire budget - your hard earned $100 - to
this project. You might have other things in mind for you $100 and not want to
contribute anything. For the sake of this example, let’s say you contribute an even $1
per ton. We can write that in our first fill in the blank sentence. Therefore, your total
contribution would be $1 per ton times 15.7 tons, or $15.70. That means that you’d be
guaranteed to take home $84.30, or your $100 minus your contribution.
The next task includes the same project from task 1 and the most cost effective
project from the remaining projects. Since we have two projects now, the tons of cow
manure reduced has increased. Again, you’re considering how to spend your $100. We
want to know how much you’d contribute per ton for these two projects. But here’s
the catch, you can only contribute the same or less per ton as you did in the previous
task.
In task 1, we said we’d contribute $1 per ton. That means that in task 2 we can
only contribute $1 per ton or less. Can we contribute $1.20? NO!
So let’s circle our contribution for this task and fill in the blanks. For this task, we’ll
contribute $1 per ton again. That means my total contribution is $74.90 and I’d be
guaranteed to take home $25.10.
Okay, let’s see how this plays out in our next task. Now we have the same two
projects from task 2 and the most cost effective project from the remaining projects.
You’ll see that tons of cow manure has increased again. Remember, our rule is you
can only contribute the same or less per ton as the previous task. Last task we
contributed $1 per ton. Can we contribute $1.10 here? NO!
Let’s say we’ll contribute 50 cents per ton here. That makes the total contribution
$38.95 and the guaranteed take home $61.05. For the next task, what would be the
amount per ton that I must contribute the same or less as? That’s right, I must
contribute the same or less as the previous task. If in task 3 I contribute 50 cents per
ton, in task 4 I must contribute 50 cents per ton or less. Good.
For each project, we know how much the cost is to implement that project. We
need to figure out if the total contribution of everyone, including you, everyone around
you, and everyone who participates in this workshop over the next two weeks, is
enough to cover the costs of the project. So for task 1, there might be a small cost and
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large contribution. If the total contribution is larger than the cost, then we look at the
next task. For task 2, we had two projects, so the cost has gone up. If everyone’s total
contribution exceeds the cost, then we continue. For task 3, let’s say the cost of these
projects is not covered by everyone’s total contribution. Then we stop.
So we’ve looked at three tasks. We choose the task that has the most projects
and where everyone’s total contribution exceeds the costs of the projects. In our
example, that would be task 2. These are the projects that are actually going to be
implemented.
So if you contributed to this task, what does that mean for you? We’re only
going to take what we need from you, out of your individual contribution, to
implement these projects. You’ll get the rest of your contribution back in the form of a
rebate. We’ll add up your rebate and how much out of your $100 you did not
contribute to the chosen task and write you a check. We’re going to put this check in
the mail in the envelope that you addressed in the beginning of the workshop. If you
do not receive something from us within 15 business days of today, even if we do not
owe you any money, please contact Dr. Uchida.
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C3. A sample survey booklet (IPA workshop)

Water Quality Decision-Making
Workshop

Water Quality Project Auction
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Water Quality Project Auction - Instructions
This auction includes several tasks, which ask how much you would pay for a water
quality project(s) that would reduce phosphorus in a given amount of cow manure per
year from entering the reservoir water.
The goal of each task is to figure out how much you would be willing to contribute to
a project that would reduce a given amount of cow manure per year from delivering
phosphorus to the reservoir water. We will tell you in the task description how many
tons of cow manure per year are prevented from entering the reservoir water if a
particular project or set of projects were to be implemented. We will then ask you to
write down how much money you would be willing to pay to prevent the phosphorus
in each ton of cow manure each year from entering the reservoir water.
We will be giving you $100, which you can either take home or contribute to the
projects in each task. This $100 is in addition to your $50 compensation for
participating tonight. Even if you contribute all of the $100 to water quality projects,
you will still take home $50. Take a minute now to think about how you might spend
$100 if you were to take it all home tonight.
If I took $100 home, I likely would spend it on ______________________________.
If I were to donate part of this money to a non-profit group, I would consider the
group or cause: (Please write “none” if you don’t think you would donate.)
____________________________________________________________________.
In each task you can contribute some, all, or none of your $100 budget to reduce
phosphorus from a given amount of cow manure from entering the reservoir water.
You have a budget of $100 for each task, regardless of how much money you
contributed in previous tasks. We will figure out how much of the $100 you will
actually contribute to water quality projects based on your contribution and
contributions by everyone else, as was explained in the presentation. Your
contribution in each task will have real consequences - water quality projects will be
implemented depending on how much money you and everyone else contribute. Only
write down how much you really would be willing to contribute to reduce the given
amount of cow manure from entering reservoir water.
How we determine how much money you actually contribute
After you have completed all the tasks, our research team will collect your responses.
For each task, we will add up how much everyone would be willing to contribute to
reduce a given amount of cow manure. Everyone includes you, everyone in this
session, and everyone in another session on a different date.
We will add up everyone’s contribution for the first task to see if you and everyone
else contributed enough money in total to cover the cost of the first project. If this total
197

contribution is enough to cover the cost of the first project, then we will consider the
second task. We will stop when the total contribution for a task is not enough to cover
the costs of the project(s) in that task. The task with the largest number of projects
where the total contribution is enough to cover the costs of all projects in that task that
will then actually be implemented.
The projects are real projects. All, some, or none of these projects might be
implemented depending on how much money you and everyone else contribute.
Your contribution, along with everyone else’s contribution, will actually go to a local
large animal owner to pay for a concrete pad or a gutter system.
Your total contribution may not be needed, in total, to cover the costs of the project(s)
chosen. If this is the case, you will only pay some of your contribution in proportion
to how much you were willing to pay. For example, if you were willing to pay $90 in
the task that was chosen for implementation but we only required 90% of everyone’s
total contributions, then you would only pay $81, which is 90% of $90 and you will
receive your contribution that is not required as a rebate.
At the end of this session tonight, you will receive $50 cash for your participation.
After we determine how many projects can be implemented based on your and
everyone’s decisions at URI, we will mail you a check for the portion of your $100
budget that you did not contribute to the projects chosen plus any rebate if applicable.
If you do not receive a check from the University of Rhode Island within 15 business
days from today, please contact Prof. Emi Uchida (emi@uri.edu; 401-874-4586)
immediately.
Water Quality Project Auction - Tasks
In this water quality project auction, each task asks how much you would pay to
prevent phosphorus in a given amount of cow manure per year from entering the
reservoir.
For your information, a 1000-pound cow produces an average of 14.6 tons of cow
manure each year.
You have a budget of $100 for each task, regardless of how much money you
contributed in previous tasks.
Please consider how much you would be willing to pay to reduce each ton of cow
manure in each task. Please remember that for each subsequent task, you can only
contribute the same or less per ton than you contributed in the previous task.
You may circle the pre-calculated row or write down your own per-ton allocation and
the total allocation for the project at the bottom of the page.
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Task 1:
This task includes one water quality project, which would reduce phosphorus in 15.70
tons of cow manure per year from entering the reservoir.
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater
than $100.
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row.
Price
per Ton
$0.00
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.00
$3.50
$4.00
$4.50
$5.00
$5.50
$6.00
$6.40

Tons of Cow Manure
Reduced each year
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70
15.70

Your Total
Contribution
$0.00
$7.85
$15.70
$23.55
$31.40
$39.25
$47.10
$54.95
$62.80
$70.65
$78.50
$86.35
$94.20
~$100.00

You would take
home
$100.00
$92.15
$84.30
$76.45
$68.60
$60.75
$52.90
$45.05
$37.20
$29.35
$21.50
$13.65
$5.80
~$0.00

I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 15.70 tons of cow manure
per year from entering the reservoir.
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented.
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Task 2:
This task includes the water quality project from Task 1 and one additional project,
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 74.90 tons of cow manure per
year (15.70 tons from Task 1 plus 59.20 tons from the additional project) from
entering the reservoir water.
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater
than $100.
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but
must not be larger.
Price per
Ton
$0.00
$0.10
$0.20
$0.30
$0.40
$0.50
$0.60
$0.70
$0.80
$0.90
$1.00
$1.10
$1.20
$1.34

Tons of Cow Manure
Reduced each year
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90
74.90

Your Total
Contribution
$0.00
$7.49
$14.98
$22.47
$29.96
$37.45
$44.94
$52.43
$59.92
$67.41
$74.90
$82.39
$89.88
~$100.00

You would take
home
$100.00
$92.51
$85.02
$77.53
$70.04
$62.55
$55.06
$47.57
$40.08
$32.59
$25.10
$17.61
$10.12
~$0.00

I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 74.90 tons of cow manure
per year from entering the reservoir.
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented.
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Task 3:
This task includes the water quality projects from Task 2 and one additional project,
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 77.90 tons of cow manure per
year (74.90 tons from Task 2 plus 3.00 tons from the additional project) from entering
the reservoir water.
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater
than $100.
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but
must not be larger.
Price per
Ton
$0.00
$0.10
$0.20
$0.30
$0.40
$0.50
$0.60
$0.70
$0.80
$0.90
$1.00
$1.10
$1.20
$1.29

Tons of Cow Manure
Reduced each year
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90
77.90

Your
Contribution
$0.00
$7.79
$15.58
$23.37
$31.16
$38.95
$46.74
$54.53
$62.32
$70.11
$77.90
$85.69
$93.48
~$100.00

Total You would
home
$100.00
$92.21
$84.42
$76.63
$68.84
$61.05
$53.26
$45.47
$37.68
$29.89
$22.10
$14.31
$6.52
~$0.00

take

I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 77.90 tons of cow manure
per year from entering the reservoir.
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented.
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Task 4:
This task includes the water quality projects from Task 3 and one additional project,
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 81.10 tons of cow manure per
year (77.90 tons from Task 3 plus 3.20 tons from the additional project) from entering
the reservoir water.
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater
than $100.
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but
must not be larger.
Price per
Ton
$0.00
$0.10
$0.20
$0.30
$0.40
$0.50
$0.60
$0.70
$0.80
$0.90
$1.00
$1.10
$1.20
$1.24

Tons of Cow Manure
Reduced each year
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10
81.10

Your
Contribution
$0.00
$8.11
$16.22
$24.33
$32.44
$40.55
$48.66
$56.77
$64.88
$72.99
$81.10
$89.21
$97.32
~$100.00

Total You would
home
$100.00
$91.89
$83.78
$75.67
$67.56
$59.45
$51.34
$43.23
$35.12
$27.01
$18.90
$10.79
$2.68
~$0.00

take

I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 81.10 tons of cow manure
per year from entering the reservoir.
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented.
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Task 5:
This task includes the water quality projects from Task 4 and one additional project,
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 84.90 tons of cow manure per
year (81.10 tons from Task 4 plus 3.80 tons from the additional project) from entering
the reservoir water.
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater
than $100.
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but
must not be larger.
Price per
Ton
$0.00
$0.10
$0.20
$0.30
$0.40
$0.50
$0.60
$0.70
$0.80
$0.90
$1.00
$1.10
$1.18

Tons of Cow Manure
Reduced each year
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90
84.90

Your
Contribution
$0.00
$8.49
$16.98
$25.47
$33.96
$42.45
$50.94
$59.43
$67.92
$76.41
$84.90
$93.39
~$100.00

Total You would
home
$100.00
$91.51
$83.02
$74.53
$66.04
$57.55
$49.06
$40.57
$32.08
$23.59
$15.10
$6.61
~$0.00

take

I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 84.90 tons of cow manure
per year from entering the reservoir.
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented.
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Task 6:
This task includes the water quality projects from Task 5 and one additional project,
which would together reduce phosphorus in a total of 88.70 tons of cow manure per
year (84.90 tons from Task 5 plus 3.80 tons from the additional project) from entering
the reservoir water.
For this task, you have a budget of $100. Your total contribution cannot be greater
than $100.
Please write down your per-ton contribution and the total contribution for the project
at the bottom of the page or you may just circle the pre-calculated row. This per-ton
value can be the same or less than your per-ton contribution in the previous task, but
must not be larger.

Price per
Ton
$0.00
$0.10
$0.20
$0.30
$0.40
$0.50
$0.60
$0.70
$0.80
$0.90
$1.00
$1.10
$1.13

Tons of Cow Manure
Reduced each year
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70
88.70

Your
Contribution
$0.00
$8.87
$17.74
$26.61
$35.48
$44.35
$53.22
$62.09
$70.96
$79.83
$88.70
$97.57
~$100.00

Total You would
home
$100.00
$91.13
$82.26
$73.39
$64.52
$55.65
$46.78
$37.91
$29.04
$20.17
$11.30
$2.43
~$0.00

take

I would pay $ _________ per ton to reduce phosphorus in 88.70 tons of cow manure
per year from entering the reservoir.
My total contribution is $__________ and I would take home $__________ (which is
$100 minus your total contribution) if the projects in this task were implemented.
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Follow Up Questions
Please indicate by placing an (X) under the appropriate column the degree to which you
agree or disagree with each of the statements below.

Strongly
Disagree
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Disagree

The decisions were relevant to
my concerns about water quality
in lakes and rivers in my
neighborhood.
My decisions were influenced by
my perception about what others
in the room would do.
My contribution would be
sufficient to implement the water
quality projects listed in each
task.
I was trying to keep my total
contribution near a constant value
of the budget ($100).
I was trying to keep my total
contribution near a certain
percentage of the budget ($100).

Neutral

The decisions were difficult.

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Statements

Your Opinion on Local Farms and Water Quality
Please indicate by placing an (X) under the appropriate column the degree to which
you agree or disagree with each of the statements below.

I believe homes that actually drink Scituate
Reservoir water should pay the costs of
manure management.
I believe manure management operations in
local livestock farms should be regulated.
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Strongly
Disagree

The quality of water in lakes and streams near
my home affects my quality of life.
I am concerned about water quality in lakes
and streams near my home.
I am concerned about water quality in lakes
and streams near my home because they are
used for recreation, such as swimming,
fishing, or boating.
I value water quality in lakes and streams near
my home even if I do not use them.
I believe local livestock farms affect water
quality of lakes and streams near my home.
I believe local livestock farms are a
significant source of nutrients like
phosphorus, which adversely affects water
quality in lakes and streams near my home.
Livestock farms should adopt farming
practices that reduce the amount of nutrients
like phosphorus from entering lakes and
streams near my home.
Livestock farmers in my neighborhood are
good stewards of the land.
I would be willing to support local livestock
farmers that improve their farming practices
in order to improve water quality.
Local livestock farmers should receive
financial and technical assistance so that they
can be better environmental stewards.
I believe local farms face difficult competition
to survive in a modern economy.

Disagree
Somewhat
Disagree
Neutral
Somewhat
Agree
Agree

Strongly
Agree

Statements

Your Background
This section asks about your social and demographic characteristics. Your answers
will help us interpret our results and support environmental managers and decision
makers. All information you provide will be kept completely confidential.
1. What is your gender?

☐ Male

☐ Female

2. What is your age?

____________ years

3. Do you own a livestock(s) or a farm animal(s) (e.g., cows, horse, sheep, goat,
pigs, chickens)?
☐ Yes

☐ No

4. Is your home…
☐ Owned by you or someone in your household with a mortgage or
loan? Include home equity loans.
☐ Owned by you or someone in your household free and clear (without
a mortgage or loan)?
☐ Rented? Skip to question 6
☐ Occupied without payment of rent? Skip to question 6
5. If you own your home:
How many times per year do you fertilize your lawn and garden?
☐ Never
☐ Once
☐ Twice
☐ Three times or more
each year
When do you fertilize your lawn and garden? Check all the apply
☐ Never
☐ Spring
☐ Summer
☐ Fall
☐ Winter
6. When did you move into your home?

Month:_________Year: _______

7. How long have you lived in your current town?

__________ years

8. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
☐ Some high school or less
☐ High school diploma
☐ GED or alternative credential
☐ Some college credit, but less than 1 year of college credit
☐ 1 or more years of college credit, no degree
☐ Associate’s degree (for example: AA or AS)
☐ Bachelor’s degree (for example: BA or BS)
☐ Master’s degree (for example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA)
☐ Professional degree (for example: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
☐ Doctorate degree (for example: PhD, EdD)
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9. Have you ever been negatively affected by farming or livestock operations in
your neighborhood?
☐ Yes
☐ No
10. Are you currently affiliated with any environmental group or organization?
☐ Yes
☐ No
11. Approximately how many days did you visit freshwater lakes or streams for
either personal enjoyment or recreation in the past 12 months? Please write 0 if
you do not visit freshwater lakes or streams for personal enjoyment or
recreation.
__________ days per year
12. Approximately how much did you donate to environmental causes or groups in
the past 12 months? Please write 0 if you do not donate to environmental
causes or groups.
$ __________ per year
13. Approximately how many days did you volunteer in environmental projects or
causes in the past 12 months? Please write 0 if you do not volunteer in
environmental projects or causes.
__________ days per year
14. What was your total household income before taxes in the past 12 months?
☐ $24,999 or less
☐ $25,000 to $49,999
☐ $50,000 to $74,999
☐ $75,000 to $99,999
☐ $100,000 to $124,999
☐ $125,000 to $149,999
☐ $150,000 or more
15. Have you ever experienced a failed septic system?
☐ Yes
☐ No
16. Approximately how many times did you test the quality of your home’s
drinking water in the past 12 months?
☐ None

☐ Once

☐ Twice
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☐ Three times or more

Please write down any comments you have about the Water Quality
Decision-Making Workshop in the space provided.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The findings of empirical research presented in this dissertation (manuscripts 1 and 2)
provide an important insight regarding methodological issues, relating to incentives
and the effect on value estimates due to a provision rule as well as consistency of
stated preferences across the repeated response format, under a discrete choice
experiment method for valuing environmental goods and services. These results may
convey important methodological learning to valuation researchers for future
consideration while developing such surveys. The preference models developed could
be used by local environmental managers to integrate values for the ecosystem
restoration projects and wetland preservation into their decision-making processes
regarding the environmental policies that affect the use and management of these
natural resources. Furthermore, the results from the public good experiments
(manuscript 3) could provide useful insights to research analysts regarding potential
ways to improve the public good institutions in the future, as well as learning in terms
of what may work and what may not, to generate private offers to provide local public
goods. Also, the results that the less-structured public good institution performed
better than the more-structured institution may emphasize the need to design simple
(in terms of implementation) public good institutions. Overall this dissertation
research contributes to both DCE literature as well as the public good experiments
literature to further our understanding in terms of examining ways to assess better
estimates of values for the goods and services that cannot be traded in common
commodity markets and important insights towards creating novel markets for the
ecosystem services.
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In Manuscript 1, I empirically examined whether the value estimates produced
by real-money field experiments using a DCE survey with an incentive compatible
provision rule were equivalent to the corresponding estimates from the DCE with a
non-incentive compatible provision rule, and I found that the value estimates are
statistically equivalent. This result is consistent with previous studies examining the
provision rules using dichotomous choices, but this study broadens this conclusion for
trichotomous choice elicitation which is the most commonly used DCE elicitation
format. This result relays an important message to valuation researchers that the
absence of theoretically predicted incentive compatibility in trichotomous choice
questions may not be a caveat of concern in such stated preference studies generally,
as implied by our results finding statistically similar underlying preference functions
across the rules. Strategic behavior under a non-incentive compatible rule predicted by
theory may not come out sharply in case of novel environmental choice settings which
may require higher-order thinking. That is, the absence of incentive compatibility may
not be sufficient to lead respondents in DCE’s to respond strategically. Our study also
utilized an opportunity to combine real, immediately implementable choice scenarios
as well as hypothetical scenarios that extended the range of attribute levels covered in
real choices and the comparison of preferences across the two suggested that the
preferences were statistically equivalent. This may be due to a spillover effect of real
scenarios over the hypothetical ones. This result also implied that future DCE studies
could utilize this insight and include some real scenarios whenever possible to create a
more consequential choice context.
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In Manuscript 2, I empirically investigated whether the stated preferences
across a series of choice scenarios in a DCE are stable, as the repeated response format
could induce incentives that may lead to non-truthful responses as predicted by theory
and also backed up by empirical evidence of systematic change in expressed
preferences across the sequence of choices. Our comparison of preferences and value
estimates under DCE studies involving two choice scenarios and a series of twelve
scenarios suggest statistically different underlying preference functions across the two
survey length formats. Further exploration of pattern of response across the sequence
of choices in the repeated survey format suggests evidence of precedent-dependent
effects relating to a potential to retain higher net surplus from the most-valued
alternative in the current task relative to the most-valued alternative in the preceding
task may induce participants to be less sensitive to cost and thus appear to have a
higher WTP across the sequence. Our exploration of precedent-dependent effect in
trichotomous choice elicitation involved choice scenarios with more attributes than
previously appeared in the literature. Such a result may be problematic for future
applications of stated-preference surveys that have assumed the multiple-attributes of
a DCE might lead respondents to adopt a truth-telling strategy throughout a sequence
of choices. Examining a change in predicted net surplus for the most-valued
alternative across the sequence under multinomial response format, I think, is a novel
way of looking at increasing or decreasing utility sequence, than previously was
employed in dichotomous choice setting with much simpler targeted DCE surveys.
In Manuscript 3, I empirically examined participants’ offers to provide
ecosystem-service public good elicited under a more-structured public good institution
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based on Lindahl’s framework known as Individualized Price Auction (IPA) relative
to a less-structured voluntary donation elicitation employing incentive mechanisms
from experimental economics literature, including a provision point (PP) with a
money-back guarantee (MBG) and a proportional rebate (PR) of any excess funds
beyond the PP. In our framed field experiment setting, a less-structured voluntary
donation garnered higher offers compared to the more-structured IPA. This result
emphasizes the need to design simple (in terms of implementation) public good
institutions to generate private contributions to provide public goods.
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